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IIASA Director’s Message
During the past three decades, IIASA has accumulated vast experience in apply-
ing integrated scientific analysis to design policy response to regional and global
environmental, social, and economic problems in a holistic, multidimensional, and
interdisciplinary manner.
IIASA maintains continually evolving models and data sets on subjects ranging
from population to energy and natural resources that have been compiled over the
course of several long-running research efforts. The Institute perceives its role as
a center for international collaboration, for meeting the technological, intellectual,
and policy challenges of globalizing societies. IIASA’s enduring objective is to
provide science-based insight into critical policy issues in international and national
debates on global change.
This comprehensive global assessment on “Climate Change and Agricultural
Vulnerability” focuses on the plight of the poor and vulnerable people who rely
on agriculture for their livelihood. It addresses the ecological and environmental
pressures on human populations in a comprehensive spatial manner, and analyses
food policy options and opportunities.
IIASA has both a responsibility and the scientific know-how and experience to
contribute to the 21st century challenges of achieving sustainable development.
Leen Hordijk
Director of IIASA
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Foreword
On the eve of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannes-
burg, we are convinced that we can move toward an implementation program for
Agenda 21: a global plan of action for sustainable development adopted at the
1992 Earth Summit in Rio. Today, we have a strong global political alliance for
change. At the Millennium Summit in 2000, the heads of government from around
the world took the unprecedented step of committing to concrete time-bound goals
related to poverty, hunger, water, education, and health.
Scientific and technological progress combined with systemic socioeconomic
understanding has given us the tools to achieve sustainable development in the 21st
century. In the next half-century, 3 billion people will join the current world popu-
lation of 6 billion. There is no way of tackling food-security and poverty concerns
without first addressing the issues of sustainable agriculture and rural development.
Natural resources are threatened, as people strive to get the most out of land
already in production or push into virgin territory. The damage is increasingly ev-
ident: arable land lost to erosion, salinity and desertification; water shortages; dis-
appearing forests; and threats to biodiversity. We now also face the new challenge
of climate change that will impact dramatically on the world’s ecosystems.
This special report, commissioned by the United Nations and prepared by the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis for the 2002 WSSD, makes an
important contribution to sustainable agricultural development by spatially quanti-
fying the agro-ecological impacts of climate change, assessed within the economic
context of the world food system.
This study, with global coverage of all countries, developed and developing,
integrates spatial agro-ecological potentials into a world economic and trade policy
framework and evaluates the impact of climate-change projections by the major
General Circulation Models, as well as all the scenarios of the Third Assessment
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
The policy implications and resource information provide an ecological–
economic systems framework for sustainable agricultural development in the
medium and long term. Detailed results are available for all countries.
Nitin Desai
Secretary General
World Summit on Sustainable Development,
Johannesburg, 2002
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Abstract
The challenge of agriculture in the 21st century requires a systemic integration of
the environmental, social, and economic pillars of development to meet the needs of
present generations without sacrificing the livelihoods of future generations. Over
the next 50 years, the world population is projected to increase by some 3 billion,
primarily in the developing countries. Yet, even today, some 800 million people
go hungry daily, and more than a billion live on less than a dollar a day. This
food insecurity and poverty affecting one-quarter of the world’s population is a sad
indictment of the failure to respond adequately in a time of unprecedented scientific
progress and economic development. There is no way we can meet food security
and poverty concerns without first addressing the issues of sustainable agricultural
and rural development.
The methodology and results reported in this study form a first comprehensive
and integrated global ecological–economic assessment of the impact of climate
change on agro-ecosystems in the context of the world food and agricultural sys-
tem. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and
the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) have developed
a comprehensive methodology based on environmental principles, referred to as
the agro-ecological zones methodology. The GIS-based framework combines crop
modeling and environmental matching procedures to identify crop-specific environ-
mental limitations under various levels of inputs and management conditions. This
has facilitated comprehensive and geographically detailed assessments of climate-
change impacts and agricultural vulnerability.
The sensitivity of agro-ecosystems to climate change, as determined by the
FAO/IIASA Agro-ecological Zones (AEZ) model, was assessed within the socio-
economic scenarios defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) Special Report on Emissions (SRES). For this purpose, IIASA’s global
linked model of the world food system was used. This modeling framework, re-
ferred to as the Basic Linked System (BLS), comprises a representation of all major
economic sectors, and views national agricultural systems as embedded in national
economies, which in turn interact with each other at the international level.
The BLS is a global general equilibrium model system for analyzing agricul-
tural policies and food system prospects in an international setting. BLS views
national agricultural systems as embedded in national economies, which interact
with each other through financial flows and trade at the international level. The na-
tional models linked in the BLS cover about 80% of the most important attributes
vi
vii
related to the world food system, such as population, land, agricultural produc-
tion, demand, and trade. The remaining countries of the world are grouped into
14 regional models to provide closure for the world system, both geographically
and economically. The national models simulate the behavior of producers, con-
sumers, and the government. They distinguish two broad sectors: agriculture and
nonagriculture. Agriculture produces nine aggregate commodities.
The combination of AEZ and BLS provides an integrated ecological–economic
framework for the assessment of the impact of climate change. We consider climate
scenarios based on experiments with four General Circulation Models (GCM), and
we assess the four basic socioeconomic development pathways and emission sce-
narios as formulated by the IPCC in its Third Assessment Report.
The main results of the study include climate-change impacts on the prevalence
of environmental constraints to crop agriculture; climate variability and the vari-
ability of rain-fed cereal production; changes in potential agricultural land; changes
in crop-production patterns; and the impact of climate change on cereal-production
potential. Results of the AEZ-BLS integrated ecological–economic analysis of cli-
mate change on the world food system include quantification of scale and location
of hunger, international agricultural trade, prices, production, land use, etc. The
analysis assesses trends in food production, trade, and consumption, and the impact
on poverty and hunger of alternative development pathways and varying levels of
climate change.
The methodology and database developed in this study provide a foundation
for detailed country studies, incorporating country-level information. The climate
change issue is global, long-term, and involves complex interactions between cli-
matic, environmental, economic, political, institutional, social, and technological
processes. It has significant international and intergenerational implications in the
context of equity and sustainable development. Climate change will impact on
social, economic, and environmental systems and shape prospects for sustainable
agricultural and rural development. Adaptation to climate change is essential to
complement climate-change mitigation, and both have to be central to an integrated
strategy to reduce risks and impacts of climate change.
Most of the discussion on climate change has focused on mitigation measures,
for example the Kyoto Protocol. Not much attention has been given to climate-
change adaptation, which will be critical for many developing countries. The de-
veloping world has not yet realized that this issue needs to be on the global agenda
and for developed countries this is not a priority, as they have the means and re-
sources to adapt to future climate change.
National governments and the international community must give agriculture
and the rural sector the highest priority in terms of resource allocation and adoption
of development policies that are locally relevant and globally consistent. Only then
can progress be made to eradicate hunger and poverty in the world.
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1
Introduction
At the first World Food Summit (WFS) in 1974, political leaders from around the
globe set the goal of eradicating hunger within a decade. Some 22 years later, at
the second World Food Summit in 1996, this goal shifted toward a reduction of
hunger to 50% of the 1990 levels by 2015. The rate of progress of recent years
in reducing the number of hungry people in the world indicates that it may take
another 60 years before the WFS target can be reached. Nevertheless, the United
Nations Millennium Summit in September 2000 and the third World Food Summit
in Rome in June 2002 again endorsed this same goal to halve world hunger levels
by 2015. What concrete actions will it take to turn these well-meaning political
goals into reality?
Some 780 million people (18% of the population of developing countries and
in the case of sub-Saharan Africa some 40%) are chronically undernourished and
poor. More than 150 million children under the age of 5 years do not receive the
nutrition they need to fully develop mentally and physically. Every minute of every
day, 15 adults and 15 children die of starvation in the developing world. This tragic
outcome, in a world where more than enough food is produced to provide everyone
with an adequate diet, is morally and ethically outrageous.
We live in a world of disparities where a quarter of the world’s population lives
in degrading poverty. Poverty has received unprecedented international attention in
the last two decades, but there has been too little progress in reducing the number
affected. In the last ten years, the rate of poverty reduction has been less than a third
of what is needed to halve extreme poverty by 2015, as per the 2000 Millennium
Summit goal.
The problems of hunger and poverty are interlinked and one cannot be solved
without tackling the other. Over 75% of the poor live in rural areas, and are depen-
dent primarily on agriculture. The poor are poor because they lack tangible assets
and do not have access to such basic needs as education, clean water, health care,
and secure shelter. And the poor are often politically and socially discriminated
against.
Agriculture has historically been the foundation of social and economic
progress in the developed countries. Today the most powerful political lobbies in
support of agriculture are found in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo, even though
less than 3% of the population of the respective countries derives a livelihood di-
rectly from agriculture. By contrast, in many developing countries, where as much
1
2as two-thirds of the population directly or indirectly earns a living from agricul-
ture, rural and agricultural societies are among the weakest political lobbies. And
farming tends to be one of the least respected occupations.
The central challenge of sustainable agriculture is to meet the food demand
of the present generation without sacrificing the needs of future generations. This
cannot be achieved without the systemic integration of the social, economic, and
environmental pillars of agriculture and rural development. Sustainable agricul-
tural development is essential for economic growth, which creates employment
opportunities in nonagricultural rural sectors, which in turn reduces poverty.
The agricultural sector is critical to social and economic progress, particu-
larly with regard to the eradication of hunger and poverty, the creation of employ-
ment and livelihood-earning opportunities, and the generation of trade and foreign-
exchange earnings. Agriculture is also at the core of environmental concerns over
the management of natural resources – land degradation, water scarcity, deforesta-
tion, and the threat to biodiversity. And yet agriculture has been marginalized, at
both national and international levels.
Agriculture essentially concerns the relationship between the natural environ-
ment and human society. With rapid population growth, securing the inherent vul-
nerability of this relationship, whether social, economic, or environmental, has to
be central to efforts to achieving sustainable development. The focus on people –
their scope, rights, capabilities, limitations, and opportunities – has multiple bene-
fits for individuals and society; yet it is the rural population that has to be central in
agricultural development efforts.
1.1 Social Vulnerability
Many factors contribute to social vulnerability (Figure 1.1), including rapid pop-
ulation growth, poverty and hunger, poor health, low levels of education, gender
inequality, fragile and hazardous location, and lack of access to resources and ser-
vices, including knowledge and technological means. And when people are socially
disadvantaged or lack political voice, this vulnerability is exacerbated further.
Over the next 50 years, the world population is projected to increase by some
3 billion, primarily in the developing countries. This increase in population, mainly
in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East, is expected to be larger
than during the period of rapid growth over the last quarter-century. This high rate
of growth and agriculture’s crucial role in overall rural development mean that in
the initial stages this sector will have to absorb many of the new entrants into the ru-
ral labor force. Currently half of the world’s workforce is employed in agriculture,
and the sector dominates the economies of 25% of the world’s countries.
3Expected population growth and decline between 2000 and 2080
Source: IIASA Population Projections
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Figure 1.1. Social vulnerability.
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Figure 1.2. Undernourished people by region.
Hunger and poverty are closely related and are the main causes of human vul-
nerability. While the lack of sufficient income to purchase food is a major factor
causing food insecurity, hunger itself contributes to poverty by lowering labor pro-
ductivity, reducing tolerance to disease, and depressing educational achievements.
Most of the 780 million undernourished people (Figure 1.2) live in some 84 low-
income and poor developing countries, with a current total population of some 4
billion, which is projected to increase to about 7 billion by 2050. The current food
gap for this undernourished population is estimated to be in the order of 25 million
tons of cereals annually, some 2.5% of total production in these affected countries.
Of serious concern is the group of 46 least developed countries, where domes-
tic per capita food production has declined by 10% in the last 20 years, in sharp
contrast to an average increase of some 40% in the developing world. In these least
developed countries, which account for 10% of the world’s population and less than
1% of the world’s income, the number of undernourished has doubled to some 250
million in the past two decades.
Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest percentage of undernourished – some 40%
of the total population – and there has been little progress in reducing the hunger
in the last three decades. By contrast, the percentage of hungry in Asia has been
halved from a level similar to sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1960s.
Some 30 years ago, the world faced a global food shortage that experts pre-
dicted would lead to catastrophic famine. That danger was averted as an inten-
sive international research effort enabled the development and farmer adoption of
high-yielding varieties of major food crops. This “Green Revolution,” driven by in-
vestment and knowledge, was most effective where environmental conditions were
good, soils were fertile, and water was plentiful. It also involved extensive use of
fertilizers and pesticides. Critics of the Green Revolution stress that it benefited
resource-rich farmers rather than the millions of small farmers, especially in rain-
fed areas. That an integrated biological, environmentally sound, and socially viable
5strategy has to be at the core of the next “precision” green revolution has been one
lesson learned.
Vulnerable populations have only limited capacity to protect themselves from
environmental hazards, in particular from extreme events such as drought and
floods. They also bear the brunt of the consequences of large-scale environmen-
tal change, such as land degradation, biodiversity loss, and climate change. In
1998, weather-related economic losses in developing countries amounted to about
$42 billion. Heavy and variable precipitation, heat waves, cyclones, drought, and
floods may become more frequent and intense, resulting in more economic shocks.
In the short term, policymakers will need to cope with an increased risk of frequent
shocks to their economies, which will affect the welfare of their most vulnerable
populations. Over the long term, they will need to cope with the effects of climate
change on the underlying production structures of the economies, with those coun-
tries dependent on agriculture most heavily hit.
The scientific and technological progress made in just the last two decades –
the information revolution of the 1980s, and the genetic revolution of the 1990s –
offers an unprecedented opportunity to reshape the productivity and sustainability
of food and agricultural systems.
The information revolution can facilitate an interactive global agricultural
knowledge system. For example, in the past, indigenous knowledge about lo-
cal varieties, farming techniques, and natural-resource management traditions and
practice that have evolved through generations has rarely made its way to re-
searchers, who could incorporate it in their work. The dissemination of agricul-
tural research and farming management experiences from around the world often
took considerable time and effort. Today, all of this, and more, can be performed
literally instantaneously with the help of the Internet. However, access to these un-
precedented tools for acquiring knowledge is growing more disparate. While in the
United States and Europe about 50% of the population has access to the Internet,
the comparable figure for Africa and South Asia is just 0.5%.
There is also a growing gap between developing and developed countries in sci-
entific and technological capacity. For example, the United States has 70 scientists
per 10,000 population, while China has six and sub-Saharan Africa just one. At
the same time, science and technology are becoming increasingly proprietary, and
owning knowledge has become the order of the day. Does this mean that those who
cannot afford it will be denied the fruits of scientific and technological progress?
The number of patent applications has grown from 1 million in 1985 to over 7 mil-
lion today.
An increasing number of agricultural research outcomes are being patented and
at the same time traditional crop varieties are disappearing. China, which once had
10,000 landrace varieties of wheat, now has only about 300, and only 14 are grown
in 40% of the wheat fields under intensive cultivation. No one knows what genetic
6traits that lead to insect and disease resistance, stronger plants, higher yields, or
even better tasting crops, might have been lost through disappearing varieties.
Genomics, particularly biotechnology, offers a new precision tool to develop
new crop varieties with attributes to counter soil toxicity and droughts, resist pests
and diseases, and increase nutrient content in crops. These tools are important in
targeting biotechnology at those problems and crops that are of relevance to the
poor. At the same time the issue of bio-safety has to be at the core of such consid-
erations. The application of biotechnology to food crops of the poor appears to be
of little interest to the private sector, while government commitment to agricultural
research continues to decline.
The developments in science and technology have the potential to contribute
substantively to eradicating hunger and poverty in the rural areas, in which the
majority of the world’s population resides. But the widening knowledge divides
within and across nations threatens the goals of equitable and sustainable devel-
opment. Only knowledge that is available, accessible, and affordable can drive
progress and overcome the increasing social vulnerability in a degrading environ-
ment.
1.2 Economic Vulnerability
The economic vulnerability (Figure 1.3) of agriculture is related to a number of in-
teracting elements, including its importance in the overall national economy, trade
and foreign-exchange earnings, aid and investments, international prices of agri-
cultural commodities and inputs, and production and consumption patterns. All
of these factors intensify economic vulnerability, particularly in countries that are
poor and have agriculture-based economies.
At the world level, the share of agriculture in total gross domestic product
(GDP) in developing countries is about 13%, in contrast to 2% in developed coun-
tries. For central, eastern, and western Africa, this share is over 31%, and in South
Asia it is around 25%. In some 25 developing countries, this share varies from
about 40–60%.
During the 1990s, the average growth rate of GDP for all developing countries
increased to 4.3%, compared to 2.7% in the 1980s. The growth rate in developed
countries was 2.3%, down from 3% in the 1980s. In the case of Africa, there was a
marginal improvement in economic growth, but this was eroded by high population
growth. The gap in the standard of living between Africa and the other regions
widened. It is estimated that the consumption expenditure of the average African
household is one-fifth lower than it was a quarter of a century ago.
The richest 20% of the world’s population consumes 85% of the world’s in-
come, while the poorest 20% lives on about 1% of global income. These disparities
7Per capita GDP index
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Figure 1.3. Economic vulnerability.
8are widening. A generation ago, the richest 20% in the world was 30 times richer
than the poorest 20%. Now, they are 70 times as rich.
Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows have fallen during the 1990s,
from $58 billion in 1992 to $53 billion in 2000. ODA, as a proportion of GDP, fell
from 0.35% in 1992 to 0.22% in 2000. Only five countries – Denmark, Luxem-
bourg, The Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden – met the aid target of 0.7% of GDP
in 2000. Most of the least developed countries suffered a decline in ODA of at least
25%, and seven countries in Africa saw ODA reduced by over 50%.
The proportion of ODA going to agriculture, which provides the livelihoods for
most people in poverty, declined from 20% in the late 1980s to about 12% in 2000,
and in absolute value fell by two-thirds. The share of ODA going to low-income
countries, where over 85% of poor people live, has remained roughly constant, at
around 63%, but has been declining in real terms.
Most of the ODA originates from the OECD countries, where agricultural sub-
sidies amounting to some $350 billion annually are maintained by import barriers
and export subsidies, while the agricultural policies of poorer countries tend to
discourage farm production.
In the 1990s, international trade boomed, with world exports growing at a rate
of 6.4%. For developing countries an export growth rate of 9.6% was recorded,
but again Africa lagged behind, its share of world exports declining from 2.7%
in 1990 to 2.1% in 2000. While developed countries have the financial means to
provide large subsidies to protect incomes and living standards of under 5% of their
population, farmers in developing countries have seen their real incomes go down.
The benefits of free trade promised to developing countries in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) are a long way from materializing. The real prices on world
markets of most agricultural commodities fell in the 1990s.
Total food imports in developing countries amounted to some $60 billion in
2000. Low-income food-insecure countries accounted for about half of this. Agri-
cultural products comprise more than one-fifth of total exports in some 53 devel-
oping countries, and some 37 developing countries expend more than a quarter of
their total export earnings on food imports. More than half of these countries are in
sub-Saharan Africa, a region with the most pervasive hunger and poverty.
World crop production grew by 2.2% per year in the 1990s, of which yield
increases contributed three-quarters. The balance came from area expansion and
more intense cropping. Increased mineral fertilizer use, mainly in the developing
countries, accounted for more than one-third of the growth in cereal production.
Fertilizer consumption in developed countries doubled from some 42 kg of nutri-
ents per hectare (ha) during the last four decades. By contrast, in central, eastern,
and western Africa, the current level of fertilizer application is less than 10 kg
per hectare. The need to intensify production to meet the demands of a growing
9population, however, must not overlook the threat of chemical pollution, especially
of water resources.
The economic challenge for developing countries is to identify specific agri-
cultural and rural development needs and opportunities, and to focus investment in
areas where the greatest impact on food security and poverty will be achieved.
The world’s land and water resources are critical for human survival. They pro-
vide food and other agricultural products, as well as other essential services such
as purification of air and water, maintenance of biological diversity, and decompo-
sition and recycling of nutrients.
The growing demand for food for an increasing population is threatening nat-
ural resources as people strive to get the most out of land already in production.
The damage is increasingly evident: arable lands lost to erosion, salinity, and de-
sertification and urban spread; water shortages; disappearing forests; and threats to
biodiversity.
1.3 Environmental Vulnerability
In the 21st century, we now face another, perhaps more devastating, environmental
threat, namely global warming and climate change, which could cause irreversible
damage to land and water ecosystems and loss of production potential. We cannot
be complacent, not when the foundation of human survival, that is, the need for
food, may be at risk due to the global-change-induced environmental vulnerability
of natural ecosystems (Figure 1.4).
Combating climate change is vital to the pursuit of sustainable development;
equally, the pursuit of sustainable development is integral to lasting climate-change
mitigation. And the most pressing challenge is to strengthen the social, economic,
and environmental resilience of the poorest and the most vulnerable against climate
change and variability.
Environmental change, particularly climate change, will have a disproportion-
ate impact on poor people in rural areas where livelihoods of the majority depend
directly on natural resources. Depletion of soil fertility and degradation of forest
resources, water resources, pastures, and fisheries is already aggravating poverty in
many developing countries. Global warming will affect the agro-ecological suit-
ability of crops. The increasing atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide will
enhance plant photosynthesis and may contribute to improved water-use efficiency.
It may also lead to increased pest and disease infestations.
Responses to climate change can be of two broad types. The first employs
adaptive measures to reduce the impacts and risks, and maximize the benefits and
opportunities, of climate change, whatever its cause. The second involves miti-
gation measures to reduce human contributions to climate change. Both adaptive
10
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Figure 1.4. Environmental vulnerability.
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Figure 1.5. The great weather and flood catastrophes over the last forty years.
measures and mitigation measures are necessary elements of a coherent and inte-
grated response to climate change. If future emissions are higher, the impact will
be stronger, and vice versa. At the same time, no matter how aggressively emis-
sions are reduced, climate change is a reality for the 21st century, since existing
emissions in the atmosphere will remain for decades to come. Thus adaptation to
climate change is inevitable.
Reports of increased climate variability and extreme events from around the
world are becoming more and more frequent. In the absence of mitigation and re-
sponse capacities, losses from damage to the infrastructure and the economy, as
well as social turmoil and loss of life, will escalate and be substantial (Figure 1.5).
And this burden will fall on the poorest and in the poorest countries. It is only in
poor countries that drought turns to famine, often resulting in population displace-
ment, suffering, and loss of life. The social and economic costs of such occurrences
may undo, in just a day or a month, the achievements of years of development ef-
forts.
Global environmental change is expected to have a significant impact on food
systems worldwide. The nature and gravity of vulnerabilities of food systems are of
utmost importance and the design of adaptive policies to cope with environmental
changes is critical.
Global environmental changes pose the following challenges to agricultural
research: changes in the flow and storage of materials, ecology of pests and dis-
eases, dynamics of rainfall regimes and water accumulation, plant responses to
temperature and CO2 concentration, reduction of greenhouse-effect gases, plant-
salt tolerance affected by intrusion of saltwater due to sea-level rise, conservation of
biodiversity, and adaptation of food production systems to extreme weather events.
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For agricultural research to respond in a timely manner to these tremendous
challenges, a concerted worldwide policy action is necessary. Networking of
scientists and researchers, priority-setting, allocation of necessary funding, inter-
regional and inter-country technology transfer, and institutional development and
strengthening are among the decisions that world leaders need to make so that
humankind as a whole can benefit from the scientific achievements toward adapting
world food systems to global environmental change.
Given the expected resilience of the driving forces of global environmental
change, even a decisive and drastic global action on mitigation will not subdue
the need for an emergent and proactive action toward adapting world food systems
to cope with the impacts of global environmental change.
Policymakers and land users face the task of reversing land degradation trends
and inefficient water use by improving conditions and re-establishing soil fertility,
reducing deforestation, and preventing the degradation of land resources in new
development areas through the appropriate allocation and adequate use of resources
for sustainable productivity.
Sustainable agricultural land use must be based on sound agronomic princi-
ples, but it must also embrace an understanding of the constraints and interactions
of other dimensions of agricultural production, including the flexibility to diver-
sify and develop a broad genetic base to ensure the possibility of rapid response to
changing conditions. Land management practices, in principal control processes of
land degradation and their efficiency in this respect, will largely govern the sustain-
ability of a given land use. Furthermore, sustainability will depend on institutional,
political, social, and economic pressures and structures that can exacerbate envi-
ronmental problems. These considerations must be integral to ensuring sustainable
agriculture.
Some 1.5 billion ha of land are used for crop production, with some 960 million
ha under cultivation in the developing countries. Over the last 30 years, the world’s
crop area expanded by some 5 million ha annually, with Latin American countries
alone accounting for 35% of this expansion. About 40% of the world’s arable
land is degraded to some degree. Many of the most degraded soils are found in
the world’s poorest countries, in densely populated, rain-fed farming areas, where
overgrazing, deforestation, and inappropriate use compound problems. When soils
become infertile, traditional farmers either let the land lie fallow until it recovers or
simply abandon unproductive lands and move on, clearing forests and other fragile
land areas as available. And the process is repeated.
Forests play an important environmental role in the production of timber, wood,
fuel, and other products, in the conservation of biodiversity and wildlife habitats, as
well as in the mitigation of global climate change and the protection of watersheds
and against flood risks (Figure 1.6). About a fifth of the world’s land surface – some
3 billion ha – is under forest ecosystems. Eight countries – Russia, Brazil, Canada,
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Figure 1.6. Loss of forest eco-systems and biodiversity.
the United States, China, Australia, Congo, and Indonesia – account for 60% of the
world’s forestland. During the past decade, some 127 million ha of forests were
cleared, while some 36 million ha were replanted. Africa lost some 53 million ha
of forest during this period – primarily from expansion of crop cultivation.
Two-thirds of the world’s population lives in areas that receive a quarter of
the world’s annual rainfall, while such sparsely populated areas as the Amazon
Basin receive a disproportionate share. About 70% of the world’s fresh water goes
to agriculture, a figure that approaches 90% in countries that rely on extensive
irrigation. Already some 30 developing countries are facing water shortages, and
by 2050 this number may increase to over 50 countries, a majority in the developing
world. This water scarcity together with degradation of arable land could become
the most serious obstacle to increasing food production.
The use that can be made of land for human primary needs is limited by envi-
ronmental factors such as climate, topography, and soil characteristics, and is to a
large extent determined by agronomic viability and the availability of science and
technology, as well as demographic, socioeconomic, cultural, and political factors
such as land tenure, markets, institutions, and agricultural policies.
Systematic and detailed geographical systems combined with knowledge about
natural resources – climate, land, and water resources, land use and land cover,
crops and land utilization types – are essential to provide a sound basis for agricul-
tural land-use planning at sub-national and national levels.
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1.4 Report Overview
This report comprises four chapters, following this introductory chapter.
Chapter 2 presents details of the ecological–economic analysis based on the
FAO/IIASA agro-ecological zones (AEZ) approach for evaluation of biophysi-
cal limitations and agricultural production potentials, and IIASA’s Basic Linked
System (BLS) for analyzing the world’s food economy and trade system.
The BLS is a global general equilibrium model system for analyzing agricul-
tural policies and food system prospects in an international setting. BLS views
national agricultural systems as embedded in national economies, which interact
with each other through trade at the international level.
The combination of AEZ and BLS provides an integrated ecological–economic
framework for the assessment of the impact of climate change. We consider climate
scenarios based on experiments with four General Circulation Models (GCM), and
we assess the four basic socioeconomic development pathways and emission sce-
narios as formulated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in
its Third Assessment Report.
Chapter 3 presents the main AEZ results of the impact of climate change on
agriculture. Results comprise environmental constraints to crop agriculture; cli-
mate variability and the variability of rain-fed cereal production; changes in po-
tential agricultural land; changes in crop-production patterns; and the impact of
climate change on cereal-production potential.
Chapter 4 discusses the AEZ-BLS integrated ecological–economic analysis of
climate change on the world food system. This includes quantification of scale and
location of hunger, international agricultural trade, prices, production, land use,
etc. It assesses trends in food production, trade, and consumption, and the impact
on poverty and hunger of alternative development pathways and varying levels of
climate change.
Chapter 5 presents the main conclusions and policy implications of this study.
2
Methodology of Ecological–Economic
Analysis of Climate Change and
Agricultural Vulnerability
The sensitivity of agro-ecosystems to climate change, as determined by the
FAO/IIASA Agro-ecological Zones (AEZ) model, was assessed within the socio-
economic scenarios defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) Special Report on Emissions (SRES). For this purpose, IIASA’s modeling
framework for analyzing the world food system was used. This modeling frame-
work, referred to as the Basic Linked System (BLS), comprises a representation of
all major economic sectors, and views national agricultural systems as embedded
in national economies, which in turn interact with each other at the international
level (see Figure 2.1).
The BLS was originally designed to study food policy, but can as well be used to
evaluate the effect of climate-induced changes on the world food-trade system. The
agro-ecological effects of climate change on food production systems were intro-
duced to the model as changes in the national or regional production relationships
per commodity.
2.1 Agro-ecological Zones
2.1.1 Introduction
Land-use and land-cover change are significant to a range of themes and issues
central to global environmental change. Alterations in the earth’s surface hold ma-
jor implications for the global radiation balance and energy fluxes, contribute to
changes in biogeochemical cycles, alter hydrological cycles, and influence eco-
logical balances and complexity. Through these environmental impacts at local,
regional, and global levels, land-use and land-cover changes driven by human ac-
tivity have the potential to significantly affect food security, renewable fresh-water
resources, and the ecological sustainability of the agricultural supply systems.
Increases in the concentration of atmospheric greenhouse gases are leading to
future climate change. Of particular interest are the consequences for agriculture
and the water sector. Past impact studies have produced a wide range of results,
not only because of the uncertainties derived from predicting future climate, but
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Figure 2.1. Integrated ecological–economic analysis of the impact of climate
change on food and agricultural systems.
also due to the vast differences in assumptions and methodologies employed in the
analyses. A consensus has emerged that developing countries are more vulnerable
to climate change than developed countries, because of the predominance of agri-
culture in the economies of these countries, the scarcity of capital for adaptation
measures, their warmer baseline climates, and their exposure to extreme events.
IIASA has widened the implementation of the FAO/IIASA Agro-ecological
Zones (AEZ) methodology to analyze climate change and food systems.
2.1.2 Methodology
The AEZ methodology for land-productivity assessments follows an environmental
approach; it provides a framework for establishing a spatial inventory and database
of land resources and crop-production potentials. This land-resources inventory
is used to assess, for specified management conditions and levels of inputs, the
suitability of crops/Land Utilization Types (LUTs) in relation to both rain-fed and
irrigated conditions, and to quantify expected production of cropping activities
relevant in the specific agro-ecological context. The characterization of land re-
sources includes components of climate, soils, landform, and present land cover.
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Crop modeling and environmental matching procedures are used to identify crop-
specific environmental limitations, under assumed levels of inputs and management
conditions.
Inherent in the methodology is the generation of a climatic inventory to pre-
dict agro-climatic yield potentials of crops. The global AEZ study uses a recent
global climatic data set compiled by the Climate Research Unit at the Univer-
sity of East Anglia, UK. The database offers a spatial resolution of 30 minutes
latitude/longitude and contains climate averages for the period 1961–1990 as well
as year-by-year data for the period 1901–1996. These data are used to characterize
each half-degree grid-cell in terms of applicable thermal climates, temperature pro-
files, accumulated temperature sums, length of growing periods, moisture deficits,
etc.
Adequate agricultural exploitation of the climatic potentials and maintenance
of land productivity largely depend on soil fertility and the management of soils on
an ecologically sustained basis. Hence, the climatic inventory was superimposed
on the FAO’s Digital Soil Map of the World (DSMW). The DSMW is derived from
the FAO/UNESCO Soil Map of the World at scale 1:5 million and presents soil
associations in grid-cells of 5-minutes latitude/longitude, forming the basis of soil
information in Global AEZ. The composition of soil associations is described in
terms of percentage occurrence of soil units, soil phases, and textures. Therefore,
each 5-minute grid-cell is considered as consisting of several land units.
Terrain slopes were derived from the GTOPO30 database developed at the
USGS Eros Data Center, providing digital elevation information in a regular grid of
30 arc-seconds latitude/longitude. At IIASA, rules based on altitude differences of
neighboring grid-cells were applied to compile a terrain-slope distribution database
(for each 5-minute grid-cell of the FAO’s DSMW) in terms of seven average slope
range classes).
The individual GIS layers with attribute data and distributions at 5-minutes
latitude/longitude constitute the land-resources database. The key components of
this database include: the FAO DSMW and linked soil association composition ta-
ble, a slope distribution database, an ecosystem database derived from the USGS 30
arc-second seasonal land-cover data set providing distributions in terms of 12 ag-
gregate land-cover classes for each 5-minute grid-cell, and a global layer of legally
protected areas. The DSMW has been made the reference for constructing a land-
surface mask, i.e., a binary layer that distinguishes grid-cells as land or sea, respec-
tively. Also, each 5-minute grid-cell is uniquely assigned to an administrative unit
(a country or region).
Methodological Steps of AEZ
The AEZ framework contains the following basic elements:
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• Selection of agricultural production systems with defined input and manage-
ment relationships, and crop-specific environmental requirements and adapt-
ability characteristics. These are termed Land Utilization Types (LUT). AEZ
distinguishes between some 154 crop, fodder, and pasture LUTs, each at
three generically defined levels of inputs and management, termed high, in-
termediate, and low levels. In this study a high level of inputs is assumed
across the board (see Box).
• Geo-referenced climate, soil, and terrain data, which are combined into a
land-resources database. The computerized global AEZ database comprises
some 2.2 million grid-cells.
• Accounting for spatial land use and land cover, including forests, protected
areas, population distribution and density, and land required for habitation
and infrastructure.
• Procedures for the calculation of potential agronomically attainable yields
and for matching crop and LUT environmental requirements with the respec-
tive environmental characteristics contained in the land-resources database,
by land unit and grid-cell.
• Assessment of crop suitability and land productivity of cropping systems.
• Applications for the estimation of the land’s population-supporting capac-
ity, multiple-criteria optimization considering socio-economics, demography
etc., of land-resource use for sustainable agricultural development.
Farming technology assumption used in this study
High-level inputs/advanced management: Production is based on improved high-
yielding varieties, efficient combination of labor and mechanization, uses op-
timum applications of nutrients and chemical pest, disease and weed control,
and employs full conservation measures. The farming system is mainly market-
oriented.
The FAO/UNESCO Digital Soil Map of the World (DSMW) has been made the
reference for constructing a land-surface database comprising more than 2.2 million
grid-cells at 5-minutes latitude/longitude within a raster of 2,160 rows and 4,320
columns.
On the input side, the key components of the database applied in AEZ include
the FAO DSMW and linked soil association and attribute tables, a global elevation
and derived slope distribution database, the global climate data set of the Climate
Research Unit of the University of East Anglia consisting of average data (period
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Figure 2.2. AEZ methodology.
1961–1990) and data for each year for the period 1901–1996, and a layer providing
distributions in terms of 11 aggregate land-cover classes derived from a global 1
km land-cover data set. The AEZ global land-resource database also incorporates
spatial delineation and accounting of forest and protected areas. A global popu-
lation data set for the year 1995 provides estimates of population distribution and
densities at a spatially explicit sub-national level for each country.
On the output side, a range of new data sets has been compiled at grid-cell
level and has been tabulated at country and regional level, including agro-climatic
characterizations of temperature and moisture profiles, and time-series of attainable
crop yields for all major food and fiber crops.
The AEZ assessments were carried out for a range of climatic conditions, in-
cluding a reference climate, individual historical years, and scenarios of future
climate based on various global climate models. Hence, the results quantify the
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impact of climate change and increased CO2 concentration on crops, both for
historical climate variability as well as for potential future climate change (see
Figure 2.2).
2.1.3 Effects of climate change and increased atmospheric CO2
concentrations on crop productivity
Temperature, solar radiation, water, and atmospheric CO2 concentration are the cli-
mate and atmospheric variables of importance to plant productivity. Plant species
vary in their response to CO2 in part because of differing photosynthetic mech-
anisms. There are important differences in temperature requirements and re-
sponses to concentration of atmospheric CO2 among C3, C4, and Crassulacean acid
metabolism (CAM) plants. Also, most of the crop plants currently cultivated have
been selected and bred into different varieties to produce efficiently high yields
under specific environmental and farming-system conditions. Nutrients and water
may be augmented via fertilization and irrigation, while radiation and temperature
are more difficult to control, particularly in large-scale agricultural operations.
Climate change will most likely result in new combinations of soil, climate,
atmospheric constituents, solar radiation, and pests, diseases, and weeds. The re-
sponses of plants to climate change have been studied in a large number of experi-
ments and in detailed modeling of basic processes. The results of this research and
knowledge of basic physical and biological processes have provided a basic under-
standing of direct and indirect effects of climate change on agricultural productiv-
ity. Some of the interactions of temperature, moisture availability, and increased
CO2 on plant growth have been investigated through crop response models. These
models have been widely used to assess yield response to climate change at many
different sites around the world, and have produced valuable insights in these inter-
actions (e.g., Rozema, 1993; Rosenzweig and Parry, 1994; IPCC, 1996).
There is generally agreement that an increase of atmospheric CO2 levels leads
to increased crop productivity. In experiments, C3 plants, such as wheat and soy-
beans, exhibit an increase in productivity of about 20–30% at doubled CO2 concen-
trations. Response, however, depends on crop species as well as soil fertility con-
ditions and other possible limiting factors. C4 plants, such as maize and sugarcane,
show a much less pronounced response than the C3 crops, increasing productivity
on average by 5–10%. In general, higher CO2 concentrations also lead to improved
water-use efficiency of both C3 and C4 plants.
Established plant-response trends to increased CO2 concentrations on the basis
of experiments, in terms of plant growth, plant water-use efficiency, and quantity
and quality of harvested produce, are summarized below:
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i. Plant growth
C3 plants (temperate and boreal) show a pronounced response to increased CO2
concentrations. C4 plants (warm tropical) show only a limited response to increased
CO2 concentrations. C3 plants with nitrogen-fixing symbionts tend to benefit more
from enhanced CO2 supplies than other C3 plants. Photosynthesis rate increases
occur immediately following exposure to increased CO2 concentrations. Initial
strong response is often reduced under long-term exposure to higher CO2 levels;
experimental evidence suggests that growth responses would be lower for peren-
nials than for annuals. Increased leaf-area production, as a result of the increased
rate of photosynthesis, leads to an earlier and more complete light interception and
therefore stimulates biomass increases. Higher biomass requires higher energy sup-
ply for maintenance, expressed in higher respiration, partly compensated by lower
specific respiration. Leaf-turnover rate increases due to self-shading and decrease
of specific leaf surface, and both tend to reduce photosynthesis per leaf. At higher
CO2 levels, plant-growth damage inflicted by air pollutants, such as nitrogen ox-
ides (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and ozone (O3), is at least partly limited because
of reduced stomatal opening.
ii. Water-use efficiency
Increased CO2 levels reduce stomatal conductance and transpiration rates. How-
ever, water consumption on a ground-area basis, i.e., canopy evapotranspiration,
versus consumption on a leaf-area basis is reported to be much less affected. The
range in water-use efficiency (WUE) of major crops is fairly wide and most dis-
tinct for C4 crops. Many studies report an increase in the water-use efficiency in
terms of dry matter produced per unit of water transpired. As a consequence of
reduced transpiration, leaf temperature will rise and may lead to a faster rate of
plant development and a considerable increase in leaf-area development, especially
in the early crop-growth stages. Reduced transpiration and the resulting higher
leaf temperature lead to an accelerated aging of the leaf tissue. Overall effects of
leaf-temperature rise will depend upon whether or not optimum temperatures for
photosynthesis are approached or exceeded.
iii. Harvest index and quality of produce
Biomass and yield increased in almost all experiments under controlled conditions.
Dry-matter allocation patterns to roots, shoots, and leaves have been observed to
change differently for C3 and C4 crops. Root/shoot ratios often increase under ele-
vated CO2 levels, favoring root and tuber crops (and also contribute to soil organic
matter build-up). Increased CO2 accelerates crop development due to increased
leaf temperature resulting from reduced transpiration, reducing the efficiency of
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biomass or seed production. The content of non-structural carbohydrates generally
increases under high CO2, while the concentration of mineral nutrients and pro-
teins is reduced. Food quality of leaf tissue may decline, leading to an increased
requirement of biomass by herbivores.
Linkage of AEZ Results with BLS
Results of AEZ agricultural production potential assessments, under various cli-
mate change/CO2 emission scenarios and obtained for different GCM-based cli-
mate experiments, were input to IIASA’s system of national agricultural models to
further assess world food system and trade implications.
2.2 Basic Linked System
The ecological–economic simulations in this report use the Basic Linked System
(BLS) of models designed by the Food and Agriculture Program of the Interna-
tional Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. IIASA’s re-
search has provided a framework for analyzing the world food system, viewing
national agricultural systems as embedded in national economies, which in turn
interact with each other at the international level. The analysis addresses develop-
ment paradigms as defined by the IPCC Working Group III for the Special Report
on Emissions Scenarios (SRES).
The BLS consists of 34 national and/or regional geographical components:
18 single-country national models, two models for regions with close economic co-
operation (one for the European Union and one for the countries of Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union), and 14 models of country groupings. The individual
models are linked together by means of a world market, i.e., an international linkage
mechanism. The model is formulated as a recursively dynamic system, working in
annual steps, the outcome of each step affected by the outcomes of earlier ones.
Each individual model covers the whole economy of the respective geographical
area. For the purpose of international linkage, production, consumption, and trade
are aggregated to nine agricultural sectors and one nonagricultural sector. All phys-
ical and financial accounts are balanced and mutually consistent: the production,
consumption, and financial ones at the national level, and the trade and financial
flows at the global level.
2.2.1 Basic principles underlying the BLS system
The Basic Linked System is a tool for analyzing agricultural policies and food
system prospects in an international setting. The BLS has been conceptualized
and constructed by IIASA in close cooperation with the Centre for World Food
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Studies and with the help of many researchers from around the world. Four books
and numerous journal articles have been published about the model system and the
results of policy analyses conducted with it. A detailed description of the system is
provided in Fischer et al. (1988). Results obtained from the system are discussed in
Parikh et al. (1988) and in Fischer et al. (1991, 1994). Several applications of the
BLS to climate-change impact analysis have been published, e.g., in Rosenzweig
and Parry (1994), Fischer et al. (1996), and Parry et al. (1999).
The national models linked in the BLS cover about 80% of the most important
attributes related to the world food system, such as population, land, agricultural
production, demand, and trade. The remaining countries of the world, together
accounting for up to 20% of these indicators, are grouped into 14 simplified re-
gional models to provide closure for the world system, both geographically and
economically. The groupings are based on country characteristics such as geo-
graphical location, income per capita, and the country’s position with regard to net
food trade. In this way, five regional groups were constructed for Africa, three for
Latin America, five for Asia, and one containing the “Rest of the World.” Further
details are shown in Annex 2.1.
The level of commodity aggregation varies between the various components
of a model as well as between different types of national models in the BLS (see
Annex 2.2). This does not, however, apply to the international level where the
linkage mechanism requires standardization. In all component models the trade
flows adhere to the same commodity classification. A list of commodity aggregates
is given in Annex 2.3.
The BLS is an applied general equilibrium (AGE) model system. This neces-
sitates that all economic activities are represented in the model. Financial flows as
well as commodity flows within a country and at the international level are kept
consistent in the sense that they must balance, by imposing a system of budget con-
straints and market-clearing conditions. Whatever is produced will be demanded,
either for human consumption, feed, or as intermediate input. Alternatively, com-
modities can be exported or put into storage. Consistency of financial flows is im-
posed at the level of the economic agents in the model (individual income groups,
governments, etc.), at the national as well as the international level. This implies
that total expenditures cannot exceed total income from economic activities and
from abroad, in the form of financial transfers, minus savings. On a global scale,
spending cannot exceed earnings.
Linkage of country and country-group models occurs through trade, world mar-
ket prices, and financial flows. The system is solved in annual increments, simul-
taneously for all countries in each time period. It is assumed that production does
not adjust instantaneously to new economic conditions. Within each one-year time
period, only demand changes with price and commodity buffer stocks can be ad-
justed for short-term supply response. However, production to be marketed in the
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following year is affected by possible changes in relative prices. This feature makes
the BLS a recursively dynamic system. The iterative solution procedure proceeds
in three steps:
1. For given prices (either last year’s market-clearing solution, or intermediate
results from a previous iteration), calculate net exports and imports for all 34
countries and country groups of the BLS.
2. Check market clearance for each commodity, i.e., test whether the sum of
exports over countries equals the sum of imports.
3. Revise world market prices according to imbalances calculated in (2). When
markets are balanced, accept prices as the world market solution for that
particular year and proceed with calculations for next time period; otherwise
return to (1).
This process is repeated until the world markets are simultaneously cleared in
all commodities. The procedure is sketched in Figure 2.3.
It is assumed that goods are marketed in the year following the period in which
they are produced. At the beginning of each period, commodity supply is given.
The exchange process results in equilibrium prices, i.e., a vector of international
prices such that global imports and exports balance for all commodities. These
market-clearing prices are then used to determine value added in production and
income of households and governments.
Simulations with the BLS generate a variety of outputs for model variables and
indicators. At the global level these include world market prices, global popula-
tion, global production and consumption, and global income. At the country level
the information varies with the type of model, including in general the following
variables: producer and retail prices, level of production, use of primary production
factors (land, labor, and capital), intermediate input use (feed, fertilizer, and other
chemicals), human consumption, stock levels and commodity trade, gross domes-
tic product and investment by sector, levels of taxes, tariffs, and income by group
and/or sector.
2.2.2 The BLS national models
The national models simulate the behavior of producers, consumers, and the gov-
ernment. The models distinguish two broad sectors: agriculture and nonagriculture.
Agriculture produces nine aggregate commodities. All nonagricultural activities
are combined into one single aggregate. Domestic disappearance of a commodity
is the sum of human consumption, feed use (where appropriate), intermediate con-
sumption, and stock changes. In addition, the nonagricultural commodity is also
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Figure 2.3. The international linkage in the BLS (from Parry et al., 1999).
required as an investment good, and for processing and transporting agricultural
goods.
Production in the standard national models is critically dependent on the avail-
ability of the primary factors, namely land, labor, and capital. The former is re-
quired only in the agricultural sector, while the latter two are determinants of output
in both the agricultural and the nonagricultural sectors. Capital stocks are accumu-
lated through investment and depreciation. Once a decision is made on how much
to invest in each of the two main sectors, the capital stock generated with this in-
vestment is committed to the respective sector. The maximum land available for
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cropping depends on a country’s total extent of land suitable for agriculture and the
profitability of agricultural land use, i.e., the economic incentives as expressed by
the relative price of agriculture to nonagriculture. The responsiveness of how much
land can be cultivated due to changing economic conditions is rather low since both
time and investment are needed to bring new land into cultivation.
For each of the agricultural commodities, acreage (or livestock numbers) and
yields are determined. Crop yields respond to fertilizer application; animal output
increases with feeding intensity. Fertilizer application is sensitive to relative prices.
Feed use is adjusted and optimized in each time period so as to obtain least-cost
feed rations. This means that variable inputs of fertilizer and animal feeds adjust to
changing economic conditions with only a short delay.
Once the yield levels are determined, net revenues per hectare or per livestock
unit are calculated. These in turn determine the relative profitability of the various
agricultural commodities, a key criterion for allocating land, labor, and capital.
These three production factors are required as inputs into the production process
and are allocated between the various enterprises in order to maximize net returns
subject to the available technology. This allocation process is carried out in each
time step.
Technical progress is included in the yield functions of crops and livestock. The
rate of technical progress is estimated from past performance. For simulations into
the future it is set externally and can be varied according to scenario assumptions.
While it is mainly changing retail prices and incomes that alter consumer de-
mand, producers are most affected by farm-gate prices of outputs and inputs, by
their past investment decisions, by technical innovations, and by environmental
changes, e.g., projected climate change.
2.2.3 Climate-change impact analysis with the BLS
The evaluation of the potential impacts of the different SRES story lines on pro-
duction and trade of agricultural commodities, in particular on food staples, was
carried out in two steps. First, simulations were undertaken representing “futures”
with the BLS, which were consistent with the respective demographic and eco-
nomic assumptions of the SRES marker scenarios but where current climate and
atmospheric conditions would prevail. Second, yield impacts due to temperature
and CO2 changes, as derived from the agro-ecological assessment, were simulated
with the BLS and compared to the respective outcomes without climate change.
The primary role of such reference scenarios is to serve as “neutral” points of
departure, from which climate-change scenarios with their altered assumptions on
crop productivity take off as variants, with the impact of climate change being seen
in the deviation of these simulation runs from the respective reference scenario.
The simulations are carried out on a yearly basis from 1990 to 2080.
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2.2.4 Assumptions about exogenous variables
As a global system of linked national and regional models, and based on general
equilibrium principles, the BLS contains only a few variables that are truly ex-
ogenous. Among those variables are demographic change and labor participation,
technical progress, shifts in lifestyles, and the setting of policy measures, e.g., trade
quotas, price subsidies, or tariffs.
Population growth rates were obtained from the projections assumed in the
IPCC SRES scenarios, i.e., they are based on three alternative projections prepared
by the UN Population Division and by IIASA. Population growth rates have been
incorporated for individual countries (Lutz and Goujon, 2002; CIESIN, 2002), and
were aggregated to country groups where necessary. Labor participation rates de-
pend on population structure. Thus, trajectories of total labor force in a country
are exogenously prescribed and do not change across scenarios of the same family
of SRES experiments. Note, however, that the allocation of labor between agricul-
ture and nonagriculture is determined within the model and responds to changing
economic conditions.
Technical progress enters the representation of the production processes at dif-
ferent levels in a country model, e.g., yield and mechanization functions of agricul-
ture, feeding efficiency relations, and – important to overall growth performance –
technical progress in the nonagricultural sector. Time is used as a proxy variable
for phasing in technical progress.
A critical step in the assessment is translating quantified trajectories of key
variables from the IPCC SRES scenarios to IIASA’s model of the world food and
agriculture system. First, the demographic and economic projections of the BLS
are calibrated to match the macroeconomic assumptions of the respective IPCC
SRES marker scenarios. Second, the climate-change yield component of the BLS
is parameterized based on detailed results from global AEZ assessments for climate
changes simulated according to alternative SRES assumptions and GCM-based cli-
mate scenarios.
The story line formulation and scenario quantifications developed by the SRES
analytical teams and several modeling groups includes various “marker” scenarios,
i.e., projections of population as well as trajectories of global and regional gross
domestic product (GDP), emissions, and energy consumption. A high degree of
correspondence with the BLS in key variables for modeling the economy makes
it feasible to harmonize the scenario analysis undertaken in IPCC SRES and with
the BLS. One possible approach would have been to directly impose projections of
GDP and other variables from SRES marker scenarios as exogenous inputs to the
BLS. This would have constrained the BLS in a very rigid manner, in effect by-
passing its representation of the interdependencies between agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors.
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To keep these interdependencies intact, the approach chosen was to harmonize
rates of economic growth generated in the BLS with those projected in the IPCC
SRES marker scenarios through adjustment of production factors and of assumed
rates of technical progress. Growth rates in the national models of the BLS are
endogenously generated based on three elements: (a) capital accumulation through
investment and depreciation, related to a savings function that depends on lagged
GDP levels as well as balance of trade and financial aid flows; (b) dynamics of
the labor force as a result of demographic changes; and (c) (exogenous) technical
progress. For calibrating economic growth to SRES story lines, the 34 geographical
model components of the BLS were aggregated into ten broad regions (EMF14,
1995). The harmonization of production factors and GDP for the period 1990–
2080 was then carried out on a region-by-region basis. The relationship between
the BLS geographical entities and the regions used in the calibration process is
shown in Annex 2.4. It also indicates the mapping of BLS entities to broad SRES
regions defined in the IPCC special report.
With population predetermined and economic growth calibrated to SRES story
lines, important factors determining food requirements and demand are specified
exogenously. The other factors that influence human consumption, e.g., prices and
incomes, are endogenous to the model. All demand components, i.e., human con-
sumption, feed use, other intermediate consumption, buffer stock levels, and seed
and waste, are endogenous in the models. The flexibility to adjust to price and
income changes varies significantly, among commodities as well as for different
kinds of utilization.
2.2.5 Assessing impacts of climate change on agriculture
Most models included in the BLS distinguish between yield and acreage functions.
Yield impacts caused by climate change have been assessed outside the BLS, using
the FAO/IIASA global agro-ecological zones methodology. They enter the vari-
ous BLS yield functions by means of multiplicative adjustment factors, i.e., yield
changes suggested by agronomic research were translated into altered parameteri-
zations of BLS yield functions. It is important to note that we bend or shift yield
functions in accordance with experimental results, rather than changing yields di-
rectly; this leaves room in the model for economic adaptation in response to climate
change.
Acreage allocation is indirectly affected through changes in the economic per-
formance of the competing crop-production activities. The BLS is also equipped
to handle explicit acreage constraints in the factor allocation module of the agri-
cultural production component; this feature has not been activated in the current
analysis.
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The assessment of the impacts of climate change on agriculture is carried out
relative to four baselines, modeled according to the IPCC SRES marker scenarios
termed A1, A2, B1, and B2. These base scenarios represent alternative extrapola-
tions of the world system into the future. The system is simulated for the period
1990–2080. Simulation is carried out in one-year increments. All scenarios of
climate-change impact start in 1990 and are taken relative to a reference climate
of the period 1961–1990. Climate impacts on yields were phased in with piece-
wise linear functions, i.e., the yield change multipliers incorporated into the yield
response functions were built up gradually with time so as to reach the respective
impacts as determined by the AEZ analysis for the years 2020, 2050, and 2080.
The BLS offers a range of variables and indicators for assessing the simulation
results. The most important among them are those that are indicative of changes in
welfare, such as cost of consumption comparisons, gross domestic product, calorie
consumption, estimates of the number of people at risk of hunger, and income
parity between agriculture and the other sectors of the economy. In addition, there
are several commodity-specific indicators available, such as production, yield and
acreage, consumption and trade, as well as prices.
2.3 Climate Scenarios
Scenarios of climate change were developed in order to estimate their effects on
crop yields, extents of land with cultivation potential, and the number and type of
crop combinations that can be cultivated. A climate-change scenario is defined as a
physically consistent set of changes in meteorological variables, based on generally
accepted projections of CO2 (and other trace gases) levels.
The IPCC published a Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) in 2000
(Nakicenovic and Swart (eds.), 2000). This report describes the new set of emis-
sions scenarios used in the IPCC Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001). The
SRES scenarios have been constructed to explore future developments in the global
environment with special reference to the production of greenhouse gases and
aerosol precursor emissions. All the SRES scenarios are “non-mitigation” sce-
narios with respect to climate change.
The range of scenarios analyzed in this study addresses development paradigms
as defined by the IPCC Working Group III for the SRES. The AEZ model has
been applied to results of General Circulation Models (GCM), which were avail-
able for the IPCC SRES emission scenarios A1FI, A1B, A2, B1, and B2. Out-
puts from GCM experiments were obtained through the IPCC Data Distribution
Centre (DDC) and the Climate Research Unit (CRU) at the University of East An-
glia (http://ipcc-ddc.cru.ac.uk). For use in AEZ, the outputs of the climate model
experiments, with various spatial resolutions, have been interpolated to a grid of
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0.5 × 0.5 degrees latitude/longitude and applied to reference a climatology of
1961–1990, which has been compiled by the CRU (New et al., 1998). Results of
the following coupled atmosphere-ocean general circulation models were included
in the analysis for this report:
Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research: HadCM3 is a coupled
atmosphere-ocean GCM developed at the Hadley Centre and described by Gordon
et al. (2000) and Pope et al. (2000). The model has a stable control climatology
and does not use flux adjustment. The atmospheric component of the model has
19 levels with a horizontal resolution of 2.5 degrees of latitude by 3.75 degrees of
longitude, which produces a global grid of 96 × 73 grid-cells. This is equivalent to
a surface resolution of about 417 km × 278 km at the equator, reducing to 295 km
× 278 km at 45 degrees of latitude. The oceanic component of the model has 20
levels with a horizontal resolution of 1.25 × 1.25 degrees of latitude/longitude. At
this resolution it is possible to represent important details in oceanic current struc-
tures. Annual results of monthly weather variables of HadCM3 simulations were
available from DDC for simulations using the IPCC SRES A2 and B2 emission
scenarios; additionally, results for A1FI and B1 scenarios were provided by CRU.
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO):
The CSIRO Climate Change Research Program is Australia’s largest and most com-
prehensive program investigating the greenhouse effect and global climate change.
The CSIRO coupled model involves global atmospheric, oceanic, sea-ice, and bio-
spheric sub-models (Gordon and O’Farrell, 1997; Hirst et al., 1997). The at-
mospheric, biospheric, and sea-ice sub-models are the same as those used in the
CSIRO Mark 2 GCM, as detailed in McGregor et al. (1993) and Kowalczyk et al.
(1994). Atmospheric and oceanic components use a spectral horizontal grid, each
grid-cell measuring about 625 km by 350 km, with nine vertical levels in the at-
mosphere and 21 levels in the ocean. Annual results of monthly weather variables
of CSIRO experiments were available from DDC for simulations using the IPCC
SRES A1b, A2, B1, and B2 emission scenarios.
Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling and Analysis (CCCma): For SRES
emission scenarios, results were obtained with the second version of the Canadian
Global Coupled Model (CGCM2). It is based on the earlier CGCM1, but with some
improvements, in particular, regarding the ocean mixing parameterization and sea-
ice dynamics (Flato and Hibler, 1992). A description of CGCM2 and a comparison,
relative to CGCM1, of its response to increasing greenhouse-gas forcing is avail-
able in Flato and Boer (2001). The CGCM1 model and its control climate are
described by Flato et al. (2000). It is a spectral model with a surface grid resolution
of roughly 3.7 by 3.7 degrees latitude/longitude and ten vertical levels. The ocean
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component has a resolution of roughly 1.8 by 1.8 degrees and 29 vertical levels.
A multi-century control simulation with the coupled model has been performed
using the present-day CO2 concentration to evaluate the stability of the coupled
model’s climate, and to compare the modeled climate and its variability to that ob-
served. The IPCC DDC provides annual time-series of monthly climate variables
for SRES A2 and B2 scenarios.
National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR): The Parallel Climate
Model (DOE-PCM) is a joint effort, sponsored by the US Department of Energy
(DOE), to develop a parallel climate model between Los Alamos National Labo-
ratory (LANL), the Naval Postgraduate School, the US Army Corps of Engineers’
Cold Regions Research and Engineering Lab, and the National Center for Atmo-
spheric Research. Version 1 of the PCM couples the NCAR Community Climate
Model version 3, the LANL Parallel Ocean Program, and a sea-ice model from the
Naval Postgraduate School. Further details of the PCM control run are described
in Washington et al. (2000). Results provided by the IPCC DDC are annual time-
series of monthly climate variables for a grid of 68 by 128 grid-cells for IPCC
SRES emission scenarios A2 and B2.
2.3.1 Comparison of outputs of the four GCMs
Comparisons of results from HadCM3, CSIRO, CGCM2, and NCAR have been
made for all land and for current agricultural land separately in terms of “Temper-
ature change (◦C) versus CO2 concentration levels (ppm)” and for “Temperature
change (◦C) versus precipitation change (%).”
Relationships between CO2 concentration levels and predicted temperature re-
sponses show a close correlation. Results for HadCM3, CSIRO, and CGCM2 are
similar. Temperature response to increased CO2 is, however, systematically lower
in the case of NCAR’s PCM model.
Relationships between temperature change and change in precipitation levels
are far less distinct; rather large regional differences exist, both in terms of correla-
tion among different climate models and even direction of change.
Figure 2.4 and Table 2.1 present for the four GCMs the implied responses of
temperature to increasing CO2 concentrations, compiled from the GCM outputs
obtained for different SRES emission scenarios, and the correlations between mod-
eled temperature increase and precipitation change, considering all land grid-cells
for the world and for developed and developing nations separately. Annex 2.1 pro-
vides correlations for individual regions.
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Figure 2.4. Responses of temperature to increasing CO2 concentrations and cor-
relations between temperature increase and precipitation change.
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Table 2.1. Overall correlations between temperature increase and precipitation
change.
Regions HadCM3 CSIRO CGCM2 NCAR
World +/– + +/– –
Developed + + + +
Developing – + – +
North America + + + +
Central America – 0 – +/–
South America – 0 – +
Oceania +/– +/– + +
East Asia + + 0 +
South Asia + + + +
Southeast Asia + + – +
Northern Africa – – +/– –
Eastern Africa – + +/– +
Western Africa +/– – + +
Central Africa – 0 +/– +
Southern Africa – – +/– +/–
Northern Europe + + + +
Western Europe – + +/– 0
Eastern Europe +/– +/– +/– +
Southern Europe – – – –
Russia + + + +
Central Asia + +/– 0 +
West Asia – – +/– +
+ positive correlation, – negative correlation, +/– mixed and 0 constant precipitation.
2.4 IPCC SRES Scenarios
The climate issue is part of the larger question of how complex social, economic,
and environmental subsystems interact and shape development pathways, thereby
strongly affecting emissions and consequently the extent and pace of resulting cli-
mate change, as well as the capacity to mitigate and adapt to climate change. The
long-term nature and uncertainty of climate change and its driving forces require
scenarios that extend to the 21st century (IPCC, 2000). In response to a 1994 eval-
uation of the earlier IPCC IS92 emission scenarios, the 1996 Plenary of the IPCC
requested a Special Report on Emission Scenarios (SRES) (Nakicenovic and Swart,
2000).
The SRES scenarios cover a wide range of the main driving forces of future
emissions, from demographic to technological and economic developments, but
exclude policies that would explicitly address climate change. The SRES scenarios
include the range of emissions of all relevant species of greenhouse gases and sulfur
and their driving forces.
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Four different narrative story lines were developed to describe consistently the
relationships between driving forces and their evolution, and to add context for
the scenario quantification. Each story line represents different demographic, so-
cial, economic, technological, and environmental developments (IPCC, 2000). The
story lines, termed A1, A2, B1, and B2, are briefly summarized here.
SRES A1: A future world of very rapid economic growth, low population growth,
and rapid introduction of new and more efficient technology. Major underlying
themes are economic and cultural convergence and capacity-building, with a sub-
stantial reduction in regional differences in per capita income. In this world, people
pursue personal wealth rather than environmental quality. The A1 scenario fam-
ily develops into three groups that describe alternative directions of technological
change in the energy system. The three A1 groups are distinguished by their tech-
nological emphasis: fossil-intensive (A1FI), non-fossil energy sources (A1T), or a
balance across all sources (A1B).
• World economy grows at 3.3% over the period 1990–2080. The per capita
GDP in 2080 amounts to $76,000 in the developed world and $42,000 in the
developing world. The average income ratio between currently developed
and developing countries was 13.8 in 1990 and this reduces to 1.8 in 2080.
Thus it is an equitable world where current distinctions between poor and
rich countries eventually dissolve.
• Demographic transition to low mortality and fertility; the world sees an end
to population growth. The total population for developing countries reaches
7,100 million in 2050 and then declines to 6,600 million in 2080, whereas
the population in the developed world stabilizes at 1,250 million in 2050.
• Environmental quality is achieved through active measures emphasizing
“conservation” of nature changes towards active “management” – and mar-
keting – of natural and environmental services.
• Final energy intensity decreases at an average annual rate of 1.3%; transport
systems evolve to high car ownership, sprawling sub-urbanization, and dense
transport networks, nationally and internationally; large regional differences
in future GHG emission levels.
SRES A2: A very heterogeneous world. The underlying theme is that of strength-
ening regional cultural identities, with an emphasis on family values and local tra-
ditions, high population growth, and less concern for rapid economic development.
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• World economy grows at 2.3% over the period 1990–2080. The per capita
GDP in 2080 amounts to $37,000 in the developed world and $7,300 in the
developing world. The average income ratio between currently developed
and developing countries was 13.8 in 1990 and this reduces to 5.1 in 2080.
Thus it is a world where income disparities have been reduced by about two-
thirds of current levels.
• Rapid population growth continues, reaching a world total of 11 billion in
2050 and almost 14 billion in 2080. The total population of developing
countries reaches 9.4 billion in 2050 and 11.7 billion in 2080, whereas the
population in the developed world reaches 1.4 billion in 2050 and 1.6 billion
in 2080. Social and political structures diversify, with some regions moving
toward stronger welfare systems.
• Environmental concerns are relatively weak, although some attention is paid
to bringing local pollution under control and maintaining local environmental
amenities.
• The fuel mix in different regions is determined primarily by resource avail-
ability; technological change is rapid in some regions and slow in others;
high energy and carbon intensity, and correspondingly high GHG emissions.
SRES B1: A convergent world with rapid change in economic structures, “de-
materialization,” and introduction of clean technologies. The emphasis is on global
solutions to environmental and social sustainability, including concerted efforts for
rapid technology development, dematerialization of the economy, and improving
equity.
• World economy grows at 2.9% over the period 1990–2080. The per capita
GDP in 2080 amounts to $55,000 in the developed world and $29,000 in the
developing world. The average income ratio between currently developed
and developing countries was 13.8 in 1990 and this reduces to 2.0 in 2080.
Thus it is an equitable world where current distinctions between poor and
rich countries eventually dissolve.
• Demographic transition to low mortality and fertility; the world sees an end
to population growth. The total population for developing countries reaches
7,100 million in 2050 and than declines to 6,600 million in 2080, whereas the
population in the developed world stabilizes at 1,250 million in 2050. High
level of environmental and social consciousness combines with a globally
coherent approach to sustainable development.
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• Environmental consciousness and institutional effectiveness; high environ-
mental quality is high; increasing resource efficiency; reduction of material
wastage, maximizing reuse and recycling.
• Smooth transition to alternative energy systems as conventional oil resources
decline; high levels of material and energy saving as well as reductions in
pollution; transboundary air pollution is basically eliminated in the long
term; low GHG emissions.
SRES B2: A world in which the emphasis is on local solutions to economic, social,
and environmental sustainability. It is again a heterogeneous world with less rapid
and more diverse technological change, but a strong emphasis on community ini-
tiative and social innovation to find local, rather than global solutions.
• World economy grows at 2.7% over the period 1990–2080. The per capita
GDP in 2080 amounts to $47,000 in the developed world and $18,000 in the
developing world. The average income ratio between currently developed
and developing countries was 13.8 in 1990 and this reduces to 2.6 in 2080.
Thus it is a world where income disparities have been reduced by over four-
fifths of current levels.
• Population growth continues, reaching a world total of 9.3 billion in 2050
and almost 10.1 billion in 2080. The total population for developing coun-
tries reaches 7.9 billion in 2050 and 8.7 billion in 2080, whereas the popu-
lation in the developed world reaches 1.2 billion in 2050 and then declines
to 1.1 billion in 2080. Social and political structures diversify, with some
regions moving toward stronger welfare systems; increased concern for en-
vironmental and social sustainability.
• Environmental protection is an international priority; improved management
of some transboundary environmental problems.
• Energy systems differ from region to region, depending on the availability of
natural resources; energy intensity of GDP declines by about 1% per year;
technical change across regions is uneven; low level of car dependence and
less urban sprawl; transition away from fossil resources; development of less
carbon-intensive technology in some regions.
A comparison of some key characteristics, such as population development,
economic wealth, emissions and the resulting atmospheric CO2 abundance, is pre-
sented in Figure 2.5.
37
0
2000
6000
10000
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
M
ill
io
ns
0
4000
8000
12000
16000
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
M
ill
io
ns
A1, B1 A2
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
C
O
2 
em
is
si
on
s 
G
tC
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
0
40000
80000
120000
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
G
D
P
 $
/c
ap
A1-MDC
A1-LDC
A2-MDC
A2-LDC
B2-MDC
B2-LDC
B1-MDC
B1-LDC
0
4000
8000
12000
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
AML
ASIA
REF
OECD
M
ill
io
ns
B2
A1B
A1FI
A2
B1
B2
A1B
A1FI
A2
B1
B2
(a) (b)
(c)
(d) (e)
(f)
C
O
2 
pp
m
Figure 2.5. IPCC SRES scenarios to 2100. (a) CO2 emissions to 2100. (b) CO2
concentration. (c) GDP per capita. (d)–(f) Population projections.
3
Impacts of Climate Change on
Agro-ecology
3.1 Introduction
Human activities are changing the Earth’s climate, and this is having an impact
on all ecosystems. The expected changes in climate will alter regional agricultural
systems, with consequences for food production. The specifics of the impact will
depend on how the effects of climate change translate into factors that determine
the viability and utility of ecosystems.
Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(1992) states that the impact on world food supply should be key when considering
at which point greenhouse gas emissions might imply dangerous anthropogenic in-
terference with the climate system. The AEZ methodology and the spatial database
with global coverage provide a comprehensive basis for ecological assessments and
quantification of the impact of climate variability and climate change on regional
and national crop production.
During the past few years, case studies on the potential impacts of climate
change have been compiled for a number of countries, including Australia, Egypt,
Finland, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway, Thailand, the UK, the
USA, and Vietnam. The majority of these studies have been based on climate-
change experiments with General Circulation Models (GCMs), but they differ
markedly in their baseline data, methods of analysis, and scenarios of climate
change.
In the context of the present debate over international agreements such as the
Kyoto Protocol and the outcome of the Third Assessment Report (TAR) of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), it is important that uniform
assessments be carried out to compare and evaluate national, regional, and global
impacts of climate change on food and agricultural production. Such quantified
and spatial information provides important inputs that can underpin national and
regional adaptive polices to mitigate the consequences of climate change and also
facilitate international negotiations on climate change, taking into account the rel-
ative impacts in the context of their specific development needs and priorities.
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The effects of global warming and increased atmospheric carbon concentra-
tions will result in improved growing conditions in some areas, and thus crop pro-
duction may increase. Elevated atmospheric CO2 levels are expected to augment
crop productivity because of increased photosynthetic activity and improved water-
use efficiency. At the same time, however, higher temperatures may intensify pest
and disease problems, which in turn would lead to crop losses. Crop yields in some
countries may also be affected by drier conditions and increased water stress.
As a first step in the ecological-economic assessment of climate change and
agricultural vulnerability, climate-change scenarios were developed in order to es-
timate their effects on crop yields, amounts of land with cultivation potential, and
the number and type of crop combinations that can be cultivated. The range of
scenarios analyzed in this study addresses development trajectories as defined by
the Working Group III for the IPCC TAR (IPCC, 2001). The AEZ model has been
applied to results of various recent GCM experiments, which are available from the
IPCC DDC for the IPCC SRES emission scenarios A1FI, A1B, A2, B1, and B2.
A total of 12 climate runs from four GCM groups in Australia, Europe, and North
America were compiled and assessed to cover a wide range of possible future devel-
opments, to cater for uncertainties regarding future greenhouse gas emissions, and
to obtain robust conclusions vis-a`-vis apparent differences among climate models.
This chapter presents the main AEZ results and findings of the impact of
climate change on agriculture. Results comprise environmental constraints to
crop agriculture; climate variability and the variability of rain-fed cereal pro-
duction; changes in the characteristics and extent of potential agricultural land;
changes in crop suitability and multi-cropping; and the impact of climate change on
cereal-production potential. The economic implications of these changes in agro-
ecology and the consequences for regional and global food systems are explored in
Chapter 4.
3.2 Climatic Resources under Climate Change
Agricultural crop distribution and production is largely dependent on the geograph-
ical distribution of thermal and moisture regimes. Global warming is significantly
increasing the area with temperature regimes conducive to growth and production
of agricultural crops. As an example, Plates 3.1 and 3.2 present the distribution of
thermal climates for reference conditions (period 1961–1990) and for the HadCM3-
A1FI climate projections in the 2080s. The northward shift in thermal regimes due
to global warming implies a significant reduction of boreal and arctic ecosystems,
and a large expansion of areas with temperate climate conditions in Siberia and
Canada. In the Southern hemisphere, however, the temperate zones of Argentina
and Chile disappear almost completely. The subtropics, apart from a general shift
40
Pl
at
e
3.
1.
Th
er
m
al
cl
im
at
es
(re
fer
en
ce
cl
im
at
e,
19
61
–1
99
0).
41
Pl
at
e
3.
2.
Th
er
m
al
cl
im
at
es
(H
ad
CM
3-A
1F
1,
20
80
s).
42
Pl
at
e
3.
3.
Le
ng
th
o
fg
ro
w
in
g
pe
rio
ds
(re
fer
en
ce
cl
im
at
e,
19
61
–1
99
0).
43
Pl
at
e
3.
4.
Le
ng
th
o
fg
ro
w
in
g
pe
rio
ds
(H
ad
CM
3-A
1F
1,
20
80
s).
44
Pl
at
e
3.
5.
Po
pu
la
tio
n
de
ns
ity
(19
95
)i
n
hy
pe
r-a
rid
,a
rid
,a
n
d
se
m
i-a
rid
ar
ea
s
(L
GP
<
12
0
da
ys
)f
or
re
fe
re
nc
e
cl
im
at
e
(19
61
–
19
90
).
45
Pl
at
e3
.6
.P
op
ul
at
io
nd
en
sit
y
(19
95
)in
hy
pe
r-a
rid
,a
rid
,a
n
d
se
m
i-a
rid
ar
ea
s
(L
GP
<
12
0
da
ys
)f
or
pr
oje
cte
dc
lim
at
eo
fs
ce
n
ar
io
H
ad
CM
3-
A
1F
Ii
n
th
e
20
80
s.
46
to higher latitudes, remain by and large of a similar extent. A major expansion of
tropical zones occurs, which apart from a very small stretch in South Africa and a
narrow fringe along the Mediterranean coast, will cover almost all of Africa.
Changes in rainfall patterns, in addition to shifts in thermal regimes, influence
local seasonal and annual water balances, and in turn affect the distribution of pe-
riods during which temperature and moisture conditions permit agricultural crop
production. Such characteristics are well reflected by the so-called length of grow-
ing period (LGP), which has been calculated by grid-cell for reference conditions
and for the 12 GCM climate-change projections considered in this study. Plates 3.3
and 3.4 present an example of the global distribution of LGP for reference condi-
tions and again for the 2080s using the HadCM3-A1FI scenario.
Mainly due to the influence of higher temperatures, large increases of LGP
are found in current temperate, boreal, and arctic regions. For developed coun-
tries and the group of developing countries in temperate Central and East Asia, the
zones with LGP of less than 120 days calculated for reference climate (1961–1990)
amount to some 37.1 million km2, i.e., 55% of total area. Under the conditions of
the SRES B2 climate projections for the 2080s, this area with short LGP would be
reduced by 4.2–9.2 million km2 for the range of GCMs assessed in this study. The
average reduction across models, of these areas with very limited growing condi-
tions, under the SRES B2 scenario is 6.3 million km2, about 17% of current extents.
For even larger climate changes, as would result from greenhouse-gas emissions in
the SRES A2 scenario, the average decrease of areas with LGP of less than 120 days
would amount to 8.1 million km2, a decline of 21% compared to current conditions.
Decreases of LGP, on the other hand, are found in areas with diminishing
amounts or deteriorating distribution of rainfall as, for example, in Northern Africa
and northeast Brazil. Another remarkable trend in the projections of the Hadley
Centre model is an apparent decrease of excess wetness in the Amazon area. For
tropical and sub-tropical regions, an LGP of less than 120 days indicates hyper-
arid, arid, and dry semi-arid lands with unsuitable or highly variable and unreliable
conditions for crop agriculture. Nearly 1 billion people worldwide and more than
180 million people in Africa alone are presently living in these vulnerable environ-
ments, relying to a large extent on agriculture for their livelihood (Plates 3.5 and
3.6). Climate change will cause a deterioration of growing conditions for crops
and natural ecosystems in developing countries (excluding temperate Central and
East Asia) where some 27.4 million km2, i.e., just over 40% of total area in these
countries, currently have an LGP of less than 120 days. Calculations with climate
projections from three of the four GCMs (excluding NCAR-PCM) produce consis-
tent increases of arid areas in developing countries, on average of 0.9 million km2
(or 3.4%) and 1.5 million km2 (5.5%) respectively for simulations of SRES B2 and
A2 emission scenarios in the 2080s.
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Figure 3.1. Impact of climate change on extents of arid and dry semi-arid lands in
sub-Saharan Africa.
More than 60% of the negative outcomes occur in sub-Saharan Africa, where
AEZ estimates for the reference climate (1961–1990) amount to some 10.8 million
km2 of land with an LGP of less than 120 days. Climate changes, as projected
by GCMs for the SRES B2 and A2 emission scenarios in the 2080s, would result
in another 580,000 km2 (scenario B2, with a range of 360,000–760,000 km2) and
920,000 km2 (scenario A2, with a range of 850,000–1,025,000 km2) of arid and dry
semi-arid lands, an increase of 5.4% and 8.5% over current conditions respectively.
This outcome is mirrored by a decrease of areas with favorable growing condi-
tions, such as the moist semi-arid and sub-humid zones with an LGP of 120–270
days. For these areas, average reductions of their extents in the 2080s amount to
310,000 and 510,000 km2 for the SRES B2 and A2 climate scenarios respectively,
a decrease of 3.3% and 5.5% of these zones compared to current conditions. The
results for sub-Saharan Africa are presented in Figure 3.1, which shows percentage
changes in extents of land with an LGP of less than 120 days relative to the level of
atmospheric CO2 concentrations occurring in different SRES scenarios.
3.3 Environmental Constraints to Crop Agriculture
3.3.1 Land constraints under current climate
The AEZ land-resources inventory allows a characterization of various regions ac-
cording to the prevailing environmental constraints. A soil and terrain constraint
classification has been formulated and has been applied to each grid-cell of the
land-resources inventory, covering all land excluding Antarctica. The constraints
considered include: terrain-slope, soil depth, soil fertility, soil drainage, soil tex-
ture, and soil salinity/sodicity. Climate constraints are classified according to the
length of periods with cold temperatures and moisture limitations.
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Table 3.1. Severe environmental constraints for rain-fed crop production (reference
climate, 1961–1990).
Land with severe constraints for
rain-fed cultivation of crops
Total Total with Too Too Too Too Poor
extents constraints cold dry wet steep soils
Region (106 ha) (106 ha) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
North America 2,139 1,529 71.5 35.9 14.0 0.0 3.2 18.5
Eastern Europe 171 31 18.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 15.0
Northern Europe 173 78 45.2 18.0 0.0 0.0 2.5 24.6
Southern Europe 132 58 44.1 0.7 0.2 0.0 20.2 23.1
Western Europe 110 32 28.9 0.6 0.0 0.0 10.3 18.1
Russian Federation 1,677 1,140 68.0 44.5 1.9 0.0 1.9 19.7
Central America & Caribbean 271 140 51.7 0.0 27.7 0.4 15.0 8.7
South America 1,778 1,101 61.9 0.5 10.6 6.6 3.2 41.0
Oceania & Polynesia 848 630 74.3 0.1 58.6 3.9 1.2 10.5
Eastern Africa 888 462 52.1 0.0 27.0 0.0 3.1 22.0
Middle Africa 657 387 58.9 0.0 12.9 0.2 0.5 45.3
Northern Africa 547 500 91.3 0.0 88.0 0.0 2.2 1.0
Southern Africa 266 200 75.3 0.0 58.7 0.0 6.5 10.1
Western Africa 632 464 73.3 0.0 50.6 0.0 0.1 22.7
Western Asia 433 364 84.2 0.0 74.2 0.0 6.2 3.7
Southeast Asia 445 234 52.6 0.0 0.0 25.0 11.5 16.1
South Asia 668 361 54.1 2.0 34.7 0.0 10.6 6.8
East Asia & Japan 1,152 776 67.4 16.3 26.4 0.2 12.0 12.4
Central Asia 414 372 89.8 2.5 75.7 0.0 4.8 6.7
Developed 5,231 3,478 66.5 29.6 15.8 0.1 3.1 17.9
Developing 8,168 5,381 65.9 2.7 33.3 3.2 5.6 21.0
World 13,400 8,859 66.1 13.2 26.5 2.0 4.6 19.8
Note: Columns are mutually exclusive and the order in which constraints are listed defines a priority
ranking for areas where multiple severe constraints apply. For instance, land with very poor soil
conditions in the arctic region is shown as “too cold” and is not listed as having severe soil constraints.
On the basis of available global soil, terrain, and climatic data, the AEZ assess-
ment estimates that under current climate conditions, some 8.9 billion hectares of
land – about two-thirds of the Earth’s surface – suffer severe constraints for rain-fed
crop cultivation. An estimated 13% is too cold, 27% is too dry, 2% is too wet, 5% is
too steep, and 20% has very poor soils. Table 3.1 presents the regional distribution
of different types of severe constraints to rain-fed crop production. Please note that
columns in Table 3.1 are mutually exclusive and that the order in which constraints
are listed defines a priority ranking for areas where multiple severe constraints ap-
ply. For instance, land with very poor soil conditions in the arctic region is shown
as “too cold” and is not listed as having severe soil constraints.
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3.3.2 Land constraints under climate change
The AEZ assessment estimates, for climate scenario HadCM3-A1FI in the 2080s,
that the amount of land with severe environmental constraints for rain-fed crop
cultivation will slightly decrease from 88.6 million km2 to 87.7 million km2 of
land. For developed countries, the net decrease in extent of land with severe con-
straints amounts to 1.6 million km2, while the net extent in developing countries
increases by 0.7 million km2. However, these aggregate net totals hide many im-
portant changes.
In the warmer world of scenario HadCM3-A1FI, only an estimated 5% will
suffer from severe cold temperature constraints in the 2080s, a major change from
some 13% under current climate conditions. Too-dry conditions occur in 29% of
land, and 1% is too wet. As climate change alters the prevalence of climate limi-
tations, terrain and soil become limiting factors in respectively 6% (i.e., too steep)
and 25% (poor soil conditions) of land. Table 3.2 presents the regional distribution
of different types of severe constraints to rain-fed crop production under the Hadley
Centre climate-change experiment.
Plates 3.7 and 3.8 present, for current conditions and for scenario HadCM3-
A1FI in the 2080s, the spatial distribution of areas with overall no constraints,
slight and moderate constraints, and areas with severe temperature, moisture stress,
excess wetness, terrain or soil constraints. Plate 3.9 highlights areas where im-
provements with regard to environmental constraints to crop production can be ex-
pected, as well as areas where climate change would result in harsher environments
for crop agriculturalists.
Table 3.3 presents a transition matrix for extents of grid-cells as classified for
reference climate (1961–1990) and for conditions according to scenario HadCM3-
A1FI in the 2080s. Current conditions are summarized by the row totals shown
in the first numeric column. Column totals, in the last row of the matrix, denote
class extents calculated for future climate. The transition matrix captures underly-
ing dynamics of changes better than the aggregate class totals alone. For instance,
while the extent of land classified as posing no constraint for rain-fed crop agricul-
ture increases from 4,153,000 to 4,338,000 km2, the full matrix reveals that only
3,413,000 km2, about 80% of the area without constraints under current conditions,
would remain in that class.
3.3.3 Convergence of scenario results for environmental constraints
On the positive side, according to all 12 GCM climate projections for the 2080s,
the results suggest that, for the world as a whole, land with severe constraints that
essentially prohibit crop agriculture may decrease slightly by 0.7–2.2% of total
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Table 3.2. Severe environmental constraints for rain-fed crop production (scenario
HadCM3-A1FI in 2080s).
Land with severe constraints for
rain-fed cultivation of crops
Total Total with Too Too Too Too Poor
extents constraints cold dry wet steep soils
Region (106 ha) (106 ha) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
North America 2,139 1,451 67.8 21.2 13.9 0.0 4.9 27.9
Eastern Europe 171 31 18.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 15.0
Northern Europe 173 66 38.3 0.5 0.0 0.4 4.5 32.9
Southern Europe 132 60 45.5 0.0 2.4 0.0 20.4 22.6
Western Europe 110 32 28.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.8 18.1
Russian Federation 1,677 1,018 60.7 12.3 0.2 0.0 5.0 43.2
Central America & Caribbean 271 160 58.8 0.0 37.9 0.0 14.1 6.9
South America 1,778 1,128 63.4 0.0 18.3 1.2 3.1 40.7
Oceania & Polynesia 848 678 79.9 0.1 66.3 4.0 1.2 8.3
Eastern Africa 888 466 52.5 0.0 27.3 0.0 3.1 22.0
Middle Africa 657 397 60.3 0.0 14.4 0.8 0.4 44.8
Northern Africa 547 530 96.8 0.0 95.4 0.0 1.2 0.2
Southern Africa 266 235 88.4 0.0 78.8 0.0 5.7 4.0
Western Africa 632 473 74.8 0.0 54.3 0.0 0.1 20.5
Western Asia 433 372 86.0 0.0 77.1 0.0 6.2 2.7
Southeast Asia 445 211 47.3 0.0 0.0 17.3 12.0 18.0
South Asia 668 362 54.1 0.1 35.0 0.0 11.7 7.3
East Asia & Japan 1,152 753 65.4 3.0 31.4 0.7 15.2 15.1
Central Asia 414 350 84.4 0.0 60.1 0.0 6.8 17.4
Developed 5,231 3,320 63.5 12.6 16.6 0.2 4.8 29.2
Developing 8,168 5,449 66.7 0.4 37.0 1.7 6.2 21.5
World total 13,400 8,769 65.4 5.2 29.0 1.1 5.7 24.5
Table 3.3. Transition matrix of global changes in environmental constraints to crop
agriculture (scenario HadCM3-A1FI in 2080s).
Reference HadCM3-A1FI, 2080s
climate 1,000 km2 No constraint Slight Moderate Severe
No constraints 4,153 3,413 464 206 69
Slight 12,054 607 8,985 2,172 289
Moderate 29,203 316 2,607 23,554 2,726
Severe 88,585 0 547 3,434 84,605
4,338 12,603 29,366 87,688
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Table 3.4. Distributionof constraints across all 12 climate projections for the 2080s
compared to reference climate of 1961–1990.
Constraints 1961– HadCM3 CSIRO CGCM2 NCAR
(%) 1990 A1FI A2 B1 B2 A1B A2 B1 B2 A2 B2 A2 B2
None 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.6 3.5
Slight 9.0 9.4 9.4 9.0 9.0 9.5 9.3 9.2 9.3 9.6 9.3 9.5 9.4
Moderate 21.8 21.9 22.3 22.3 22.6 23.3 23.5 23.3 23.2 22.8 22.9 23.0 22.5
Severe,
of which: 66.1 65.4 65.2 65.3 65.2 64.2 64.3 64.4 64.5 64.2 64.5 63.9 64.5
Temperature 13.2 5.2 6.7 8.7 8.4 3.9 3.5 5.2 4.6 6.5 8.3 8.8 10.1
Moisture 26.5 29.0 28.1 27.7 27.7 26.7 27.0 27.0 27.1 26.8 26.6 25.0 25.7
Wetness 2.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.1 1.2 2.0 1.8
Terrain 4.6 5.7 5.6 5.4 5,4 6.0 6.0 5.8 5.9 5.8 5.5 5.4 5.2
Soil 19.8 24.5 23.7 22.3 22.7 25.8 26.1 24.6 25.0 23.9 23.0 22.7 21.8
land,1 i.e., by some 1–3 million km2. In developed countries this decrease is rather
pronounced, namely 2.3–4.8% of a total land area of some 52 million km2. In
the developing world the emerging picture is mixed. Table 3.4 compares the dis-
tributions of the environmental constraint classification across all 12 GCM-based
climate scenarios with their occurrence under current reference climate conditions.
Table 3.5 presents the range of estimates of land with severe, slight, and no con-
straints across four GCM outputs for the 2080s based on the emission trajectories
of the SRES A2 scenario in comparison to values obtained for the reference climate
of 1961–1990. Regions of the developed world that are seeing improvements, i.e., a
reduction of land with severe environmental constraints, mainly due to the removal
of cold-temperature constraints, are in particular the regions of Northern Europe
(5.5–6.8% of total area), Russia (5.3–8.0% of total area), and Central Asia (5.0–
8.3% of total area). Also North America (3.3–5.6% of total area) and East Asia &
Japan (1.4–2.6% of total area) are consistently experiencing an improvement with
regard to land constraints for crop agriculture.
On the negative side, also consistently according to the four GCM climate pro-
jections of SRES A2 scenario for the 2080s, the following regions may experience
an increase of land with severe constraints: Central America & Caribbean (1.2–
2.9% of total area), Oceania & Polynesia (0.3–4.3% of total area), Northern Africa
(1.9–3.4% of total area), and Western Asia (0.1–1.0% of total area). In South-
ern Africa, as much as an additional 11% of total land may suffer from severe
constraints.
When looking at the other end of the environmental spectrum, i.e., as to changes
of land with no or with only slight constraints, thereby indicating “good” land for
1Note that these percentages here and in the following paragraphs refer to total land rather than
class extents.
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Table 3.5. Percentage of land with severe versus slight or no constraints for refer-
ence climate (1961–1990) and maximum and minimum valuesa occurring in four
GCM climate projections for the 2080s based on SRES A2 emission scenario.
Severe constraints Slight or no constraints
% of total land % of total land
Ref Min Max Ref Min Max
North America 71.5 65.9 68.2 11.7 11.2 13.3
Eastern Europe 18.0 18.0 18.0 49.9 46.6 53.4
Northern Europe 45.2 38.3 39.7 25.9 16.6 23.5
Southern Europe 44.1 44.1 44.4 17.0 15.9 16.6
Western Europe 28.9 28.9 28.9 45.2 35.5 45.7
Russian Federation 68.0 60.0 62.7 14.9 19.4 21.2
Central America & Caribbean 51.7 52.1 54.6 10.5 10.3 10.9
South America 61.9 60.6 61.7 11.1 11.3 12.7
Oceania & Polynesia 74.3 74.4 78.6 5.0 3.6 4.9
Eastern Africa 52.1 50.5 54.5 18.9 16.7 18.9
Middle Africa 58.9 58.8 60.1 12.2 11.3 11.8
Northern Africa 91.3 93.2 94.7 1.8 0.4 0.9
Southern Africa 75.3 74.6 86.2 1.6 0.1 0.6
Western Africa 73.3 72.6 75.0 11.3 9.7 11.1
Western Asia 84.2 84.3 85.2 2.9 2.1 2.7
Southeast Asia 52.6 47.3 51.5 11.3 11.4 13.6
South Asia 54.1 50.1 53.9 22.6 21.0 24.7
East Asia & Japan 67.4 64.8 66.0 8.7 5.9 8.1
Central Asia 89.8 81.5 84.8 0.9 2.2 2.9
Developed 66.5 61.7 63.6 14.3 15.2 16.8
Developing 65.9 64.7 66.2 10.7 10.3 10.7
World 66.1 63.9 65.2 12.1 12.2 13.1
aMaximum and minimum values across constraints do generally not add up to 100%, since values
are not necessarily from the same scenario.
agriculture, a somewhat different picture emerges. It must be noted that decreases
in land with severe constraints for agriculture do not necessarily imply increases
in prime land, as in North America, Northern Europe, and East Asia & Japan.
The decreases of severe constraints result in these regions merely in more marginal
agricultural land. Improvements are found consistently in Russia, South America,
Southeast Asia, and Central Asia.
According to all four GCM projections for the 2080s, the total extent of poten-
tially good agricultural land systematically decreases in Northern Europe, Southern
Europe, all five African regions, Western Asia, East Asia & Japan, and Oceania &
Polynesia.
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Table 3.6. Transition matrix of changes in environmental constraints to crop agri-
culture of land in sub-Saharan Africa (scenario HadCM3-A1FI, 2080s).
Reference HadCM3-A1FI, 2080s
climate 1,000 km2 No constraint Slight Moderate Severe
No constraint 535 457 66 6 6
Slight 2,704 11 2,395 262 36
Moderate 6,061 3 67 5,379 612
Severe 15,128 0 0 80 15,048
471 2,528 5,727 15,702
3.3.4 The case of sub-Saharan Africa
Considering 12 climate projections of SRES scenarios simulated by four GCM
groups (at Hadley Centre, CSIRO, Canadian Climate Centre, and NCAR), the fol-
lowing overall picture emerges for sub-Saharan Africa: constraint-free prime land
decreases, land with moisture stress increases, land with extreme wet conditions
decreases slightly. Altogether, land with no or only slight constraints decreases
for 11 of 12 GCM climate projections. For the SRES scenario A2, a decrease of
good land occurs for all four GCM climate projections, by an average of 204,000
km2, i.e., 6.3% of total sub-Saharan prime land; results range from 82,000 km2
(NCAR-PCM) to 273,000 km2 (CSIRO). Land with severe climate, soil, or terrain
constraints, prohibiting use for rain-fed agriculture, increases according to 10 of
the 12 climate projections, by 260,000–610,000 km2. Only for the NCAR-PCM
model, which differs markedly from the results of other GCM experiments and
paints a somewhat benign future, the extent of sub-Saharan land with severe envi-
ronmental constraints to crop agriculture declines by about 150,000 km2 for both
the simulated A2 and B2 scenarios (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3).
A detailed picture of the changes in environmental constraint classification is
presented in Table 3.6, showing the transition matrix from current reference cli-
mate conditions to a climate of the 2080s for projections of scenario HadCM3-
A1FI for land in sub-Saharan Africa, classified according to four broad groups: no
constraints, slight, moderate, and severe constraints.
As discussed before, current conditions are summarized in the transition ma-
trix by the row totals shown in the first numeric column. Column totals, in the last
row of the matrix, denote class extents calculated for future climate. The values in
each row of the transition matrix indicate for different classes the fate of extents
classified under current conditions. The table indicates that only 80,000 km2 with
currently severe environmental constraints, out of more than 15.1 million km2, are
expected to improve with climate change, whereas more than 600,000 km2 cur-
rently classified as moderately constrained would migrate to the class of severe
environmental limitations.
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Figure 3.2. Changes in sub-Saharan land with severe environmental constraints
versus increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations.
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Figure 3.3. Changes in sub-Saharan land with no or slight environmental con-
straints versus increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations.
3.4 Climate Variability and Variability of Rain-fed Cereal
Yields and Production
3.4.1 Climate variability
On the basis of historical annual time-series of climate data for the period 1901–
1995, for each individual year the length of growing period (LGP) was calculated,
and standard deviation of LGP (SD in days) and coefficients of variation (CV in %)
were determined. For instance, Plate 3.10 shows the simulated standard deviation
of LGP for the period 1901–1995, highlighting areas of unreliable growing periods.
Areas with particular high variability in year-by-year growing conditions are found
in the mid-west of the USA, northeast Brazil, northeast Argentina and Uruguay,
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Southern Africa, Southern Mozambique, and the southeast of Australia. In all these
areas, the SD of LGP exceeds 40 days and the CV is larger than 45%.
3.4.2 Variability of rain-fed cereal production
Historical climate data for individual years has also been used to calculate a time-
series of production potentials for cereals. Of a total of 83 cereal types, consisting
of cultivars of wheat, rice, barley, rye, sorghum, millet, and setaria, AEZ tests and
selects for each grid-cell and each year the cereal type that results in the highest
production. Results were obtained for individual years, and means and standard
deviations were calculated separately for the periods 1901–1930, 1931–1960, and
1961–1990. The grid-cell results in terms of average annual total production poten-
tial and its annual variations were subsequently aggregated at country and regional
levels. The assessment was carried out for areas classified as being in cultivation
in 1992–1993 according to interpretation of remotely sensed data, as well as for all
land with rain-fed cereal-production potential, regardless of current use. The data
set used to mask areas with current cultivation is shown in Plate 3.11. Furthermore,
for comparison with average climate conditions, calculations were also performed
with average climate data of the reference period 1961–1990.
During the 20th century, the global cereal-production potential on currently
cultivated land (for fixed technology level), as simulated with AEZ year by year,
improved steadily, by some 6%, between the periods of 1901–1930 and 1961–1990.
It is also interesting to compare the average cereal output calculated on a year-by-
year basis with output that would result from an averaged reference climate. Over
the period 1961–1990, the calculations using average climate data are more than
10% higher than the average over individual years, providing a rough estimate of
the losses being incurred due to climate variability.
The picture becomes more diverse when looking at regional and country lev-
els (see Table 3.7). Most regions have been experiencing some improvements in
attainable production potential during the last century. In the developed nations as
a whole, potential cereal output increased by more than 8% due to changing cli-
mate, while simulated output variability decreased. Improvements range from little
change in potential cereal output in Southern Europe to an increase of more than
20% in Russia.
In the developing countries as a whole, simulated potential cereal output in-
creased somewhat, only by less than 3%. Yet variability increased as well. No
improvements were found for sub-Saharan Africa. Some regions, for instance in
Southern Africa, even lost average potential cereal output and at the same time saw
a considerable increase in the variability of cereal outputs.
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3.5 Changes in Rain-fed Crop Production Potentials
There are various ways of estimating the extent and production potential of land for
rain-fed crops. Any quantification depends on a variety of assumptions concerning
the range of crops and crop cultivars considered; the definition of what level of
output qualifies as acceptable; the social acceptance of land-cover conversions (of
forest in particular); and what land constraints may be alleviated with farming tech-
nology. The results of extents of land suitable for the production of crop groups and
the potential production from these extents are presented in two sets: (i) considering
all land, and (ii) considering current cultivated land. Table 3.8 shows the results of
the estimation for five crop groups, cereals, roots and tubers, pulses, oil crops, and
sugar crops, which are assessed at an assumed high level of inputs and management
level, respectively for very suitable and suitable areas (VS+S), and very suitable
and suitable and moderately suitable areas (VS+S+MS). For details of assessments
of crops under various level of inputs circumstances, reference can be made to an
IIASA Research Report and CD-ROM “Global Agro-ecological Assessment for
Agriculture in the 21st Century: Methodology and Results” (Fischer et al., 2002).
Results (see Tables 3.8a and 3.8b) show that in both cases, i.e., all land and cur-
rent cultivated land, cereals as a group have the widest adaptation to prevailing eco-
logical conditions. About 22% of the global total land area (excluding Antarctica)
is suitable (VS+S+MS) for cereals. Sugar crops, due to more specific ecological
requirements, are suitable in about 11%. Pulses, suitable in about 14% of the total
land area, have, due to relative low yield levels, a relative low production potential.
It should be emphasized that these results indicate the potential area suitable
for each of these individual crop groups. In reality, the demand mix for domestic
consumption and trade will drive the allocation of land to particular crops.
The values presented in Table 3.8 are used as a reference for comparison with
results of climate-change scenarios.
3.5.1 Cereals
Figure 3.4 offers a graphical representation of the change of cereal production po-
tential in relation to changes in atmospheric CO2 concentrations and related global
warming, as predicted by the various GCM experiments for IPCC SRES scenar-
ios. The production change is expressed as a percentage change in relation to the
reference climate (1961–1990). The results are plotted for, respectively, all land
and current cultivated land, separately for developed and developing countries.
The figure shows that with increasing CO2 concentrations when considering all
land, production of cereals will increase according to all scenarios. The strongest
increase is found in developed nations, mainly due to the expansion of suitable ar-
eas at higher latitudes. When considering current cultivated land only, the results
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Table 3.8a. Extents of rain-fed land with cultivation potential for major crop
groups (million ha), reference climate (1961–1990).
Roots & Sugar
Suitability Cereals tubers Pulses Oil crops crops
All land
VS+S land 1,980 1,422 1,237 1,812 729
VS+S+MS land 2,959 2,186 1,901 2,585 1,418
Current cultivated land
VS+S land 992 686 665 825 408
VS+S+MS land 1,368 1,016 968 1,137 671
Table 3.8b. Production potentials of rain-fed land with cultivation potential for
major crop groups (million tons), reference climate (1961–1990).
Roots & Sugar
Suitability Cereals tubers Pulses Oil crops crops
All land
VS+S land 13,959 11,649 3,260 6,485 5,220
VS+S+MS land 17,857 15,616 4,517 8,203 9,246
Current cultivated land
VS+S land 7,450 5,107 1,774 2,651 2,233
VS+S+MS land 9,036 6,664 2,274 3,302 3,429
Note: The suitability assessment for the crop groups has been based on assessments of individual
crops and crop cultivars. The cereal group is made up of wheat, barley, rye, rice, grain maize,
sorghum, millet, and setaria cultivars; roots and tubers of cassava, sweet potato and white potato;
pulses of phaseolus bean, chickpea and cowpea; oil crops of soybean, rape, groundnut, sunflower, oil
palm and olive, and for sugar crops both sugarcane and sugarbeet cultivars have been used.
are far less spectacular, except for the NCAR-PCM climate projections, which pre-
dict substantive potential production gains even on current cultivated land for both
developed and developing countries. The other scenarios predict little change for
the developed nations. Hadley Centre (shown as HAD3 in graphs) and Canadian
Climate Center (CGCM2) projections show, after an initial increase, a decline of
production potential with climate changes for developing nations, owing to CO 2
concentrations above 600–700 ppm. Please note that results account for yield im-
provements due to so-called CO2 fertilization, i.e., enhanced photosynthesis due to
CO2 enrichment of the atmosphere.
The regional aggregation of results, based on HadCM3 A1FI scenario (see Ta-
bles 3.9 and 3.10), shows for both suitable land extents and production potential of
cereals a significant decrease in Northern and Southern Africa in both cases when
considering all land or current cultivated land. Substantial increases in suitable ar-
eas and production potentials in all land as well as in current cultivated land are
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Figure 3.4. Changes in cereal production potential versus increased atmospheric
CO2 concentrations and related global warming as predicted by GCMs.
found in Central Asia. Increases in suitable land extents and production potentials
for cereals on all land are found in North America, Northern Europe, the Russian
Federation, and East Asia & Japan. This is a clear indication of the northward
shift of agricultural zones. Due to the increases in the high-latitude regions, the
developed nations will see a considerable expansion of suitable land extents and
increased production potential for cereals only when considering the use of this
“new land” at high latitudes.
Plates 3.12a and 3.12b present respectively a map showing suitability distribu-
tion of cereals for the reference climate and a map showing changes to this distribu-
tion for the HadCM3-A1FI 2080s scenario. Suitability results were calculated for
each of the approximately 2.2 million grid-cells of the database. The outcome was
mapped by means of a suitability index (SI). This reflects the suitability makeup of
a particular grid-cell. In this index VS represents the portion of the grid-cell with
attainable yields that are 80% or more of the maximum potential yield. Similarly, S,
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MS, and mS represent portions of the grid-cell with attainable yields 60–80%, 40–
60%, and 20–40% of the maximum potential yield, respectively. SI is calculated
using the following equation: SI = VS*0.9 + S*0.7 + MS*0.5 + mS* 0.3. Positive
changes are to be noted in the Northern hemisphere at high latitudes (removal of
cold-temperature constraints), in the Amazon area, and parts of Central Africa (re-
duced excess wetness). Decreases are concentrated in parts of the USA, Western
and Eastern Europe, Southern Africa, parts of East Asia, and parts of Australia. In
particular, northeast Brazil is predicted to see a further reduction in soil-moisture
conditions and consequently a substantial reduction in the suitability for cereals.
3.5.2 Wheat
Figure 3.5 shows that with increasing CO2 concentrations when considering all
land, production of wheat will increase in the developed nations according to all
scenarios. The developing countries, however, face a substantial decrease of wheat-
production potential, consistently according to all scenarios, when considering all
land or only current cultivated land.
Plates 3.13a and 3.13b present respectively a map showing suitability distribu-
tion of wheat for the reference climate and a map showing changes to this distribu-
tion for the HadCM3-A1FI 2080s scenario. The wheat crop is strongly affected by
changes in temperature regime, which is reflected in a clear shift to higher latitudes
in the Northern hemisphere. On the other hand, wheat is virtually disappearing
from Africa and suitability is decreasing in parts of the USA, large portions of Eu-
rope and South Asia, the Southern part of East Asia, and the Northern part of the
wheat-growing areas of Brazil and Paraguay.
3.5.3 Other crops
A distinct downward trend for production potentials for rain-fed sugar crops
emerges from the analysis. On all land and current cultivated land, for develop-
ing nations substantial decreases in potential productivity are predicted by all sce-
narios. In developed countries the results for all land are showing increases for
CSIRO, CGCM2, and NCAR, and a slight decrease for the HadCM3 scenarios. In
case of current cultivated land, the results are mixed; NCAR shows a steady in-
crease with increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations; CGCM2 shows, after an
initial increase, a gradual decrease for CO2 concentrations over 600 ppm; CSIRO
shows a moderate linear decrease, and HAD3 an almost linear strong decrease.
Changes in production potentials, for rain-fed sugar crops, roots and tubers,
pulses, and oil crops, as well as for rain-fed/irrigated wetland rice and other rain-
fed cereals are charted in Annex 3.1.
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Figure 3.5. Changes in wheat-production potential versus increase in atmospheric
CO2 concentrations and related global warming as predicted by GCMs.
3.6 Changes in Potential Agricultural Land
3.6.1 Potential agricultural land under current and future climates
The total extent of potential rain-fed land is estimated for each grid-cell. With no
restrictions for land-cover conversion, the results show that about one-quarter of the
global land surface, excluding Antarctica, can be regarded as potentially suitable
for crop cultivation. About 25% of the total potential suitable land is currently
located in closed forest (FAO, 2001) and highly protected areas (UNEP-WCMC,
2001). About 2 billion hectares are potentially good or prime land for agricultural
crops (VS+S); this excludes land under closed forest and highly protected areas.
More than 70% of the remaining balance between potential land and land cur-
rently in use for agriculture is found in just seven countries in Latin America and
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Africa – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Angola, Democratic Republic of
Congo, and Sudan. In these two continents there is clearly still scope for further
expansion of current agricultural land, even if closed forest and legally protected
areas remain untouched. [Despite the fact that currently reported cultivated land in
official statistics is likely to underestimate actual use in several developing coun-
tries, this does not affect the conclusion that there is still significant potential for
expansion of cultivated land in Africa and South America.]
Agronomic suitability will by no means be the only determinant of future land
development. The expansion of cultivable land will be limited due to constraints
of ecological fragility, degradation, toxicity, incidences of diseases, and lack of
finance and infrastructure. These issues will need to be explicitly considered in
country-level agricultural development.
Table 3.11 presents extents of total land with cultivation of annual or permanent
crops in 1994–1996 (this includes irrigated land shown separately), and rain-fed
cultivation potential for major food and fiber crops for the reference climate and
the HadCM3-A1FI 2080s scenario for net total land (excluding land under closed
forest and in highly protected areas) and separately for land under closed forest and
highly protected areas. A comparison of current net land potential with the land
potential derived from the HadCM3-A1FI 2080s climate projections at the global
level highlights a slight decrease in good and prime agricultural land (VS+S), but
a modest increase in total potential land (VS+S+MS) of about 2%. This indicates
that much of the additional land becoming available according to this scenario is of
only moderate quality.
All 12 GCM climate projections predict gains in potential agricultural land
globally. Strong gains are predicted for the developed nations as a whole, but es-
pecially for North America and the Russian Federation. For the developing nations
the picture is mixed. Gains are predicted by all 12 scenarios for Central Asia.
Decreases are mainly confined to developing nations; in Africa, South America,
Oceania & Polynesia, and Southeast Asia. In 10 of the 12 GCM climate projec-
tions, substantial losses are predicted for sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, note
that for Africa and South America the decrease of suitable land is relatively small
in comparison to the remaining balance of unused potential cultivable land.
To compare estimates of land with cultivation potential across scenarios, we
use a suitability index SI, which accounts for changes in area extents as well as
changes in suitability make-up of grid-cells (see Section 3.5.1).
This SI index is also particularly useful when comparing land estimates across
regions as it adjusts for differences in land quality and provides a more realistic
estimate of land-resource availability.
74
Ta
bl
e
3.
11
.
Cu
lti
v
at
ed
la
nd
19
94
–1
99
6,
an
d
ra
in
-fe
d
cu
lti
v
at
io
n
po
te
nt
ia
lf
or
m
ajo
rf
oo
d
an
d
fib
er
cr
o
ps
,h
ig
h
in
pu
ts
(m
illi
on
ha
)f
or
re
fe
re
nc
e
cl
im
at
e
an
d
H
ad
CM
3-
A
1F
I2
08
0
sc
en
ar
io
fo
rn
et
to
ta
ll
an
d
an
d
la
nd
u
n
de
rc
lo
se
d
fo
re
st
an
d
pr
ot
ec
te
d
ar
ea
s
(F
+H
).
Cu
lti
v
at
ed
la
nd
La
nd
w
ith
cu
lti
v
at
io
n
po
te
nt
ia
l
FA
O
ST
AT
R
ef
er
en
ce
cl
im
at
e
(19
61
–1
99
0)
H
ad
CM
3-
A
1F
I2
08
0s
(19
94
–1
99
6)
V
S+
S
V
S+
S+
M
S
V
S+
S
V
S+
S+
M
S
R
eg
io
n
To
ta
ll
an
d
To
ta
l
Ir
rig
at
io
n
N
et
to
ta
l
F+
P
N
et
to
ta
l
F+
P
N
et
to
ta
l
F+
P
N
et
to
ta
l
F+
P
N
or
th
A
m
er
ic
a
2,
13
9
22
5
22
21
6
87
26
7
11
7
27
7
16
1
35
4
20
1
Ea
st
er
n
Eu
ro
pe
17
1
82
7
93
12
11
1
15
95
11
11
2
15
N
or
th
er
n
Eu
ro
pe
17
3
22
1
29
10
36
16
28
12
39
17
So
ut
he
rn
Eu
ro
pe
13
2
46
9
30
2
42
3
34
2
45
3
W
es
te
rn
Eu
ro
pe
11
0
35
3
50
4
57
6
46
4
56
6
R
us
sia
n
Fe
de
ra
tio
n
1,
67
4
13
0
5
12
5
80
16
3
99
16
9
14
4
25
4
19
3
Ce
nt
ra
lA
m
er
ic
a
&
Ca
rib
be
an
27
2
44
8
34
10
44
14
31
10
43
16
So
ut
h
A
m
er
ic
a
1,
77
8
11
5
10
39
3
32
5
47
3
37
1
32
0
21
4
41
9
34
5
O
ce
an
ia
&
Po
ly
ne
sia
85
0
53
3
87
20
12
1
25
71
18
10
1
24
Ea
st
er
n
A
fri
ca
64
0
46
4
25
3
10
33
3
13
23
1
9
31
5
12
M
id
dl
eA
fri
ca
65
7
25
0
17
3
75
24
3
10
9
16
2
56
22
8
92
N
or
th
er
n
A
fri
ca
79
4
44
6
13
0
18
0
1
0
4
0
So
ut
he
rn
A
fri
ca
26
6
17
1
21
0
38
0
9
0
20
0
W
es
te
rn
A
fri
ca
63
3
65
1
13
5
14
16
9
19
12
4
13
16
2
19
W
es
te
rn
A
sia
43
3
46
11
16
0
29
0
20
0
31
0
So
ut
he
as
tA
sia
44
5
90
15
93
24
11
5
34
85
23
10
7
32
So
ut
h
A
sia
67
2
23
2
86
15
6
4
17
8
5
15
0
3
17
7
5
Ea
st
A
sia
&
Ja
pa
n
1,
15
0
14
4
56
10
6
5
14
7
7
11
5
6
15
9
10
Ce
nt
ra
lA
sia
41
4
45
12
5
0
14
0
10
0
23
0
D
ev
el
op
ed
5,
22
8
59
6
53
63
0
20
7
79
8
27
4
71
8
34
5
96
0
45
0
D
ev
el
op
in
g
8,
17
2
91
0
20
8
1,
39
6
47
3
1,
80
0
58
1
1,
26
1
34
3
1,
68
9
54
0
W
o
rld
13
,4
00
1,
50
5
26
0
2,
02
7
68
1
2,
59
8
85
5
1,
97
9
68
8
2,
64
9
99
0
No
te
:
N
et
to
ta
ll
an
d
ex
cl
ud
es
la
nd
u
n
de
rc
lo
se
d
fo
re
st
an
d
hi
gh
ly
pr
ot
ec
te
d
ar
ea
s,
al
so
ar
ea
s
re
qu
ire
d
fo
rh
ab
ita
tio
n
an
d
in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
ha
v
e
be
en
ac
co
u
n
te
d
fo
ru
sin
g
19
95
po
pu
la
tio
n
di
str
ib
u
tio
n.
75
On the basis of SI, changes in the extent of land with cultivation potential,
aggregated by region, for the reference climate and the 12 GCM climate projections
for the 2080s considered in this study, are presented in Table 3.12.
Plates 3.14 and 3.15 present the distribution of cultivable land for the refer-
ence climate (1961–1990) and the HadCM3-A1FI 2080s scenario respectively. The
quality of the potential rain-fed cultivable land is reflected by different classes of
the suitability index (SI), as described above. An SI value of 100 indicates that
the entire grid-cell is very suitable for crop cultivation. Lower values mean that
grid-cells are at least partly limited by slope, soil, or climate conditions.
A comparison of the two plates demonstrates a remarkable expansion of po-
tential cultivable land to higher latitudes of the Northern hemisphere, in particular
benefiting the Russian Federation, Northern Europe, and Canada.
Changes are very noticeable in South America. In Northern Africa, decreases
are substantial; approximately three-quarters of the potential rain-fed cultivable
land are lost as compared to the reference climate, leaving just a narrow strip of
potential rain-fed cultivable land along the Mediterranean coast. Decreases are
also visible in Southern Africa, mainly affecting Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia,
Zimbabwe, and South Africa.
For each of the approximately 2.2 million grid-cells of the database, the rain-fed
agricultural production potentials were mapped by means of a normalized suitabil-
ity index (SI). This index reflects the suitability make-up of a particular grid-cell.
A value of 100 indicates that an entire grid-cell is very suitable for crop cultivation;
values of less than 100 mean that parts of the grid-cell are of lower quality due to
slope, soil, or climatic constraints.
Figure 3.6 shows three basic sets of information for Asia, Africa, Latin Amer-
ica, Oceania, the Russian Federation combined with Europe, and North America,
namely: (i) current cultivated land (rain-fed and irrigated) in use in 1994–1996;
(ii) potential cultivable land under the reference climate; and (iii) potential cul-
tivable land for the HadCM3-A1FI climate projections in the 2080s. The potential
is shown for very suitable and suitable land (VS+S), moderately suitable land (MS),
and separately for potentially suitable land (VS+S+MS) under closed forest or in
protected areas.
3.6.2 Multiple cropping
Most cultivated land in the developed world belongs to the single-cropping zone.
Under the current climate, the extent of land allowing double or triple cropping of
rain-fed cereals in these countries is rather small, at only some 16% of the total.
In contrast, in the developing world, about 55% of land with cultivation potential
for rain-fed cereals is suitable for double or triple cropping. In South and Central
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Figure 3.6. Comparison of land with rain-fed crop production potential for current
climate, for future climate projected by HadCM3-A1FI scenario in the 2080s, and
land in use for cultivation in 1994–1996 (million ha).
America, this figure exceeds 80%, with 65% for double and about 17% for rain-fed
triple cropping (Fischer et al., 2002).
The multiple-cropping zone classification applied in Plates 3.16 and 3.17 (de-
fined by climate conditions only), for the reference climate and HadCM3-A1FI sce-
nario in the 2080s, indicates a major expansion of areas with single cropping. Shifts
in double- and triple-cropping areas are minor and differ in direction depending on
changes in moisture conditions.
Table 3.13 shows the occurrence of multiple-cropping zones for the reference
climate of 1961–1990 and the percentage changes in each class according to esti-
mates for the 12 GCM climate projections in the 2080s.
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Table 3.13. Extents of single-, double-, and triple-cropping zones for reference
climate and percent change for 12 GCM climate projections for the 2080s.
(a) World and developed nations
Reference climate & World Developed nations
GCM climate projec- Single Double Triple Single Double Triple
tions for the 2080s cropping cropping cropping Total cropping cropping cropping Total
Reference climate
(million ha) 2,820 1,088 422 4,331 1,656 227 83 1,966
% changes
CGCM2 A2 14.6 –2.8 10.0 9.8 21.9 –0.3 57.8 20.9
CGCM2 B2 9.7 –0.9 16.5 7.7 14.3 –2.9 78.9 15.0
CSIRO A1B 12.3 –0.7 17.9 9.6 20.6 –4.1 124.5 22.2
CSIRO A2 11.3 0.5 22.0 9.6 20.2 –3.0 140.4 22.6
CSIRO B1 10.2 –1.0 21.4 8.5 18.0 –8.0 122.5 19.4
CSIRO B2 11.9 –4.5 17.3 8.3 19.0 –17.0 120.5 19.2
HadCM3 A1FI 14.6 –16.7 7.0 6.0 16.0 –5.5 124.2 18.1
HadCM3 A2 15.0 –12.8 –3.3 6.2 16.6 –9.2 78.5 16.3
HadCM3 B1 9.4 –6.4 3.8 4.9 11.0 –2.7 79.1 12.3
HadMC3 B2 12.4 –7.8 –4.6 5.7 12.6 2.4 69.6 13.8
NCAR A2 9.9 0.5 22.1 8.8 14.6 8.5 70.4 16.3
NCAR B2 6.2 2.9 15.4 6.2 9.9 6.1 53.8 11.3
(b) Developing nations and sub-Saharan Africa
Reference climate & Developing nations Sub-Saharan Africa
GCM climate projec- Single Double Triple Single Double Triple
tions for the 2080s cropping cropping cropping Total cropping cropping cropping Total
Reference climate
(million ha) 1,164 862 339 2,364 573 300 57 930
% changes
CGCM2 A2 4.2 –3.4 –1.7 0.6 –3.0 –11.1 –5.9 –5.8
CGCM2 B2 3.1 –0.4 1.1 1.5 –2.2 –6.2 9.6 –2.8
CSIRO A1B 0.4 0.2 –8.3 –0.9 –5.1 –2.1 –4.0 –4.1
CSIRO A2 –1.4 1.4 –7.0 –1.2 –8.5 –0.6 –0.3 –5.4
CSIRO B1 –0.9 0.8 –3.5 –0.7 –5.5 –1.7 –2.9 –4.1
CSIRO B2 1.8 –1.2 –8.1 –0.7 –4.5 –5.0 –1.3 –4.5
HadCM3 A1FI 12.7 –19.7 –21.8 –4.1 0.7 –19.0 –7.7 –6.2
HadCM3 A2 12.7 –13.8 –23.4 –2.1 –2.1 –14.3 –10.7 –6.6
HadCM3 B1 7.0 –7.4 –14.7 –1.3 –1.0 –13.5 –6.7 –5.4
HadMC3 B2 12.2 –10.5 –22.8 –1.1 –1.9 –11.1 –3.8 –5.0
NCAR A2 3.3 –1.6 10.2 2.5 0.0 0.3 26.3 1.7
NCAR B2 0.9 2.0 6.0 2.0 –0.8 1.3 27.8 1.6
Note: Extents for reference climate and percent changes due to climate changes shown in Table 3.13
are based on a climate classification procedure as detailed in Fischer et al. (2002). They exclude
grid-cells with dominantly severe constraints, such as steep slopes and very poor soil conditions.
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Globally, the major share of the increase of potential cultivatable land involves
single-cropping areas. In 10 of the 12 climate scenarios, triple-cropping areas also
increase, while double-cropping areas change little or decrease.
For developing nations, in particular sub-Saharan Africa, the overall losses in
potential cultivatable areas are mainly at the expense of double- and triple-cropping
areas, for which losses are above-average. Unlike the other three GCMs used in
the study, the NCAR climate projections present a fairly positive picture, also for
sub-Saharan Africa, with increases in both double- and triple-cropping areas.
3.7 Heterogeneity of Climate-Change Impacts on
Cereal Production
In this study, the AEZ climate impact assessment for all developed and developing
countries is based on the projections of four GCMs, including the HadCM3 model
of the Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research, the CGCM2 model
of the Canadian Centre for Climate Modeling, the CSIRO Model of Australia’s
Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, and the NCAR PCM model of the
United States National Center for Atmospheric Research.
The AEZ framework allows an assessment of the spatial diversity of impacts
and to explore the robustness of conclusions regarding the climate projections of
different GCM groups as well as the wide range of IPCC emission scenarios.
3.7.1 Results at global level
The heterogeneity of results are illustrated with the impacts on rain-fed cereal pro-
duction of the HadCM3 climate-change projections. For this analysis, an advanced
level of inputs and management for currently cultivated areas is assumed. The
cereal-production potential for the 1961–1990 reference climate and for four dif-
ferent climate projections for the 2080s is assessed, based on the range of IPCC
SRES emission scenarios. The resulting atmospheric CO2 concentrations, starting
with 330 parts per million (ppm) (average of 1961–1990), reach in the mid-2080s
respectively 534 ppm (scenario B1), 568 ppm (scenario B2), 721 ppm (scenario
A2), and 834 ppm (scenario A1FI).
The detailed and spatially explicit results of AEZ obtained for grid-cells at
5 arc-minutes latitude/longitude can be summarized, for instance, by drawing dis-
tributions of climate impacts on production potential in currently cultivated areas.
Figure 3.7 provides some examples. In each graph, the central bar represents areas
where projected climate change results in minor productivity changes of between
–5% and +5%. Bars to the right of the center represent areas where impacts are
increasingly positive, i.e., between +5% and +15%, +15% and +25%, respectively,
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Figure 3.7. Distribution of cultivable land in terms of climate impact on cereal
productivity, HadCM3-A1FI climate projections, in the 2080s.
etc. To the left of the central bar, climate-change impacts are increasingly negative,
between –5% and –15%, –15% and –25%, respectively, etc.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the variety and complexity of climate-change outcomes.
For instance, while Russia generally gains production capacity under a climate
change as projected by the HadCM3 model, SRES scenario A1FI for the 2080s,
even in this country some areas (and hence farmers) will lose. Note the bar on
the extreme right of the graph for Russia, which represents gains due to expansion
of agricultural potentials into “new” areas. Another gaining country is China, al-
though impact distribution is widely spread and most cultivated land experiences
significant change. By contrast, India shows a rather narrow distribution, with a
pronounced median of impacts in the –5% to +5% range, indicating that agricultural
conditions in India under this scenario would change little, with limited negative
overall impacts, as can be seen from the somewhat larger area of the distribution to
the left of the center line.
Understanding these outcomes, it is not surprising that in the past, site-specific
climate-impact studies have come to a wide range of seemingly contradicting re-
sults. While differences in assumptions and methodologies may account for some
of the differences, the results obtained in this study clearly demonstrate that a wide
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Table 3.14. Estimated impacts on rain-fed cereal-production potential of gain-
ing and losing countries, for currently cultivated land, HadCM3 projections, in the
2080s.
Number of Projected population, Change in cereal-production
countries 2080 (billions) potential (% of global potential)
Scenario G N L G N L G N L Total
A1FI 54 23 73 3.0 2.2 3.3 5.5 –0.4 –7.9 –2.8
A2 61 32 57 3.3 1.4 3.8 4.1 0.5 –6.8 –2.1
B2 71 36 43 3.8 2.0 2.7 4.2 –0.9 –4.3 –1.0
B1 67 41 42 2.3 4.5 1.6 3.6 –0.6 –3.0 0.0
G = countries gaining 5% or more; N = small change of –5% to +5%; L = countries losing 5% or
more.
range of outcomes is to be expected for many countries, and that a full and reliable
picture requires a spatially comprehensive approach and analysis such as AEZ.
Table 3.14 summarizes for four HadCM3 climate-change scenarios the esti-
mated impacts on cereal-production potential in current cultivated land under rain-
fed conditions. It shows that the projected year 2080 population in 42–73 coun-
tries, with potential cereal-productivity declines of more than 5% (“losing” coun-
tries), ranges between 1.6 billion and 3.8 billion people. In these countries, cereal-
production losses vary between 3% and 8% of the global potential, a grim outlook
for the already poor among these losing countries despite the substantial increases
in some 54–71 gaining countries.
Hence, while aggregate global changes are usually rather small, large nega-
tive and positive shifts in productivity can be expected. This polarity of outcomes
increases with higher levels of CO2 concentration and the resulting climate change.
Scenario A1FI: The results for the HadCM3 climate projections show that at the
global level, 54 countries with 36% of the world’s projected population in 2080s
would gain as much as an equivalent 5.5% share of the global cereal-production
potential due to climate change, while 73 countries, accounting for 39% of the
world’s population in the 2080s, would lose 7.9%. The resulting global net loss on
current cultivated land for scenario HadCM3-A1FI amounts to 2.8%.
Scenario A2: The results for HadCM3 show that 61 countries with 38% of the
world’s projected population in the 2080s would gain an equivalent 4.1% share of
the global cereal-production potential due to climate change. However, 57 coun-
tries, with 45% of the world’s population in the 2080s, lose together 6.8%. The
global net loss for scenario HadCM3-A2 amounts to 2.1%.
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Scenario B2: In the case of this lower emission scenario, there are 71 gaining
countries with a combined increase equivalent to 4.2% of global cereal potential on
currently cultivated land, and 43 countries, with about a third of the world’s 2080s
population, losing 4.3% of the global cereal potential.
Scenario B1: For this scenario global cereal-production potential is not changing.
Yet, there are still 42 losing countries, 41 countries with only small changes, and
67 countries gaining.
3.7.2 Developing world results
Figure 3.8 summarizes results for developing countries in terms of changes in
cereal-production potential for gaining and losing countries, i.e., for three broad
groups of countries where (i) production capacity increases by more than 5%,
(ii) production capacity is only somewhat affected, in the range of 5% losses to
5% gains (not shown in graphs), and (iii) production capacity decreases by more
than 5%.
Scenario A1FI: The results under HadCM3 show that 42 developing countries
may benefit from substantial increases in cereal-production potential averaging
more than 17% of their potential, which represents 6.2% of developing-world
cereal-production potential. At the same time, some 52 countries may lose on
average 19% of their current potential, a loss of 5% of developing-world potential.
Scenario A2: Some 50 developing countries, with 45% of the developing world’s
projected population in the 2080s, would gain 6% of developing-world cereal-
production potential (over 16% of their own potential) due to climate change, while
40 countries may lose 12% of their production potential. For the CSIRO model, 48
developing countries gain 20% production potential (i.e., 3.5% of the total potential
in developing countries), while 35 countries lose 17%, some 6.5% of developing-
world cereal-production potential. Thus, there would be an overall 3% net loss
according to CSIRO climate projections. The results for Canadian CGCM2 and the
NCAR climate models indicate gains for the developing world as a whole, in the
range of 8% (for CGCM2) to 11% (for NCAR-PCM).
Scenario B2: For this lower emission scenario, the net balance of changes in
cereal-production potential of developing countries for the HadCM3 projections
shows a 2.2% increase. There are 59 developing countries that gain 12% cereal po-
tential (6.1% of regional total) and 29 countries that lose an average 10% (3.8% of
regional total) of the cereal-production potential. The results of the CSIRO model
show 43 countries gaining and 30 countries losing cereal potential, with a net re-
gional loss of 2.3%. For the CGCM2 and the NCAR model, developing countries
may gain 6–7% of potential production due to climate changes in the 2080s.
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Figure 3.8. Impacts of climate change on rain-fed cereal-production potential
of developing countries, for currently cultivated land in the 2080s, according to
HadCM3 and CSIRO climate projections.
Country Results Highlights
In the case of the major developing-country cereal producers, 14 countries account
for 80% of current cereal production in the developing world. China, the world’s
largest cereal producer, gains substantially, in the 5–23% range for all climate mod-
els except for the CSIRO model, where there is a loss of 5–7%. For India, the
second-largest cereal producer, Brazil, and Thailand, results vary according to cli-
mate model. Argentina gains production potential by 7–24% for the HadCM3 and
NCAR models, and loses 10–30% production potential for the CSIRO and CGCM2
models. South Africa substantively loses production potential for all climate mod-
els and scenarios, except for NCAR’s projection of scenario A2, where a small gain
occurs.
Examples of the impacts of climate change for individual countries, calculated
for the higher emission scenarios A1FI and A2 using the HadCM3 and CSIRO
climate projections, are shown in map form in Plates 3.18 and 3.19.
3.7.3 Current food-insecure countries
The FAO has estimated the total number of undernourished people in 99 developing
countries at 780 million (FAO, 2001). Fifteen of these countries, mainly in the
Middle East, North Africa, and South America, have relatively high levels of gross
domestic product per capita of more than US$3,000. These countries, accounting
for about 1% of the total undernourished, are not discussed here.
The total population of the remaining 84 food-insecure countries at present
amounts to some 4.2 billion, equivalent to 74% of the current world population.
Some 18% of the 4.2 billion are undernourished. By the 2080s, the UN projects the
total population of these countries to increase to 6.8 billion (United Nations, 2001),
equivalent to 80% of the world population.
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The results for this group of food-insecure countries, depending on the level of
CO2 emissions and rate of climate change, show a net loss of up to 2% in four of
the 12 scenarios, namely for HadCM3 and CSIRO. Despite these relatively small
changes for the group as a whole, the individual country results are reason for
concern in that up to 40 countries, with a total population in the range of 1–3
billion, may lose on average 10–20 % of their cereal production potential in the
2080s due to climate change.
Food-insecure Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
With the exception of the results for the NCAR-PCM model, Sudan, Nigeria,
Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Somalia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Sierra Leone,
Angola, Mozambique, and Niger lose cereal production potential in the 2080s
for the other three climate models and across all the emission scenarios. These
countries currently have 87 million undernourished, equivalent to 45% of the to-
tal undernourished in sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, Zaire, Tanzania, Kenya,
Uganda, Madagascar, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Guinea all gain ce-
real production potential in the 2080s. These eight gaining countries currently have
73 million undernourished, equivalent to 38% of the undernourished population in
sub-Saharan Africa.
The balance of gaining and losing countries in Tables 3.15 to 3.17 demonstrates
two important factors. First, the net balance of changes in cereal-production poten-
tial for sub-Saharan Africa will very likely be negative, with net losses of up to 12%
of the region’s current production potential. Second, there will be large variations
in outcomes, with up to 40% of sub-Saharan countries losing a rather substantial
share of their agricultural resources.
Most of the food-insecure countries in sub-Saharan Africa are also poor. They
lack the resources to produce enough food and often do not have access to for-
eign exchange for financing food imports. Production losses resulting from climate
change could further worsen the prevalence and depth of hunger. This burden will
undoubtedly fall disproportionately on the poorest and the most vulnerable.
Climate-change impacts highlight the urgent need to intensify agricultural land
management and expand agricultural land area, both of which will lead to addi-
tional greenhouse-gas emissions and increasing environmental pressures. More-
over, agricultural land expansion will unavoidably lead to losses of natural ecosys-
tems and biodiversity, especially through clearance of forests. Such considerations
must be central in mitigating the impacts of climate change on food and agricultural
production.
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Table 3.15. Estimated impacts on rain-fed cereal-production potential, for cur-
rently cultivated land of sub-Saharan African countries, HadCM3 projections, in
the 2080s.
Number of Projected population, Change in cereal-production
countries 2080 (billions) potential (% of region’s potential)
Scenario G N L G N L G N L Total
A1FI 17 8 16 0.62 0.43 0.55 5.1 –0.6 –8.6 –4.1
A2 14 11 16 0.58 0.23 0.78 5.3 0.7 –7.9 –1.9
B2 13 15 13 0.56 0.57 0.46 4.4 0.1 –7.1 –2.6
B1 17 10 14 0.65 0.22 0.72 5.0 0.1 –6.4 –1.3
G = countries gaining 5% or more; N = small change of –5% to +5%; L = countries losing 5% or
more.
Table 3.16. Estimated impacts on rain-fed cereal-production potential, for cur-
rently cultivated land of sub-Saharan African countries, CSIRO projections, in the
2080s.
Number of Projected population, Change in cereal-production
countries 2080 (billions) potential (% of region’s potential)
Scenario G N L G N L G N L Total
A1B 18 8 15 0.67 0.24 0.69 3.7 0.5 –12.3 –8.1
A2 16 8 17 0.63 0.24 0.73 3.3 0.1 –15.1 –11.7
B2 16 11 14 0.71 0.27 0.62 2.6 0.5 –10.1 –6.7
B1 12 13 16 0.59 0.31 0.69 2.2 0.1 –9.3 –7.1
G = countries gaining 5% or more; N = small change of –5% to +5%; L = countries losing 5% or
more.
Table 3.17. Estimated impacts on rain-fed cereal-production potential, for cur-
rently cultivated land of sub-Saharan African countries, for IPCC scenario A2, in
the 2080s.
Number of Projected population, Change in cereal-production
countries 2080 (billions) potential (% of region’s potential)
Scenario G N L G N L G N L Total
HadCM3 14 11 16 0.58 0.23 0.78 5.3 0.7 –7.9 –1.9
CSIRO 16 8 17 0.63 0.24 0.73 3.3 0.1 –15.1 –11.7
CGCM2 13 14 14 0.79 0.32 0.49 6.0 0.0 –8.7 –2.7
NCAR 25 13 3 1.07 0.39 0.13 8.2 0.4 –0.8 7.8
G = countries gaining 5% or more; N = small change of –5% to +5%; L = countries losing 5% or
more.
4
Climate Change:
Impacts on Food Systems
The climate-change impact on agricultural production potential, discussed in the
previous chapter, allows consideration of not only the spatial (local, national, re-
gional, and global) and temporal (current and future generations) dimension of
climate change, but also its linkage with the economic and social dimension of sus-
tainable development. The vulnerability of agricultural systems varies with geo-
graphic location, time, socioeconomic conditions, and environmental resources.
The capacity to mitigate and to adapt to climate-change impacts is strongly
related to the future development paths. The socioeconomic and, even more so, the
technological characteristics of different futures strongly affect emissions, hence
the extent and pace of the impacts of climate change, as well as the capability of
societies to adapt to and mitigate climate change.
The combination of the agro-ecological zones (AEZ) approach and IIASA’s
linked system of national agricultural models (BLS) provides an integrated
ecological-economic framework for the assessment of the impact of climate
change. We consider climate scenarios based on experiments with four General
Circulation Models (GCM), and we assess the four basic socioeconomic devel-
opment pathways and emission scenarios as formulated by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its Third Assessment Report.
This chapter presents the results of an integrated spatial ecological and eco-
nomic assessment of climate-change impacts, evaluated in the context of the world
food economy.
4.1 World Food System – Baseline Simulations
under IPCC Future Development Paths
In addition to CO2 emissions and energy technologies, two principal driving forces
in the SRES scenarios are population and economic growth. We have formulated
two additional scenarios, A2s and B2s, alongside the four IPCC scenario families,
A1, A2, B1, and B2, in order to test in particular the robustness and sensitivity of
main conclusions with regard to assumptions on economic growth.
In scenario A1, the world economy grows at 3.3% over the period 1990–2080.
The per capita GDP in 2080 amounts to a gigantic $76,000 in the developed world
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and $42,000 in the developing world. The average income ratio between developed
and developing countries is reduced from 13.8 in 1990 to about 1.8 in 2080. Thus,
it is a rich and equitable world where current distinctions between poor and rich
countries eventually dissolve. Over the period 1990–2080, the annual per capita
GDP growth rate is 2% for developed countries and around 4.3% for developing
countries. This compares with the historical 1975–1990 growth rates of 2.0% and
1.7% respectively. Here the issue is whether developed countries can achieve such
growth “forever”, and whether the assumed high growth rate for the developing
world, at more than twice the level of the developed world, can be sustained for a
period of 100 years.
There is also a continued demographic transition to low mortality and fertility;
in this scenario, the world sees an end to population growth. The total population
for developing countries reaches 7.1 billion in 2050 and then starts declining to
6.6 million in 2080. The population in the developed world peaks at 1.5 billion
(including the “Rest of World” region) in the 2050s and then decreases slowly.
Two regions, namely Africa and Western Asia, are projected to see a three-fold
increase in their populations over the next 100 years, in comparison to an average
overall increase of two-thirds for the developing world as a whole over the period
1990–2080 (see Table 4.1).
Scenario B1 assumes the same population projections as scenario A1. The
world economy grows at 2.9% over the period 1990–2080. The per capita GDP
in 2080 amounts to $55,000 in the developed world and $29,000 in the develop-
ing world. The average income ratio between currently developed and developing
countries reduces from 13.8 in 1990 to 2.0 in 2080. As in A1, this scenario results
in an equitable world where current distinctions between poor and rich countries
eventually dissolve.
Although the economic growth rate in scenario B1 is assumed to be some 10%
and 20% lower for the developing and developed countries respectively, in compar-
ison to the high growth assumptions in scenario A1, this still results in a high per
capita GDP annual growth rate of 3.9% for the developing countries averaged over
the period 1990–2080.
In scenario B2, the world economy grows at 2.7% over the period 1990–2080.
The per capita GDP in 2080 amounts to $18,000 in the developing world. The av-
erage income ratio between currently developed and developing countries reduces
to 2.6 in 2080. Thus it is a world where income disparities have been reduced by
over four-fifths from current levels. Population growth continues, reaching a world
total of 9.3 billion in 2050 and then about 10 billion in 2080. The total population
for developing countries reaches 7.9 billion in 2050 and 8.7 billion in 2080.
In scenario A2, the world economy grows at 2.3% over the period 1990–2080.
The per capita GDP in 2080 amounts to $37,000 in the developed world and $7,300
in the developing world. The average income ratio between currently developed
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Table 4.1. BLS reference projections for IPCC future development path scenarios:
Population (in millions).
Scenario A1 Scenario B1
1990 2020 2050 2080 1990 2020 2050 2080
WORLD 5194 7531 8634 8086 5194 7531 8634 8086
OECD 689 794 852 880 689 794 852 880
EFSU 400 420 410 364 400 420 410 364
MDCs 1089 1214 1262 1244 1089 1214 1262 1244
AFR 611 1278 1770 1869 611 1278 1770 1869
LAM 434 649 747 696 434 649 747 696
WAS 194 400 591 598 194 400 591 598
CPA 1247 1517 1422 1092 1247 1517 1422 1092
SEA 1442 2246 2603 2341 1442 2246 2603 2341
LDCs 3927 6089 7132 6596 3927 6089 7132 6596
ROW 178 228 241 246 178 228 241 246
Scenario A2 Scenario B2
1990 2020 2050 2080 1990 2020 2050 2080
WORLD 5194 8028 11094 13656 5194 7607 9323 10135
OECD 689 805 892 1035 689 776 764 731
EFSU 400 439 503 611 400 408 396 374
MDCs 1089 1243 1395 1646 1089 1184 1159 1105
AFR 611 1330 2111 2609 611 1292 2021 2510
LAM 434 713 1056 1417 434 656 808 870
WAS 194 431 811 1134 194 390 560 645
CPA 1247 1707 2219 2805 1247 1599 1705 1718
SEA 1442 2369 3223 3708 1442 2246 2789 2975
LDCs 3927 6550 9420 11672 3927 6183 7883 8717
ROW 178 234 280 338 178 240 280 313
and developing countries reduces to 5.1 in 2080. Thus it is a world where income
disparities still exist but have been reduced by about two-thirds from current levels.
The average annual GDP growth rates for developing and developed countries over
the period 1990–2080 are the lowest in this scenario (in comparison to the other
SRES scenarios), at 1.2% and 2.3% respectively.
Scenario A2 assumes a high level of demographic growth, with the world pop-
ulation increasing to 13.7 billion in 2080. The total population of developing coun-
tries reaches 9.4 billion in 2050 and 11.7 billion in 2080 (see Table 4.1).
In addition to the above four SRES scenarios, we consider two more scenar-
ios, which we call A2s and B2s. They use the same basic assumptions as A2 and
B2, except for economic growth: the annual economic growth rate over the period
1990–2080 in A2s and B2s is assumed to be some 45% lower than the correspond-
ing values in A2 and B2.
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In scenario A2s, the world economy grows at 2.0% over the period 1990–2080.
The per capita GDP in 2080 amounts to $35,000 in the developed world and $3,000
in the developing world. The average income ratio between developed and develop-
ing countries is reduced only by about 15% from current levels, indicating a largely
inequitable world still in 2080.
In scenario B2s, the world economy grows at 1.7% over the period 1990–2080.
The per capita GDP in 2080 amounts to $43,000 in the developed world and $4,600
in the developing world. Here, the average income disparity ratio between devel-
oped and developing countries declines to about 9.3 in 2080.
The BLS results of the above six scenarios, without climate change, provide the
baseline assessment, against which the climate-change impact results for the four
GCMs and the various IPCC scenarios will be compared to quantify the impact of
climate change on specific agricultural measures.
4.1.1 Baseline assessment
Tables 4.2–4.7 show the results of the baseline assessment for the six scenarios.
Cereal Production
In 1990, world cereal production amounted to 1.8 billion tons,1 divided roughly
equally between developed and developing countries. The simulated world cereal
production in 2080 ranges from 3.7 billion tons in scenario B1 to 4.8 billion tons
in scenario A2. The developed world production ranges from 1.4 billion tons in
scenario B1 to 1.6 billion tons in scenario A2s. The developing countries achieve
up to a three-fold increase in production from the 1990 levels, with Africa alone
increasing production five-fold or more in all of the six scenarios.
At the world level, the developed countries, particularly OECD countries, form
the major cereal exporter, with total net exports in 2080 ranging from 240 million
tons in scenario B1 to some 380 million tons in scenario A2 (see Table 4.4). Africa
(including Northern Africa) is projected to import some 20–30%, in all of the six
scenarios, of its cereal demand in 2080. In the case of Western Asia, cereal demand
is met through imports equivalent to some 50–60% of the region’s demand in the
six scenarios. The Centrally Planned Asia region, which includes China, becomes
a net cereal exporter in the 2080s in scenarios A1 and B1, and an importer in the
other four scenarios due to (perhaps unrealistic) high population growth assumed
in the region. For Southeast Asia, net cereal trade is less than 5% of the cereal
demand in this region. Latin America is a net exporter in all scenarios, except for
some imports in scenario B2s.
1Rice is included as milled equivalent. A factor of 0.67 was used to convert paddy rice to milled
equivalent.
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Table 4.2. BLS reference projections for IPCC future development path scenarios:
Cereal production (in million tons).
Scenario A1 Scenario B1
1990 2020 2050 2080 1990 2020 2050 2080
WORLD 1801 2673 3406 3884 1801 2641 3334 3729
OECD 590 785 915 956 590 781 912 941
EFSU 307 361 421 488 307 359 410 468
MDCs 897 1147 1336 1445 897 1139 1322 1410
AFR 73 163 265 331 73 162 265 322
LAM 102 202 253 243 102 197 230 211
WAS 50 84 108 103 50 84 108 106
CPA 362 539 693 841 362 536 687 827
SEA 250 446 639 800 250 431 612 735
LDCs 837 1434 1957 2318 837 1410 1901 2202
ROW 67 92 113 121 67 91 110 117
Scenario A2 Scenario B2
1990 2020 2050 2080 1990 2020 2050 2080
WORLD 1801 2736 3764 4791 1801 2682 3474 4115
OECD 590 787 944 1053 590 781 905 970
EFSU 307 370 471 593 307 367 438 542
MDCs 897 1157 1415 1645 897 1148 1343 1512
AFR 73 167 298 438 73 167 284 382
LAM 102 217 361 507 102 204 270 286
WAS 50 84 116 165 50 84 109 115
CPA 362 542 711 890 362 538 697 855
SEA 250 472 737 998 250 446 653 833
LDCs 837 1483 2223 2998 837 1439 2013 2470
ROW 67 97 126 147 67 96 119 133
Scenario A2s Scenario B2s
1990 2020 2050 2080 1990 2020 2050 2080
WORLD 1801 2712 3695 4642 1801 2659 3377 3850
OECD 590 785 947 1023 590 778 906 936
EFSU 307 367 465 617 307 365 420 508
MDCs 897 1153 1412 1640 897 1143 1327 1443
AFR 73 166 292 439 73 166 268 361
LAM 102 214 355 498 102 201 254 248
WAS 50 84 109 129 50 84 112 127
CPA 362 539 702 876 362 535 684 830
SEA 250 460 704 917 250 437 619 717
LDCs 837 1464 2161 2859 837 1422 1937 2283
ROW 67 96 122 143 67 95 113 124
Note: Rice is included as milled equivalent; conversion factor from paddy rice to milled is 0.67.
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Table 4.3. BLS reference projections for IPCC future development path scenarios:
Cereal demand (in million tons).
Scenario A1 Scenario B1
1990 2020 2050 2080 1990 2020 2050 2080
WORLD 1796 2669 3403 3877 1796 2639 3330 3721
OECD 434 562 665 719 434 557 648 702
EFSU 339 378 432 505 339 376 433 510
MDCs 773 940 1096 1224 773 933 1082 1212
AFR 109 242 391 456 109 242 387 462
LAM 112 198 248 248 112 198 242 237
WAS 76 153 235 261 76 153 235 262
CPA 388 568 646 636 388 566 644 641
SEA 257 450 655 916 257 430 608 770
LDCs 941 1612 2175 2517 941 1589 2117 2373
ROW 81 117 132 136 81 117 132 137
Scenario A2 Scenario B2
1990 2020 2050 2080 1990 2020 2050 2080
WORLD 1796 2736 3764 4790 1796 2680 3471 4112
OECD 434 536 591 670 434 553 594 607
EFSU 339 373 435 525 339 369 423 499
MDCs 773 909 1026 1195 773 922 1017 1106
AFR 109 250 425 551 109 242 427 568
LAM 112 199 303 411 112 190 250 277
WAS 76 161 289 412 76 151 229 277
CPA 388 619 888 1214 388 595 737 872
SEA 257 479 687 836 257 459 665 851
LDCs 941 1708 2593 3425 941 1637 2308 2843
ROW 81 119 145 170 81 122 147 162
Scenario A2s Scenario B2s
1990 2020 2050 2080 1990 2020 2050 2080
WORLD 1796 2711 3694 4640 1796 2656 3375 3846
OECD 434 532 587 661 434 549 579 576
EFSU 339 372 436 531 339 369 420 506
MDCs 773 904 1023 1192 773 918 999 1082
AFR 109 245 408 526 109 235 405 524
LAM 112 198 300 400 112 189 247 263
WAS 76 160 284 387 76 150 223 261
CPA 388 620 888 1211 388 597 736 872
SEA 257 465 648 754 257 446 618 680
LDCs 941 1688 2527 3278 941 1617 2229 2601
ROW 81 119 144 170 81 122 147 163
Note: Rice is included as milled equivalent; conversion factor from paddy rice to milled is 0.67.
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Table 4.4. BLS reference projections for IPCC future development path scenarios:
Net cereal exports (in million tons).
Scenario A1 Scenario B1
1990 2020 2050 2080 1990 2020 2050 2080
WORLD 6 4 4 4 6 2 4 7
OECD 156 223 250 250 156 224 263 240
EFSU –32 –17 –11 –11 –32 –18 –23 –42
MDCs 123 206 240 240 123 207 240 198
AFR –36 –79 –126 –126 –36 –80 –122 –140
LAM –9 4 5 5 –9 0 –12 –26
WAS –26 –69 –127 –127 –26 –69 –127 –156
CPA –26 –30 46 46 –26 –30 42 186
SEA –7 –4 –16 –16 –7 0 4 –35
LDCs –104 –178 –217 –217 –104 –179 –215 –171
ROW –14 –25 –19 –19 –14 –26 –21 –19
Scenario A2 Scenario B2
1990 2020 2050 2080 1990 2020 2050 2080
WORLD 6 0 0 0 6 1 3 3
OECD 156 251 352 383 156 227 311 363
EFSU –32 –3 36 67 –32 –2 15 42
MDCs 124 248 389 450 124 225 326 405
AFR –36 –82 –127 –113 –36 –76 –142 –185
LAM –10 19 58 96 –10 14 19 9
WAS –26 –77 –173 –248 –26 –67 –120 –162
CPA –26 –77 –177 –324 –26 –57 –39 –17
SEA –7 –7 50 162 –7 –13 –12 –18
LDCs –105 –225 –369 –427 –105 –198 –295 –373
ROW –14 –22 –19 –23 –14 –26 –28 –30
Scenario A2s Scenario B2s
1990 2020 2050 2080 1990 2020 2050 2080
WORLD 6 1 2 2 6 3 2 5
OECD 156 254 361 363 156 229 327 360
EFSU –32 –5 29 86 –32 –4 1 1
MDCs 124 249 390 448 124 225 328 361
AFR –36 –78 –116 –87 –36 –69 –137 –163
LAM –10 16 55 98 –10 11 7 –15
WAS –26 –76 –175 –258 –26 –66 –111 –134
CPA –26 –80 –186 –334 –26 –62 –52 –42
SEA –7 –5 56 163 –7 –9 1 38
LDCs –105 –224 –365 –419 –105 –195 –292 –318
ROW –14 –23 –23 –27 –14 –27 –34 –39
Note: Rice is included as milled equivalent; conversion factor from paddy rice to milled is 0.67.
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Table 4.5. BLS reference projections for IPCC future development path scenarios:
Cultivated land (in million ha).
Scenario A1 Scenario B1
1990 2020 2050 2080 1990 2020 2050 2080
WORLD 1521 1616 1651 1599 1521 1611 1638 1581
OECD 343 340 339 341 343 339 337 338
EFSU 263 260 257 259 263 260 256 257
MDCs 606 600 596 600 606 599 593 595
AFR 232 280 311 290 232 279 309 287
LAM 160 200 201 185 160 198 194 177
WAS 70 68 71 67 70 68 71 67
CPA 147 144 141 135 147 144 141 135
SEA 264 284 294 289 264 284 294 288
LDCs 872 976 1018 966 872 972 1008 953
ROW 43 40 36 33 43 40 36 33
Scenario A2 Scenario B2
1990 2020 2050 2080 1990 2020 2050 2080
WORLD 1521 1636 1746 1794 1521 1623 1692 1693
OECD 343 340 341 346 343 340 339 340
EFSU 263 262 259 262 263 262 260 261
MDCs 606 602 600 608 606 602 598 601
AFR 232 282 333 345 232 281 332 345
LAM 160 212 257 285 160 204 218 209
WAS 70 68 71 71 70 68 70 69
CPA 147 146 146 145 147 145 143 139
SEA 264 286 303 306 264 283 295 296
LDCs 872 994 1109 1153 872 981 1057 1059
ROW 43 40 37 33 43 40 37 33
Scenario A2s Scenario B2s
1990 2020 2050 2080 1990 2020 2050 2080
WORLD 1521 1633 1743 1792 1521 1620 1685 1669
OECD 343 339 338 343 343 339 341 333
EFSU 263 262 260 262 263 262 260 261
MDCs 606 601 598 604 606 601 601 594
AFR 232 281 331 342 232 280 326 337
LAM 160 212 259 292 160 204 215 204
WAS 70 68 71 70 70 68 70 69
CPA 147 146 145 145 147 145 143 139
SEA 264 286 302 306 264 283 294 294
LDCs 872 992 1108 1155 872 979 1048 1043
ROW 43 40 37 33 43 40 36 33
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Table 4.6. BLS reference projections for IPCC future development path scenarios:
People at risk of hunger (in millions).
Scenario A1 Scenario B1
1990 2020 2050 2080 1990 2020 2050 2080
LDCs 824 663 208 108 824 749 239 91
ASIA 527 342 41 24 527 432 53 22
CPA 172 81 3 4 172 92 4 0
SEA 355 261 38 21 355 340 49 22
OTHER LDCs 297 321 167 84 297 317 187 69
AFR 207 251 102 42 207 250 127 34
LAM 58 22 13 9 58 21 11 7
WAS 32 48 52 32 32 46 49 27
Scenario A2 Scenario B2
1990 2020 2050 2080 1990 2020 2050 2080
LDCs 824 782 721 768 824 630 348 233
ASIA 527 387 209 195 527 246 85 54
CPA 172 136 110 110 172 98 42 20
SEA 355 251 99 85 355 148 42 33
OTHER LDCs 297 395 512 573 297 384 263 180
AFR 207 271 297 287 207 283 181 113
LAM 58 64 79 90 58 51 26 16
WAS 32 60 136 197 32 50 57 51
Scenario A2s Scenario B2s
1990 2020 2050 2080 1990 2020 2050 2080
LDCs 824 925 988 1065 824 773 502 458
ASIA 527 477 323 274 527 315 90 54
CPA 172 133 103 105 172 94 27 3
SEA 355 343 220 170 355 221 63 51
OTHER LDCs 297 448 665 790 297 458 412 405
AFR 207 317 431 475 207 345 323 331
LAM 58 70 89 101 58 58 26 14
WAS 32 62 145 214 32 54 63 60
The world cereal prices are highest in scenario A2 in the 2080s, reaching a value
more than 2.7 times the 1990 prices. Only in scenario B2s, the world cereal price
in the 2080s falls some 17% below the 1990 price level owing to a low effective
demand for food due to low population growth and lack of purchasing power in
developing countries. Table 4.7 also shows that world market prices for all crops
increase by 30–110% in five of the scenarios, except for scenario B2s, where the
price in 2080 would be 25% lower than in the 1990s.
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Table 4.7. BLS reference projections for IPCC future development path scenarios:
Index of agricultural world market prices (1990=100).
SRES A1 SRES B1
2010 2020 2050 2080 2010 2020 2050 2080
All crops 94 115 157 172 89 103 132 132
Cereals 98 120 156 161 93 109 131 113
Other crops 91 112 157 178 87 101 133 141
Production 99 120 162 172 95 109 140 137
Exports 99 120 162 172 96 112 145 141
SRES A2 SRES B2
2010 2020 2050 2080 2010 2020 2050 2080
All crops 97 106 152 209 97 102 135 147
Cereals 103 118 184 267 100 108 138 150
Other crops 94 100 135 181 95 99 134 147
Production 99 107 145 189 99 103 132 140
Exports 100 109 154 211 99 104 135 144
SRES A2s SRES B2s
2010 2020 2050 2080 2010 2020 2050 2080
All crops 92 96 118 143 92 92 89 75
Cereals 98 106 144 195 94 97 95 83
Other crops 89 91 104 118 90 89 86 72
Production 94 97 115 131 94 93 90 75
Exports 96 100 123 149 95 95 93 81
Cultivated Land
Total cultivated land in developed countries in 1994–1996 amounted to about
600 million hectares (ha). As discussed previously in Chapter 3, there is addi-
tional potential land that can be cultivated. The results of all the four scenarios,
A1, B1, A2, and B2, show, however, that land under cultivation is likely to stay
close to the 1990 level and that additional production in various scenarios comes
mainly from increased productivity (see Table 4.5). For developing countries total
land in 1994–1996 amounted to 870 million ha, with Southeast Asia accounting
for about 30% of this. In scenarios A1 and B1, the land under cultivation in 2080
in the developing countries increases by about 10% compared to 1990, whereas in
scenario A2 and B2 this increase is higher, at about 30% and 20% respectively.
Most of the new crop land is cultivated in Africa and Latin America. In Southeast
Asia, some 30–40 million ha of additional land are brought under cultivation in the
four scenarios. For 2050 and 2080, the lowest level of total world cultivated land
results in scenario B1, respectively 1.64 billion ha and 1.58 billion ha; the high-
est demand for land occurs in scenario A2, with some 1.75 billion ha in 2050 and
almost 1.8 billion ha in 2080. Note that in scenarios A1 and B1, the land under
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cultivation in the 2050s is higher than in the 2080s; this occurs in line with the peak
in projected population that also occurs around the middle of the century.
Hunger
The results in Table 4.6 show that in scenarios A1, B1, A2, and B2, in spite of rela-
tively high levels of economic growth, there is little progress in reducing hunger to
2020. The results to 2020 imply that specific targeted programs for hunger reduc-
tion will be necessary to meet the millennium goals of reducing hunger by half in
2015.
In the period 2020–2050, considerable progress is made and hunger is substan-
tially reduced in scenarios A1, B1, and B2. In the case of scenario A2, hunger per-
sists and the number of undernourished in 2080 amounts to 768 million compared
to roughly 800 million undernourished in 2000.
In scenario A2s, the number of hungry increases to some 1.1 billion in the
2080s, equivalent to almost 10% of the projected population. The situation is worse
in Africa, where the number of hungry would more than double, to 475 million
people in 2080, equivalent to around 20% of the total population.
In the case of Asia, there is a reduction of the number of hungry in all scenarios.
These results indicate that “trickle down” of development, under relatively very
high levels of economic growth and with moderate population increases, can reduce
the number of hungry in the world in the 2050s and 2080s. It is worrying, however,
that this does not appear to have a sufficient impact in the next 20 years. If pop-
ulation growth is high, as in scenario A2, progress on eradicating hunger will be
difficult, with the total number of hungry remaining at about the same level in the
2080s as in the 1990s.
The above baseline results provide a frame for assessing the climate-change
impact of various climate models and emission scenarios, which follows in the
next section.
4.2 Impact of Climate Change on Food Production,
Consumption, and Trade
The evaluation of the impact of climate change on production, consumption, and
trade of agricultural commodities, in particular on food staples, was carried out by
comparing the results of a range of IPCC climate-change scenarios to reference
projections of the world food system simulated without imposing climatic change.
These reference projections were presented in the previous section.
The climate-change scenarios devised within the project involve a large number
of experiments that relate to four aspects:
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• climate impacts for different future socioeconomic and technical develop-
ment paths;
• uncertainty of results in view of differences in climate projections of different
GCM groups;
• robustness of results with regard to altered economic growth assumptions;
and
• sensitivity of results to different assumptions with regard to physiological
effects of atmospheric CO2 enrichment on yields.
Some 50 simulation experiments have been carried out with the ecological-
economic framework provided by AEZ and BLS. The simulation experiments cover
the following aspects:
1. Simulations for the four basic IPCC demographic and economic future de-
velopment paths were described as scenarios A1, A2, B1, and B2.
2. In addition, two development scenarios with lowered economic growth rates
and based on IPCC scenarios A2 and B2 were simulated.
3. Simulations for these development paths were carried out separately without
considering climate-change impacts on yields and for climate-change projec-
tions of four GCM groups.
4. The socioeconomic development paths scenarios A2 and B2 were simulated
super-imposing the full range of climate projections to analyze their sensitiv-
ity with regard to the magnitude of climate change.
5. Additional simulations were carried out without considering physiological
effects of increased atmospheric CO2 concentrations on crop growth and
yield.
Data on crop yield changes were estimated with AEZ, as detailed in the previ-
ous chapter, for different scenarios of climate change, and were compiled to provide
yield-impact parameterizations for the 34 countries or major regions covering the
world in the BLS. Yield variations caused by climate change were introduced into
the yield response functions by means of a multiplicative factor impacting upon the
relevant parameters in the mathematical representation.
Exogenous variables, population growth and technical progress, were left at
the levels specified in the respective reference projections. No specific adjustment
policies to counteract altered performance of agriculture were assumed beyond the
farm-level adaptations resulting from economic adjustments of the individual actors
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in the national models. The adjustment processes taking place in the different sce-
narios are the outcome of the imposed yield changes causing distortions in national
production levels and costs, leading to changes of agricultural prices in the inter-
national and national markets; this in turn affects investment allocation and labor
migration between sectors as well as reallocation of resources within agriculture.
Time is an important aspect in this adjustment process: the yield modifications due
to climate change begin in 1990. Three separate snapshots of climatic change are
provided referring to the 2020s, 2050s, and 2080s, respectively. This allows the
economic actors in the national and international food system to adjust their de-
cisions over a 90-year period. AEZ model simulations were conducted separately
for these three time points. Climate-change yield impacts were phased in linearly
between the climate “snapshots” provided by the respective climate scenario; i.e.,
the yield change multiplier terms incorporated in the yield response functions of
the BLS were built up gradually as a function of time for the periods 1990–2020,
2020–2050, and 2050–2080, so as to fully reach the impact levels derived with
AEZ respectively in 2020, 2050, and 2080.
4.2.1 Climate-change yield impacts without economic adjustments
Before assessing the dynamic impacts of climate-change-induced yield modifica-
tions through simulation with the BLS, we may ask what magnitude of distortion
the change in agricultural productivity of a particular scenario would imply for the
world food system. This measure of distortion indicates the production changes
that would occur due to yield changes without adjustments of the economic system,
which will take place over time due to market-price changes among agricultural
commodities, in response to demand-supply imbalances of commodity markets, as
well as adjustments of agricultural prices relative to other sectors. It refers to a state
of the system that would not be in equilibrium, in the sense of meeting commodity
supply-demand balances. As such it is only of theoretical interest, but it helps to
understand and quantify the nature and magnitude of adjustments taking place in
the food system due to changing economic conditions.
To obtain for any particular year t an estimate of the climate-change yield im-
pact without economic adjustment, Λ(t), for any particular scenario, we apply the
crop-wise productivity changes obtained in the AEZ assessment, λji (t), to the pro-
duction levels determined in the respective BLS reference projection (without cli-
mate change) in year t. For cereals these impacts can be added up without weight-
ing. To arrive at estimates of climate-change impacts (without economic adjust-
ment) for other groups of crops and the entire sector, world market prices of year
t as simulated in the respective reference projection are used. In mathematical
notation,
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Table 4.8. Climate-change impacts on crop production, without economic adjust-
ment, year 2080 (% change).
HadCM3 CSIRO CGCM2 NCAR-PCM
Other All Other All Other All Other All
Scenario Cereals crops crops Cereals crops crops Cereals crops crops Cereals crops crops
World
A2 –0.7 –2.2 –1.6 –1.2 –1.5 –1.3 –0.4 5.0 2.7 3.4 7.3 5.6
B2 –0.1 –0.4 –0.2 –1.7 –0.9 –1.2 1.3 6.0 4.0 2.4 5.4 4.1
Developed
A2 2.1 –3.0 –0.0 5.1 1.3 3.5 1.5 3.7 2.4 10.2 16.4 12.8
B2 1.7 –2.4 –0.1 3.2 0.1 1.9 3.7 7.0 5.1 7.4 12.0 9.3
Developing
A2 –2.1 –2.1 –2.1 –4.3 –2.1 –3.0 –1.4 5.4 2.8 –0.1 5.2 3.2
B2 –1.0 0.1 –0.3 –4.2 –1.1 –2.3 0.1 5.8 3.6 –0.2 3.9 2.4
Note: For aggregation, production distortions due to climate change were weighted with world market
prices of the scenario A2 reference projection without climate change.
ΛR(t) =

∑
j∈R
∑
i∈C
PWit ·Qjit · λji(t)

 /

∑
j∈R
∑
i∈C
PWit ·Qjit

 ,
where ΛR(t) is climate-change production impact, without economic adjustment,
on region R in year t; λji (t) is climate-change yield impact for crop i, in country
j, in year t; PWit is world market price of commodity i in year t of BLS refer-
ence projection simulated without considering climate change; Qjit is production of
commodity i, in country j, in year t of BLS reference projection simulated without
considering climate change.
Table 4.8 shows impacts of climate change on production estimated for the
global and regional levels for the IPCC A2 and B2 development path scenarios.
The magnitude and even direction of the aggregate impact at world level varies
with climate projections of different GCM groups. Scenarios based on HadCM3
and CSIRO projections result in a small negative net impact at global level. For
instance, for climate projections using emission scenario A2, the global impact on
cereals ranges from –0.7% to –1.2%, i.e., a gap of about 60 million tons in 2080.
When aggregating all crops, and using the production levels of the A2 reference
projection as weights, the net impact amounts to –1.3% to –1.6%. Climate pro-
jections by the Canadian CGCM2 model and NCAR-PCM model imply moderate
positive global crop-production changes of 2.7–5.6%. In Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the
time path of production impacts of different climate projections is shown for IPCC
scenario A2.
However, as demonstrated in Table 4.9 for scenario A2, the impacts of cli-
mate change on crop production are geographically quite unevenly distributed, with
106
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1990 2010 2030 2050 2070
%
 c
h
an
g
e
A2-H3
A2-CS
A2-C2
A2-NC
Figure 4.1. Climate-change impacts on global crop production for projections of
IPCC scenario A2, without economic adjustment.
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Figure 4.2. Climate-change impacts on aggregate crop production in develop-
ing and developed regions for projections of IPCC scenario A2, without economic
adjustment.
Note: H3 = HadCM3; CS = CSIRO; C2 = CGCM2; NC = NCAR-PCM.
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Table 4.9. Climate-change impacts on crop production for IPCC scenario A2, by
region, without economic adjustment, year 2080 (% change).
HadCM3 CSIRO CGCM2 NCAR-PCM
All All All All
Region Cereals crops Cereals crops Cereals crops Cereals crops
World –0.7 –1.6 –1.2 –1.3 1.4 4.0 2.4 4.1
Developed 2.1 0.0 5.1 3.5 3.7 5.1 7.4 9.3
North America 2.5 0.8 9.8 8.3 3.2 2.4 8.3 8.4
Western Europe –2.6 –5.8 –5.0 –3.9 –1.5 –2.8 0.6 0.3
Former Soviet Union 2.9 –0.3 3.9 0.8 6.1 9.5 9.6 14.1
Developing –2.1 –2.1 –4.3 –3.0 –1.4 2.8 –0.2 2.4
Africa –2.2 –1.9 –3.1 –4.6 –1.9 0.5 0.1 4.3
Latin America 4.6 0.6 0.8 2.5 0.4 1.0 2.1 2.3
Centrally Planned Asia –0.8 –4.5 –3.4 –5.8 2.2 4.8 4.3 5.7
South Asia –13.5 –10.7 –11.6 –7.6 –5.4 0.2 –7.4 –2.0
Note: For aggregation, production distortions due to climate change were weighted with world market
prices of the scenario A2 reference projection without climate change.
many much larger positive and negative distortions for different regions. At the ag-
gregate level, developed countries experience for all variants of the A2 scenario
an increase in productivity. In contrast, developing regions suffer a loss in cereal
productivity in all estimates presented here; for aggregate crop production the out-
come is mixed. Within the group of developed countries, gains of 2.5–9.8% in
cereal productivity occur for North America, and similar for the Former Soviet
Union. Western Europe suffers losses of up to 6%, except for minor gains when
using NCAR-PCM projections.
Impacts on developing regions are mostly negative for South Asia and Africa,
mixed for Centrally Planned Asia (including China), and overall positive for Latin
America.
4.2.2 Climate-change impacts with economic adjustments
The calculations above discuss an effect that would result if climate-induced yield
changes were to occur without agronomic and economic adjustment. However,
when simulating with the BLS, in scenarios with shortfalls in food production
caused by climate-change yield impacts, market imbalances push international
prices upwards and provide incentives for reallocation of capital and human re-
sources. At the same time, consumers react to price changes and adjust their pat-
terns of consumption accordingly. Let us first discuss the simulated changes on the
world market.
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Table 4.10. Impact of climate change on world market prices, year 2080
(% changes relative to reference projection).
Cereals All crops
Scenario HadCM3 CSIRO CGCM2 NCAR HadCM3 CSIRO CGCM2 NCAR
A2 14.4 8.9 3.3 –10.6 11.3 6.9 –2.9 –12.9
B2 2.1 6.8 –6.7 –11.8 0.0 3.6 –10.3 –14.8
B1 3.1 4.7 n.a. n.a. 2.5 2.0 n.a. n.a.
A1FI 19.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
A1B n.a. 4.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.5 n.a. n.a.
Table 4.10 contains changes in world market prices, for cereals and an overall
crop price index, as simulated in the respective yield impact scenarios relative to
the respective reference projection.
In the case of HadCM3 climate projections, cereal prices increase by 2–20%
relative to the respective reference projection. For CSIRO the increase is 4–10%.
For NCAR-PCM, as global production capacity increases relative to reference con-
ditions, cereal prices drop by 10–12%, and the crop price index decreases by 13–
15%. The simulated crop-price changes in response to climate change are quite
moderate due to the relatively small net global impact on crop-production potential.
Impact of Climate Change on Agriculture
The dynamic simulation of climate-change impacts with the BLS result in complex
interactions among commodity markets, regions, as well in manifold responses by
consumers and producers. In order to estimate the aggregate impacts caused by
both the climate-change-induced productivity changes and the economic adjust-
ments of actors, we compare value added in agriculture (at constant world mar-
ket prices of the base year 1990) obtained in a climate scenario simulation to the
outcome in the respective reference projection simulated without climate change.
Results are summarized in Table 4.11.
The results re-emphasize the general findings that: (i) impacts at aggregate
global level are small, ranging from –1.5% (in HadCM3-A1FI scenario) to 2.6%
(in NCAR-A2 scenario) – this compares to a global GDP of agriculture, obtained
in the reference projections, ranging in 2080 from US$2.9 trillion (scenario B1) to
US$3.6 trillion (scenario A2) at 1990 prices; (ii) agriculture in developed countries
as a group will likely benefit from climate change; and (iii) developing regions,
with the exception of Latin America, are confronted with negative impacts on GDP
of agriculture. For Asia the loss in value added of agriculture amounts to some 4%
in the case of the higher emission scenarios for HadCM3 and CSIRO, equivalent
to some US$500 billion. Outcomes differ by less than 1% from the respective ref-
erence scenarios for CGCM2 and NCAR climate projections. Aggregate outcomes
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Table 4.11. Impact of climate change on GDP of agriculture, by region and climate
model projections, in 2080 (% changes from respective reference projection).
HadCM3 CSIRO CGCM2 NCAR
A1FI A2 B2 B1 A2 B2 B1 A2 B2 A2 B2
World –1.5 –0.9 –0.4 –0.5 –0.8 –0.9 –0.3 1.1 1.0 2.6 2.4
Developed –0.5 0.2 –0.7 1.1 3.9 2.6 5.1 2.8 5.1 12.9 9.6
North America 7.5 3.1 2.7 7.7 10.5 8.6 11.2 2.8 5.4 12.6 5.4
Europe –14.7 –18.0 –16.9 –8.1 –10.9 –11.8 –7.0 –14.0 –16.9 –6.2 –8.2
Soviet Union –4.9 –0.5 1.9 –0.9 0.5 2.0 3.5 3.5 11.9 22.7 17.0
Developing –1.9 –1.2 –0.3 –0.9 –2.4 –2.2 –2.4 0.6 –0.3 –0.5 0.1
Africa –4.9 –3.7 –1.6 –7.0 –9.2 –6.8 –7.1 –1.9 –8.2 –2.0 1.4
Latin America 3.7 1.4 1.8 4.1 3.6 1.7 0.4 –1.8 –4.3 –2.4 –2.5
Southeast Asia –3.7 –5.0 –3.5 –0.8 –4.4 –4.3 –4.1 –0.4 1.0 –0.9 –1.1
Centrally Planned Asia –6.4 –2.1 –0.8 –2.0 –4.0 –3.9 –4.1 –1.1 –0.1 2.2 1.6
Asia –4.3 –4.2 –2.8 –1.1 –4.3 –4.2 –4.1 –0.6 0.7 –0.1 –0.4
Table 4.12. Impact of climate change on cereal production, by region and climate
model projections, in 2080 (% changes from respective reference projection).
HadCM3 CSIRO CGCM2 NCAR
A1FI A2 B2 B1 A2 B2 B1 A2 B2 A2 B2
World –1.4 –0.9 –0.4 –0.7 –1.2 –1.3 –1.1 –0.5 0.4 1.7 1.2
Developed 2.8 –0.4 2.8 2.2 5.5 5.5 6.3 1.8 4.7 11.2 8.4
North America 1.3 –5.6 –0.1 1.5 7.4 5.9 7.2 –0.5 1.5 9.6 9.0
Western Europe –3.4 2.1 2.0 –1.6 –5.4 –5.5 –4.8 –2.1 2.2 0.3 0.2
Former Soviet Union 7.0 5.4 7.2 4.9 7.3 8.7 9.2 5.1 9.4 18.7 10.9
Developing –3.9 –1.1 –2.2 –2.4 –4.8 –5.3 –5.8 –1.7 –2.1 –3.4 –3.0
Africa –0.6 –0.3 –0.5 –0.2 1.3 –0.4 –0.2 2.7 –1.5 1.1 –1.0
Latin America 15.9 11.5 4.9 8.2 3.7 0.8 –0.7 –1.6 –1.2 –2.4 –1.1
Southeast Asia –10.2 –10.7 –8.8 –5.9 –12.7 –11.3 –10.7 –6.2 –6.7 –13.0 –10.4
Centrally Planned Asia –7.1 –0.6 –0.4 –2.7 –5.5 –4.9 –5.2 –1.4 –0.1 3.9 2.6
Asia –8.6 –5.9 –4.6 –4.2 –9.3 –8.0 –7.8 –4.0 –3.4 –5.0 –3.8
for Africa are generally negative as well, a loss of 2–8% for HadCM3 and CGCM2
simulations, and decreases of 7–9% for CSIRO projections, implying a loss at 1990
prices of US$10–60 billion. Among developed regions, North America gains sub-
stantially in all simulated scenarios; Western Europe loses agriculture value added
in all scenarios, and the Former Soviet Union mostly benefits from climate-induced
changes in production conditions.
Impact of Climate Change on Cereal Production
The dynamic impact of climate change on the production of cereals, resulting both
from changes in land productivity as well as economic responses of actors in the
system, is summarized in Table 4.12.
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Table 4.13. Impact of climate change on direct human cereal consumption, by de-
veloping region and climate model projections, in 2080 (% changes from respective
reference projection).
HadCM3 CSIRO CGCM2 NCAR
A1FI A2 B2 B1 A2 B2 B1 A2 B2 A2 B2
World –3.4 –2.4 –1.4 –1.6 –2.5 –2.5 –2.4 –1.5 –0.4 0.7 0.7
Developing –3.7 –2.6 –1.5 –1.8 –2.8 –2.7 –2.7 –1.6 –0.5 0.7 0.8
Africa –2.8 –3.0 –1.1 –1.1 –1.8 –1.2 –1.1 –1.2 –0.1 0.0 0.9
Latin America –2.0 –2.1 –0.5 –0.6 –1.2 –0.9 –0.5 –0.6 0.5 0.5 1.1
Southeast Asia –3.9 –4.2 –3.0 –2.7 –2.5 –3.1 –3.3 –1.5 –1.2 –0.4 –0.6
Centrally Planned Asia –4.8 –0.7 –0.2 –1.3 –4.3 –4.0 –4.2 –2.5 –0.2 2.4 2.4
Asia –4.2 –2.5 –1.8 –2.2 –3.4 –3.5 –3.6 –2.0 –0.8 1.0 0.7
The model results present a fairly consistent pattern of response in regional ce-
real production to climate change. At global level, taking into account economic
adjustment of actors and markets, cereal production falls within 2% of the results
for the respective reference simulations without climate change. Again, aggrega-
tion produces deceivingly small numbers. Developing countries consistently expe-
rience reductions in cereal production in all climate scenarios. Negative changes of
5–6% are most pronounced in simulations based on CSIRO climate projections. In
this case, production moves to developed regions, notably North America and the
Former Soviet Union, where increases of 6–9% are observed. The most significant
negative changes occur in Asian developing countries, where production declines
in all scenarios, ranging from about 4% decreases for CGCM2 and NCAR climate
projections to reductions of 6–10% for HadCM3 and CSIRO.
Impact of Climate Change on Cereal Consumption and Net Trade
In the SRES worlds of the 2080s, consumers are assumed to be much richer than
today and are largely separated from agricultural production processes. They earn
their incomes mainly in the nonagricultural sector. Therefore, changes in consump-
tion depend more on food prices and income differences than on local agricultural
production. Table 4.13 summarizes the changes in direct human food consumption
of cereals (i.e., excluding feed consumption) occurring in the world food system
simulations in response to climate change.
Table 4.13 shows a fairly uniform decline in direct human consumption of cere-
als across models and scenarios, with the exception of simulations based on NCAR
climate projections. For HadCM3, direct human cereal consumption in develop-
ing countries declines by 2–4%, i.e., equivalent to 40–80 million tons, compared
to direct human consumption of cereals in developing countries for the respective
reference simulations ranging from 1.6 billion tons (scenario B1) to 2.1 billion tons
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(scenario A2). Consumption in Asian developing countries accounts for two-thirds
of this amount. Consumers in Latin America are least affected.
Demand and supply for commodities meet in the market. The simulations of
the IPCC development path scenarios without climate change result in a growing
dependence of developing countries on net cereal imports of between 170 million
tons (scenario B1) and 430 million tons (scenario A2), as shown in Section 4.1
(Table 4.4). Climate change will add to this dependence, increasing net cereal
imports of developing regions in the order of 10–40%, varying with development
path scenario and GCM climate projections. Even in the case of NCAR projections,
resulting in overall positive impacts on agricultural productivity, the comparative
advantage for producing cereals shifts to developed countries, and net imports of
developing countries increase by about 25%, equivalent to an additional 110 million
tons in scenario A2 and about 90 million tons of additional imports in scenario B2.
It is important to note that these changes in comparative advantage between
developed and developing regions are likely to accentuate the magnitude of the im-
pacts suggested by the assessment, i.e., “winners” are likely to gain more, “losers”
will lose more than projected here without full economic impacts and adjustment
in nonagricultural sectors.
4.3 Impact of Climate Change on the Number of People
at Risk of Hunger
Section 4.1 has highlighted that estimates of the number of people at risk of hunger
vary greatly according to socioeconomic development trajectories, in particular as-
sumed income levels and income distribution, and population numbers.
The BLS estimate is based on FAO data (FAO, 2001) and relies on a strong
empirical correlation between the share of undernourished in the total population
and the ratio of average national food supply relative to aggregate national food
requirements. This correlation is plotted in Figure 4.3. The horizontal axis repre-
sents an aggregate measure of food availability. For instance, the curve suggests
that the share of undernourished in the total population will fall below 20% for an
index value of 130, i.e., when aggregate food supply exceeds aggregate national
food requirements by 30%. Hunger is completely eliminated for index values of
food supply over requirements of above 170.
The impact of climate change on the number of people at risk of hunger is es-
timated in the BLS, using the relationship shown in Figure 4.3. Hence, the impact
of climate change on the number of undernourished is measured via changes in the
ratio of aggregate national human food consumption to food requirements. This
ratio is affected by the direct impact of climate change on domestic food produc-
tion, as well as by the indirect effects related to income changes and the prices
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Figure 4.3. The share of undernourished in the total population.
of food imports, which depend on the global availability of food. Therefore, on
the one hand the trade system will mitigate negative local climate-change impacts
when consumers can afford to buy food on the international market. On the other
hand, food prices rising due to climate change may put an extra burden on those
consumers who depend on imports, even without a region experiencing direct local
climate-change impacts on production conditions. Overall, the trade system helps
somewhat to disperse the impacts of climate change by providing access to food for
consumers that can pay for it and by providing additional incentives to producers
to mobilize additional production capacities where available.
Based on more than 40 simulation experiments with the BLS, some fairly robust
conclusions emerge from our analysis of climate-change impacts. First, climate
change will most likely increase the number of people at risk of hunger. The im-
pact of climate change reduced the number of undernourished only in one scenario,
namely the benign climate projected by the NCAR-PCM model. Second, the sig-
nificance of any climate-change impact on the number of undernourished depends
entirely on the level of economic development assumed in the SRES scenarios.
In scenario A1, where the number of undernourished decreases to about
200 million by 2050, and is further reduced to about 100 million people by 2080,
i.e., one-eighth of the current level, the impact of climate change in 2080 is large
only in relative terms, an increase of 26% from 108 million to 136 million, but rel-
atively small in absolute terms when the magnitude of the current hunger problem
is considered. According to the underlying assumptions of scenario A1, consumers
worldwide are economically well-off and agriculture provides only a marginal con-
tribution of around 1% to national incomes. Under such assumptions, trade can
compensate for regional shortfalls in production, and due to generally high lev-
els of consumption reductions in food supply will cause only moderate changes
in the number of undernourished. To put it very bluntly, for the wealthy societies
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of scenario A1 – even the currently poor regions are assumed to reach economic
levels exceeding in per capita terms current average OECD incomes – hunger is
a marginal issue and remains so even with climate change; a desirable vision but
perhaps overly optimistic in comparison to actual achievements of the last 30 years.
The conclusions obtained for SRES scenario B1 are similar to those for scenario
A1. For B1, without climate change, we estimate that the number of people at risk
of hunger would fall from currently about 800 million people to below 100 million
by the 2080s, i.e., a number even slightly lower than in scenario A1. As there is
more moderate climate change in scenario B1, due to lower CO2 emissions than
in scenario A1, the negative impact on the number of undernourished is small both
in relative and absolute terms. HadCM3-B1 results show an increase of 8%, from
91 to 99 million people; for climate projections of the CSIRO model the impact is
even less, at some 4%.
The outcome of BLS simulation experiments regarding the number of people
at risk of hunger is quite different under the high-population SRES scenario A2.
Under this set of assumptions, the number of undernourished, even without con-
sidering climate change, remains high throughout the simulation period to 2080.
Again, climate change increases the number of hungry, but this time absolute num-
bers do matter. In the reference case, without considering climate change, the num-
ber of undernourished estimated for 2050 amounts to 721 million people; for 2080
it is 768 million. This number increases by nearly 120 million, by some 15%, in
both HadCM3 and CSIRO climate projection scenarios. Climate projections of the
Canadian CGCM2 model result in 817 million people at risk of hunger, equivalent
to an additional 50 million undernourished due to climate change. The situation
reverses only in the simulations with projections of NCAR-PCM for emission sce-
nario A2. Here the number of undernourished decreases by 5% due to improved
agricultural conditions worldwide, with mitigated moisture stress in many regions
and the lowest temperature increase of all the models considered in this study.
To explore further the relationship between different levels of climate change
and the prevalence of hunger in a socioeconomic setting as defined by the SRES
scenarios A2 and B2, several additional simulation experiments were undertaken.
The full range of climate-change impacts on crop yields as projected in AEZ were
imposed on the socioeconomic development paths of the two scenarios. Figure 4.4
summarizes the simulation results, showing for the demographic and socioeco-
nomic development assumed in SRES scenario A2, the additional number of peo-
ple at risk of hunger in 2080 plotted against different levels of atmospheric CO2
concentrations and associated climate changes. Note that the number of under-
nourished grows faster than linear with the level of climate change. For climate
change according to scenario HadCM3-A1FI, the additional number of undernour-
ished is about 175 million people, more than 22% above the reference projection
without climate change.
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Figure 4.4. Increase in undernourished due to climate change, for socioeconomic
conditions of the SRES A2 scenario in the 2080s.
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Figure 4.5. Additional number of undernourished due to climate change, by re-
gion, for socioeconomic conditions of the SRES A2 scenario in the 2080s.
Figure 4.5 indicates that the overall impact of climate change on the level of
undernourishment is comparable for the simulations with climate projections from
the HadCM3 and the CSIRO models. However, the regional distribution of the
occurrence of additional undernourished differs. CSIRO results show increased
hunger in Asian countries, while HadCM3 results show increased hunger in Africa
and Latin America.
Scenario B2, with regard to demographic and socioeconomic development,
falls inbetween the results obtained for scenario A2 on the one side and scenar-
ios A1 and B1 on the other. Regarding greenhouse-gas emissions and projected
levels of climate change, scenario B2 falls inbetween the lower scenario B1 and the
higher emission scenarios A2 and A1. Concerning people at risk of hunger, there
is a substantial improvement observed in scenario B2, from more than 800 million
currently to an estimated 350 million people in 2050 and down further to about
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230 million in 2080. This number is quite sensitive to long-term economic perfor-
mance, as is illustrated by the results obtained for sensitivity scenario B2s discussed
earlier. For both the HadCM3 and CSIRO climate projections, the estimated num-
ber of people at risk of hunger in the 2080s increases by about 5%. For climate pro-
jections of the Canadian model and the NCAR-PCM, hunger even decreases due
to much improved growing conditions in many developed and developing coun-
tries, mainly in the temperate climate zones. Several sensitivity simulation exper-
iments for the full range of climate projections with HadCM3 and CSIRO models
were completed for the demographic and socioeconomic development stipulated
in SRES scenario B2. The resulting estimates of the number of undernourished
range from 208 million (an improvement of 10% obtained with the NCAR-PCM
climate projections) to 268 million (with HadCM3 climate for emissions of A1FI).
The latter number is some 15% higher than in the reference simulation of scenario
B2 without climate change.
In summary, climate-change impacts on agriculture will increase the number of
people at risk of hunger. This impact would be of global significance if imposed on
an already high level of undernourishment, as is the case in the assumed develop-
ment of scenario A2. In all other scenarios, with rapid economic growth and a tran-
sition to stable population levels, poverty, and with it hunger – though negatively
affected by climate change – would become a much less prevalent phenomenon
than it is today.
5
Conclusions
5.1 Climate Change and Agricultural Vulnerability
Combating climate change is vital to the pursuit of sustainable development;
equally, the pursuit of sustainable development is integral to lasting climate-change
mitigation and adaptation. The climate-change issue is global, long-term, and
involves complex interaction between climatic, social, environmental, economic,
technological, institutional, and political processes. It has significant interna-
tional and intergenerational implications in the context of equity and sustainable
development.
The ability of agriculture to adapt to and cope with climate change depends
on such factors as population growth, poverty and hunger, arable-land and water
resources, farming technology and access to inputs, crop varieties adapted to lo-
cal conditions, access to knowledge, infrastructure, agricultural extension services,
marketing and storage systems, rural financial markets, and economic status and
wealth. The livelihoods of populations and communities are highly dependent on
these factors, and the developing countries, particularly the least developed coun-
tries, are most vulnerable. As a result of this dependency, the developing countries
are less able to adapt and are susceptible to climate-change damage, just as they are
vulnerable to other social, environmental, and economic stresses.
Vulnerable populations have only limited capacity to protect themselves from
environmental hazards, in particular from extreme events such as drought and
floods. They also bear the brunt of the consequences of large-scale environmen-
tal damage, such as land degradation, biodiversity loss, and climate change. Heavy
and variable precipitation, heat waves, cyclones, drought, and floods may become
more frequent and intense, resulting in more economic shocks. In the short term,
policymakers will need to cope with an increased risk of frequent shocks to their
economies, which will affect the welfare of their most vulnerable populations. Over
the long term, they will need to manage the effects of climate change on the un-
derlying production structures of the economies, with those countries dependent on
agriculture most heavily hit.
The central challenge of sustainable agriculture is to meet the food demand
of the present generation without sacrificing the needs of future generations. This
cannot be achieved without the systemic integration of the social, economic, and
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environmental pillars of agriculture and rural development. Sustainable agricul-
tural development is essential for economic growth, which creates employment
opportunities in nonagricultural rural sectors, which in turn reduce poverty.
Policies that reduce pressure on resources, improve management of environ-
mental risks, and increase the welfare of the poorest members of society can sim-
ultaneously advance sustainable development and equity, and enhance adaptive ca-
pacity and coping mechanisms. The inclusion of climate-change impacts in the
design and implementation of national and international development initiatives
can reduce vulnerability to climate change.
Many factors contribute to social vulnerability, including rapid population
growth, poverty and hunger, poor health, low levels of education, gender inequal-
ity, fragile and hazardous location, and lack of access to resources and services,
including knowledge and technological means. And when people are socially dis-
advantaged or lack political voice, their vulnerability is exacerbated further.
The economic vulnerability of agriculture is related to a number of interact-
ing elements, including its importance in the overall national economy, trade and
foreign-exchange earnings, aid and investments, international prices of agricultural
commodities and inputs, and production and consumption patterns. All of these
factors intensify economic vulnerability, particularly in countries that are poor and
have agriculture-based economies.
Agriculture is at the core of environmental vulnerability and concerns the man-
agement of natural resources – land degradation, water scarcity, deforestation, and
the threat to biodiversity. Climate change could cause irreversible damage to land
and water ecosystems, and lead to loss of production potential. In this report the
agro-ecological impact of climate change has been quantified for all countries,
developed and developing. These results have been integrated in an ecological–
economic framework, embedded in the world food economy. The main results of
these assessments are summarized below.
5.2 Summary of Results
5.2.1 Impacts of climate change on agro-ecology
Human activities are changing the Earth’s climate, and this is having an impact
on all ecosystems. The expected changes in climate will alter regional agricultural
systems, with consequences for food production. The specifics of the impact will
depend on how the effects of climate change translate into factors that determine
the viability and utility of ecosystems.
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Climatic Resources
The results of an agro-climatic assessment using climate projections of Global Cir-
culation Models (GCM) show a northward shift in thermal regimes due to global
warming, with a significant reduction of boreal and arctic ecosystems [62% reduc-
tion of the current total of 2,122 million hectares (ha)]. A major expansion of the
tropical zones occurs, which, apart from a very small stretch in South Africa and a
narrow fringe along the Mediterranean coast, will cover almost all of Africa.
Calculations using outputs from three of four major GCMs produce consistent
increases of arid areas in developing countries. At present, there are 1,080 mil-
lion ha of land in Africa with a length of growing period (LGP) of less than 120
days. Climate change in the 2080s would result in an expansion of such land by
about 5–8%, equivalent to 58 million ha and 92 million ha respectively. This ex-
pansion of arid areas would be mirrored by a contraction of 31–51 million ha of
the favorable growing zones of 120–270 days. Nearly 1 billion people worldwide
and more than 180 million people in Africa alone are presently living in these
vulnerable environments, relying mainly on agriculture for their livelihoods.
Environmental Constraints to Crop Agriculture
In the 2080s, the following regions may experience an increase of land with severe
constraints: Central America & Caribbean (1.2–2.9% of a total area of 271 mil-
lion ha), Oceania & Polynesia (0.3–4.3% of a total area of 848 million ha), North-
ern Africa (1.9–3.4% of a total area of 547 million ha), and Western Asia (0.1–1.0%
of a total area of 433 million ha). In Southern Africa, as much as an additional 11%
of a total land area of 266 million ha may suffer from severe constraints.
In the 2080s, the total extent of potentially good agricultural land systemat-
ically decreases in Northern Europe (by 1.5–9.6%), in particular in the UK and
Ireland; Southern Europe (0.7–7.7%), in particular in Spain; Eastern Europe (0.2–
5.9%), in particular in Ukraine; Northern Africa (0.5–1.3%), in particular in Al-
geria, Morocco, and Tunisia; Southern Africa (0.1–1.5%), in particular in South
Africa; and in East Asia & Japan (0.9–2.5%), in particular in China and Japan. In-
dividual countries with decreasing, potentially good agricultural land not reflected
in regional totals are: Venezuela, New Zealand, Mozambique, Sudan, and Uganda.
Considering projections of SRES scenarios simulated by four GCMs,
constraint-free prime land decreases for sub-Saharan Africa, while land with mois-
ture stress increases. In addition, land with severe climate, soil, or terrain con-
straints, prohibiting use for rain-fed agriculture, increases according to 10 of the
12 climate projections, by 26–61 million ha, compared to 1,513 million ha in the
reference climate scenario.
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Climate Variability and Variability of Rain-fed Cereal Production
Areas with a particularly high variability of year-by-year growing conditions are
found in the mid-west of the USA, northeast Brazil, northeast Argentina and
Uruguay, Southern Africa, southern Mozambique, and the southeast of Australia.
In the developed nations as a whole, potential rain-fed cereal output increased
between the periods of 1901–1930 and 1961–1990 by more than 8%, equivalent
to about 200 million tons, due to the changing climate, while output variability
decreased. In the developing countries as a whole, potential cereal output increased
somewhat, by just under 3%, equivalent to about 70 million tons. Yet variability
increased as well. No improvements were found for sub-Saharan Africa. Some
regions, for instance in Southern Africa, lost average potential cereal production
as compared to the beginning of the 20th century, and at the same time saw a
considerable increase in the variability of cereal outputs.
Crop-production Potentials
The regional aggregation of results, based on the HadCM3-A1FI 2080s scenario,
shows for both suitable rain-fed land extents and production potential of cereals a
significant decrease in Northern and Southern Africa.
The developed nations, however, will see a considerable potential for expansion
of suitable land extents and increased production potential for cereals only when
considering the use of this “new land” at high latitudes. These potential increases
are mainly located in North America (40% increase over reference climate esti-
mate of 358 million ha), in Northern Europe (16% increase over reference climate
estimate of 45 million ha), in the Russian Federation (64% increase over reference
climate estimate of 244 million ha), and in East Asia & Japan (10% increase over
reference climate estimate of 150 million ha).
Developing countries consistently face a substantial decrease of wheat-
production potential, according to all scenarios for the 2080s (in the order of 15–
45%); wheat is virtually disappearing from Africa. Wheat-production potential is
decreasing in South Asia (20–75%), Southeast Asia (10–95%), and South America
(12–27%).
A distinct downward trend for the production potential of rain-fed sugar crops
emerges from the analysis. Developing countries lose some 6–38% of their rain-
fed production potential on currently cultivated land. For developed countries the
outcome is mixed.
For roots and tubers, the change in rain-fed production potential varies, from
a loss of 13% to a gain of 4% in all model scenarios, except for the NCAR where
there is a gain in production potential of 23–29%. In the case of the developing
countries the change ranges from a loss of 23% to a gain of 20%.
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Potential Agricultural Land
All 12 GCM climate projections predict gains in potential agricultural land glob-
ally. Strong gains are predicted especially for North America (20–50%) and in the
Russian Federation (40–70%). However, significant losses are predicted in partic-
ular in Northern and Southern Africa. In 10 of the 12 GCM climate projections,
substantial losses (up to 9%) are predicted for the sub-Saharan African region.
In developing nations and in particular sub-Saharan Africa, the overall contrac-
tions in potential cultivatable areas are mainly at the cost of double- and triple-
cropping areas, where losses are above average. Although the area for single crop-
ping increased in sub-Saharan Africa at the expense of double- and triple-cropping
areas, considerably more is lost to the category where cropping is not possible.
The land suitability index (SI) accounts for changes in area extents as well as
changes in productivity. This SI index is useful when comparing land productivity
estimates across regions, as it adjusts for differences in land quality and provides
a more realistic estimate of land-resource availability. The HadCM3-A1F1 sce-
nario results show a remarkable increase of effective land resources, as expressed
by SI, in higher latitudes of the northern hemisphere, in particular benefiting the
Russian Federation, Northern Europe, and Canada. In Northern Africa, three-
quarters of suitable rain-fed land is lost as compared to reference climate condi-
tions. Decreases are also noted in Southern Africa, mainly affecting Mozambique,
Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. In all 12 scenarios, developed
countries gain 6–24%, while for developing countries there is a loss of 2–8% for
HadCM3 and CSIRO climate projections and gains of 1–4% when applying the
CGCM2 and NCAR model results.
Climate-change Impacts on Cereal Production
Site-specific climate-impact studies have come to a wide range of seemingly con-
tradicting results. While variations in assumptions and methodologies may account
for some of the differences, the results obtained in this study clearly demonstrate
that a wide range of outcomes is to be expected for many countries, and that a full
and reliable picture requires a spatially comprehensive approach and analysis such
as AEZ.
For four HadCM3 climate-change scenarios, the estimated impacts on rain-fed
cereal-production potential on current cultivated land imply that there are 42–73
countries with potential cereal-productivity declines of more than 5% (“losing”
countries). The population in 2080 of these countries ranges between 1.6 billion
and 3.8 billion people. In these countries, cereal-production losses amount to 3–
8% of the global potential; a grim outlook for the already poor among these losing
countries despite substantial increases in some 54–71 gaining countries.
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Some 14 developing countries account for 80% of current cereal production
in the developing world. China, the world’s largest cereal producer, gains sub-
stantially, in the 5–23% range for all climate models except for the CSIRO model,
where there is a loss of 5–7%. For India, the second-largest cereal producer, Brazil,
and Thailand, results vary according to climate model. Argentina gains production
potential by 7–24% for the HadCM3 and NCAR models, and loses 10–30% pro-
duction potential for the CSIRO and CGCM2 models. South Africa substantively
loses production potential for all climate models and scenarios, except for NCAR’s
projection of scenario A2, where a small gain occurs.
Current Food-insecure Countries
The total population of the 84 poor food-insecure countries at present amounts to
some 4.2 billion, equivalent to 74% of the current world population. Some 18% of
the 4.2 billion are undernourished. By the 2080s, the UN projects the total popula-
tion of these countries to increase to 6.8 billion (United Nations, 2001), equivalent
to 80% of the world population.
Individual country results are reason for concern. For example, in the results of
the HadCM3 scenarios, 20–40 poor and food-insecure countries, with a projected
total population in 2080 in the range of 1–3 billion, may lose on average 10–20%
of their cereal-production potential due to climate change.
With the exception of the results for the NCAR-PCM model, Sudan, Nigeria,
Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Somalia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Chad, Sierra Leone,
Angola, Mozambique, and Niger lose cereal-production potential in the 2080s for
the other three climate models, across all the emission scenarios. These countries
currently have 87 million undernourished, equivalent to 45% of the total undernour-
ished in sub-Saharan Africa. By contrast, Zaire, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Mada-
gascar, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Guinea all gain cereal-production
potential in the 2080s. These eight gaining countries currently have 73 million un-
dernourished, equivalent to 38% of the undernourished population in sub-Saharan
Africa.
Most of the food-insecure countries in sub-Saharan Africa are also poor. They
lack the resources to produce enough food and often do not have access to for-
eign exchange for financing food imports. Production losses as a result of climate
change could further worsen the prevalence and depth of hunger. This burden will
undoubtedly fall disproportionately on the poorest and the most vulnerable.
Climate-change impacts highlight the urgent need to intensify agricultural
land management and expand agricultural land area, both of which will lead
to additional greenhouse-gas emissions and increasing environmental pressures.
Moreover, agricultural land expansion will unavoidably lead to losses of natural
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ecosystems and biodiversity, especially through the clearance of forests. Such con-
siderations must be central in mitigating the impacts of climate change on agricul-
tural production.
5.2.2 Impacts of climate change on food systems
The evaluation of the impact of climate change on production, consumption, and
trade of agricultural commodities, in particular on food staples, was carried out
with a large number of experiments that relate to four aspects: magnitude of cli-
mate change for different future socioeconomic and technical development paths;
uncertainty of results in view of differences in climate projections of different GCM
groups; robustness of results with regard to altered economic growth assumptions;
and sensitivity of results to different assumptions with regard to physiological ef-
fects of atmospheric CO2 enrichment on yields. Some 50 simulation experiments
were carried out with the integrated ecological-economic framework provided by
the agro-ecological zones (AEZ) model and databases, and IIASA’s linked system
of national agricultural models (BLS). Yield modifications due to climate change
start in the base year 1990. Three separate snapshots of climatic change are pro-
vided referring to the 2020s, 2050s, and 2080s, respectively.
Impacts of Climate Change on Crop Production without Economic Adjustments
The magnitude and even direction of the aggregate climate-change impact at world
level varies with climate projections of different GCM groups. We estimated the
magnitude of distortions that result from applying climate-induced productivity
changes to each country’s agricultural production pattern in a reference projection
without climate change, thus measuring the impact without economic adjustment.
Scenarios based on HadCM3 and CSIRO projections result in a small negative net
impact at global level. For climate projections using emission scenario A2, the
global impact on cereals ranges from –0.7% to –1.2%, i.e., a gap of about 60 mil-
lion tons in 2080. When aggregating all crops, the net impact amounts to –1.3% to
–1.6%. Climate projections by the Canadian CGCM2 model and the NCAR-PCM
model imply moderate positive global crop-production changes of 2.7–5.6%.
However, the impacts of climate change on crop production are geographically
unevenly distributed. Developed countries experience for all variants of the A2
scenario an increase in productivity. In contrast, developing regions suffer a loss
in cereal productivity in all estimates. Within the group of developed countries,
gains of 3–10% in cereal productivity occur for North America, and similar for
the Former Soviet Union. Western Europe suffers losses in most projections of up
to 6%.
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Impacts on developing regions are mostly negative for South Asia (–8% to
–17% for scenario A2) and Africa (–3.5% to +0.5%), mixed for Centrally Planned
Asia (–6% to +1%), and overall positive for Latin America.
Impacts of Climate Change with Economic Adjustments
Shortfalls in food production, caused by climate change, create market imbalances,
which push international prices upwards and provide incentives for reallocation of
capital and human resources, thus mitigating climate-change impacts by economic
adjustments.
In the case of HadCM3 climate projections, cereal prices increase by 2–20%
relative to the reference projection; for CSIRO the increase is 4–10%. Generally,
the simulated crop-price changes in response to climate change are moderate due
to a relatively small net global impact on crop-production potential.
Impact of climate change on agricultural GDP. The results underline three
general findings. First, the impact of climate change on GDP of the agriculture sec-
tor is relatively small for the aggregate global level, between –1.5% (in HadCM3-
A1FI scenario) and +2.6% (in NCAR-A2 scenario); this refers to total global GDP
of agriculture in the reference projections ranging from US$2.9–3.6 trillion (at 1990
prices). Second, agriculture in developed countries as a group will likely bene-
fit from climate change. Third, developing regions, with the exception of Latin
America, are confronted with negative impacts on agricultural GDP.
For Asia, the loss in value added of agriculture in 2080 amounts to some 4% in
the case of A1 and A2 emission scenarios for HadCM3 and CSIRO (total agricul-
tural GDP of US$1.1–1.3 trillion in the reference projections). Aggregate outcomes
for Africa are generally negative, a loss of 2–8% for HadCM3 and CGCM2 sim-
ulations, and decreases of 7–9% for CSIRO projections (total agricultural GDP of
US$0.6–0.7 trillion in reference projections). Among developed regions, North
America gains substantially in all simulated scenarios (3–13% for scenario A2);
Western Europe loses agriculture value added in all scenarios (loss of 6–18% in
scenario A2), and the Former Soviet Union mostly gains value added (some 0–23%
in scenario A2) in response to climate change.
Impact of climate change on cereal sectors. The model results present a fairly
consistent response pattern of regional cereal production to climate change. At
global level, taking into account economic adjustments of actors and markets,
cereal-production changes fall within 2% of the results for the reference simula-
tions without climate change. However, aggregation produces deceivingly small
numbers. Developing countries consistently experience reductions in cereal pro-
duction in all climate scenarios. Negative changes of 5–6% are most pronounced
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in simulations based on CSIRO climate projections. In this case, production moves
to developed regions, notably North America and the Former Soviet Union, where
increases of 6–9% are observed. The most significant negative changes occur in
Asian developing countries, where production declines in all scenarios, ranging
from about 4% decreases for CGCM2 and NCAR climate projections to reductions
of 6–10% for HadCM3 and CSIRO.
Impact of climate change on cereal consumption and net trade. In the SRES
worlds of the 2080s, consumers are assumed much richer than they are today, and
are largely separated from agricultural production processes. Consumption lev-
els depend foremost on food prices and incomes rather than on changes in local
agricultural production.
A fairly uniform decline in direct human consumption of cereals (i.e., exclud-
ing feed consumption) in developing countries occurs in response to climate change
across all climate models and emission scenarios (with the exception of simulations
based on NCAR climate projections). For HadCM3, direct human cereal consump-
tion in developing countries declines by 2–4%, i.e., in the order of 40–80 million
tons, compared to total consumption in the range of 1.6 billion tons (scenario B1) to
2.1 billion tons (scenario A2) in the reference projections. Consumption changes in
Asian developing countries account for two-thirds of this amount, albeit consump-
tion declines from relatively high levels due to fast economic growth. Consumers
in Latin America are least affected.
The simulations of the IPCC development path scenarios without climate
change result in a growing dependence of developing countries on net cereal im-
ports of between 170 million tons (scenario B1) and 430 million tons (scenario
A2). Climate change will add to this dependence, increasing net cereal imports of
developing regions by 10–40% according to development path scenario and GCM
climate projections. Even in the case of NCAR projections, resulting in overall pos-
itive impacts on agricultural productivity, the comparative advantage for producing
cereals shifts to developed countries, and net imports of developing countries in-
crease by about 25%, an additional 110 million tons in scenario A2 and around
90 million tons of additional cereal imports in scenario B2.
It is important to note that these changes in comparative advantage between
developed and developing regions are likely to accentuate the magnitude of the
impacts suggested by this agricultural assessment, i.e., “winners” are likely to gain
more, “losers” will lose more than projected without accounting fully for impacts
and adjustments in nonagricultural sectors.
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Impact of Climate Change on the Number of People at Risk of Hunger
Based on more than 50 simulation experiments with the BLS model, fairly robust
conclusions emerge from the analysis of climate-change impacts. First, climate
change will most likely increase the number of people at risk of hunger. Second,
the importance and significance of the climate-change impact on the level of un-
dernourishment depends entirely on the level of economic development assumed in
the SRES scenarios.
For the wealthy societies of IPCC development path scenario A1 – even the
currently poor regions are assumed to reach economic levels exceeding in per capita
terms current average OECD incomes – hunger is a marginal issue and remains so
even with climate change; a desirable vision, but perhaps overly optimistic in view
of the actual achievements of the last 30 years.
The outcome of BLS simulation experiments regarding the number of people
at risk of hunger is quite different for the high-population SRES scenario A2. Un-
der this set of assumptions, the level of undernourished, even without considering
climate change, remains at a high level in the 2080s. In the reference case, with-
out considering climate change, the number of undernourished estimated for 2080
is 768 million. This number increases by nearly 120 million, equivalent to some
15%, in both experiments with HadCM3 and CSIRO climate projections. Climate
projections of the Canadian CGCM2 model result in an additional 50 million un-
dernourished due to climate change. For even larger climate changes, such as pro-
jected by HadCM3-A1FI scenario for the 2080s, additional undernourished people
amount to 175 million. This indicates that under socioeconomic conditions of de-
velopment path A2, the number of undernourished is likely to increase more than
linear with the level of climate change.
Climate change will affect the number of people at risk of hunger. This impact
will be of global significance only if super-imposed in a situation with an already
high level of undernourishment, as in development path A2 and to a lesser extent
in scenario B2. In all other cases, with stabilizing population levels and rapid eco-
nomic growth, poverty, and with it hunger – though negatively affected by climate
change – would become much less prevalent than it is today.
The results of this study provide a methodology and database for country-level
assessments of climate and agricultural vulnerability. In the context of the present
debate over international agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the outcome
of the Third Assessment of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), it is
important that uniform assessments be carried out to compare and evaluate national,
regional, and global impacts of climate change on food and agricultural production
systems. Such quantified and spatial information provides important inputs that
can underpin national and regional adaptive policies to mitigate the consequences
of climate change and also facilitate international negotiations on climate change,
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taking into account the contributions of various countries to global warming as well
as their specific development needs and priorities.
The nature and gravity of vulnerabilities of food systems to climate change and
variability, and the design of policies to adapt them to cope are of utmost impor-
tance, and agricultural research has a central role in this.
The challenges of climate change and variability for agricultural research now
relate to elucidate the changes in the flow and storage of materials, the ecology of
pests and diseases, the dynamics of rainfall regimes and water accumulation, the
plant responses to temperature and CO2 concentration, the reduction of greenhouse
gases in animal production, the plant tolerance to salty water due to sea-level in-
crease in many coastal areas, the conservation of biodiversity, the adaptation of
food production systems to extreme weather events, among other important issues
that need to be tackled.
For agricultural research to respond in a timely manner, a worldwide concerted
policy action is necessary. Networking of researchers, priority setting, allocation
of necessary funding, inter-regional and inter-country technology transfer, insti-
tutional development and strengthening are among the decisions that need to be
made so that agricultural research can contribute toward mitigation and adaptation
of agriculture to climate change.
Most of the discussion on climate change has focused on mitigation measures,
for example the Kyoto Protocol. Not much attention has been given to climate-
change adaptation, which will be critical for many developing countries. For devel-
oped countries, the issue of adaptation to future climate change is not a priority, as
they already have the means and resources to respond. In contrast, the developing
world must recognize the urgency to put this issue of adaptation to climate change
on the global agenda.
Annex 2.1
Responses of Temperature to Increasing CO2
Concentrations and Correlations Between Temperature
Increase and Precipitation Change by Region
Comparisons of results from four General Circulation Models (GCM), the
HadCM3, CSIRO, CGCM2, and NCAR model, have been made separately for all
land and for current cultivated land in terms of “Temperature change (◦C) versus
CO2 concentration levels (ppm)” and for “Temperature change (◦C) versus pre-
cipitation change (%).” The figures in this Annex present for the four GCMs the
implied responses of temperature to increasing CO2 concentrations, compiled from
the GCM outputs obtained for different SRES emission scenarios and combined
with AEZ data layers. It also shows the correlations between projected temperature
increases and precipitation changes, considering all land grid-cells for individual
regions (excluding Antarctica).
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Annex 2.2
National and Regional Models in the BLS
National Models
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, United
States; EU-9, Eastern Europe, and Former USSR.
Aggregate Regional Country Group Models
African Oil Exporters: Algeria, Angola, Congo, Gabon.
Africa, Medium Income, Food Exporters: Ghana, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Senegal,
Cameroon, Mauritius, Zimbabwe.
Africa, Medium Income, Food Importers: Morocco, Tunisia, Liberia, Mauritania,
Zambia.
Africa, Low Income, Food Exporters: Benin, Gambia, Togo, Ethiopia, Malawi,
Mozambique, Uganda, Sudan.
Africa, Low Income, Food Importers: Guinea, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, Burk-
ina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Zaire, Burundi, Madagascar, Rwanda,
Somalia, Tanzania.
Latin America, High Income, Food Exporters: Costa Rica, Panama, Cuba, Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, Suriname, Uruguay.
Latin America, High Income, Food Importers: Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago,
Chile, Peru, Venezuela.
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Latin America, Medium Income: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Colombia, Guyana, Paraguay, Haiti, Bolivia.
Southeast Asia, High-Medium Income, Food Exporters: Malaysia, Philippines.
Southeast Asia, High-Medium Income, Food Importers: Republic of Korea,
Democratic People’s Republic Korea, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia.
Asia, Low Income: Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka.
Near/Middle East, Oil Exporters: Libya, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus,
Lebanon, Syria.
Near/Middle East, Medium-Low Income: Jordan, Yemen, Afghanistan.
Rest of the World: All other countries not specified above.
Annex 2.3
Commodity Classification in the BLS
Commodity classifications as used in the national models of the BLS are given be-
low. Table A2.3.1 shows the ten commodities used at the world market level, i.e.,
the level of commodity aggregation employed to clear the international markets.
Table A2.3.2 presents the more detailed commodity list as used to describe hu-
man demand. Finally, Table A2.3.3 gives the classification used in the agricultural
supply module that allocates production inputs, i.e., land, capital and labor, to the
agricultural production activities.
Table A2.3.1. Classification at the world market level.
No. Commodity Unit of measurement
I. Wheat 1,000 mt
II. Rice, milled 1,000 mt milled equivalent
III. Coarse grains 1,000 mt
IV. Bovine & ovine meat 1,000 mt carcass weight
V. Dairy product 1,000 mt whole milk equivalent
VI. Other meat & fish 1,000 mt protein equivalent
VII. Protein feeds 1,000 mt protein equivalent
VIII. Other food US$ million, 1970
IX. Nonfood agriculture US$ million, 1970
X. Nonagriculture US$ million, 1970
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Table A2.3.2. Human demand in standard national models.
No. Commodity Unit of measurement Index
1. Wheat 1,000 mt I
2. Rice, milled 1,000 mt milled equivalent II
3. Coarse grains 1,000 mt III
4. Oils & fats 1,000 mt oil equivalent VIII
5. Protein feeds 1,000 mt protein equivalent VII
6. Sugar products 1,000 mt sugar refined VIII
7. Bovine & ovine meat 1,000 mt carcass weight IV
8. Pork 1,000 mt carcass weight VI
9. Poultry & eggs 1,000 mt protein equivalent VI
10. Dairy products 1,000 mt whole milk equivalent V
11. Roots & vegetables US$ million, 1970 VIII
12. Fruits & nuts US$ million, 1970 VIII
13. Fishery products 1,000 mt protein equivalent VI
14. Coffee 1,000 mt VIII
15. Cocoa & tea US$ million, 1970 VIII
16. Clothing fibers US$ million, 1970 IX
17. Industrial crops US$ million, 1970 IX
18. Nonagriculture US$ million, 1970 X
Table A2.3.3. Agricultural production in standard national models.
No. Commodity Unit of measurement
1. Wheat 1,000 mt
2. Rice, milled 1,000 mt milled equivalent
3. Coarse grains 1,000 mt
4. Protein feed, crop origin 1,000 mt protein equivalent
5. Other food, crop origin US$ million, 1970
6. Nonfood, crop origin US$ million, 1970
7. Roughage (not used) (not used)
8. Pork, poultry, eggs 1,000 mt protein equivalent
9. Bovine & ovine meat 1,000 mt carcass weight
10. Dairy products 1,000 mt whole milk equivalent
11. Fruits & nuts US$ million, 1970
Annex 2.4
Aggregation of BLS Country Modules to World Regions
SRES
Economic group region Region BLS componenta
MDC = OECD NAM Canada, United States
More developed
countries
WEU Austria, EC-9
PAO Australia, Japan, New Zealand
EFSU FSU+EEU Eastern Europe & Former USSR
LDC = ALM AFR Egypt, Kenya, Nigeria,
Less developed Africa oil exporters,
countries Africa medium income/food exporters,
Africa medium income/food importers,
Africa low income/food exporters,
Africa low income/food importers
LAM Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
Latin America high income/food exporters,
Latin America high income/food importers,
Latin America medium income
WAS Turkey,
Near/Middle East oil exporters,
Near/Middle East medium-low income countries
ASIA CPA China,
Far East Asia high-medium income/food importers
SEA India, Pakistan,
Asia low income countries
Indonesia, Thailand,
Far East Asia high-medium income/food exporters
Rest of world ROW ROW Rest of the world
aFor details of country grouping in the BLS, see Fischer et al. (1988).
Note: The Rest of the World aggregate includes both more and less developed countries. Although
the aggregate variables in ROW are dominated by more developed countries of the OECD, these are
not included with the respective regional aggregates, MDC and LDC. The table above provides the
closest possible match between BLS geographic components and the regions considered by the SRES
story lines.
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Annex 3.1
Changes in Crop-production Potential Versus Increase
in Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations and Related Global
Warming as Predicted by GCMs
Comparisons of results from four General Circulation Models (GCM), the
HadCM3, CSIRO, CGCM2, and NCAR model, have been made for the change
of crop-production potential in relation to changes in atmospheric CO2 concen-
trations and related global warming. The figures presented in this Annex offer
a graphical representation of production change of rain-fed/irrigated rice and the
following rain-fed crop groups: other grains (including maize, sorghum, millet,
barley, rye, and setaria); roots & tubers, pulses, oil crops, and sugar crops. The
production change is expressed as a percentage change in relation to the reference
climate (1961–1990). The results are plotted for, respectively, all land and current
cultivated land, separately for developed and developing countries.
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